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1THE BTWC PROTOCOL:
REVISED PROPOSED COMPLETE TEXT FOR AN INTEGRATED REGIME
 by Graham S. Pearson* , Nicholas A. Sims  , Malcolm R. Dando¤ and Ian R. Kenyon#
Introduction
1.  Completion of a Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is within reach1.  By March 2000,
Evaluation Papers had been prepared and distributed addressing 19 of the 23 Articles in the
draft Protocol and Evaluation Paper no. 17 provided a complete proposed clean text based on
the February 2000 draft Protocol in AHG/50 (Part I)2.
2.   The March Ad Hoc Group session saw a further useful development in that the individual
Friends of the Chair categorized the remaining square brackets in the text for which they are
responsible into three categories:
a.  Category I:  "Little controversy, relatively easy to resolve"
b.  Category II: "Medium level of disagreement"
c.  Category III: "Strong conceptual differences in views".
This categorization was made using the AHG/50 text and was done electronically with the
three categories of square brackets being marked in yellow, green and red respectively.
3.  An analysis of the principal Cat III issues in the Preamble and the 23 Articles of the
Protocol text for which there are "Strong conceptual differences in views" shows that,
although these are interrelated and all are important issues, they can with advantage be
further divided into three groups:
A.  Key Issues
1. Red light/green light initiation procedure for investigations
2. Randomly-selected visits to all declared facilities
3. Thresholds
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24. Modification, particularly to Article I, of the BTWC ( Protocol Art I General 
Provisions, Art II Definitions, Art XI Relationship of the Protocol to the
BTWC)
5. Transfer guidelines (Art III of the BTWC, non-impedance of economic and 
technological development issues)
6.  Cooperation Committee role
7. Biodefence in Art VII of the Protocol
8. Clarification procedures regarding facilities that appear to meet the requirements
for declaration and have not been declared
B.  Other Issues
1.  Declaration Triggers (BL-3, Work with Listed Agents, Other Production Facilities,
Other Facilities, Outbreaks)
2.  Date for initial declarations (1925/1946/1975)
3.  "Testing and evaluation, production" information in declarations
4.  Documentation availability during visits/investigations
5.  Sampling during visits/investigations
6.  Access and Executive Council procedures for visits/investigations
7.  Waiver of immunity for Director-General and Organization for the Prohibition of 
Biological Weapons (OPBW).
C.  Further Issues
1.  Preambular language
2.  Redress situation -- report to UN General Assembly/Security Council
3.  Request for assistance being conditional on a simultaneous request for a field 
investigation.
4.  Seat of the Organization
5.  Executive Council representation from Asia/East Asia and the Pacific/West and 
South Asia
6.  Dispute procedure
7.  Frequency of Review Conferences (5/10 years)
8.  Amendments to Annexes/Appendices
9.  Entry into Force
10.  Reservations
4.  This Evaluation Paper provides a revised proposed complete clean text for the Protocol
which has been revised so as to show how the April 2000 AHG/51 Part I Protocol text3 might
be amended, taking into account the latest Part II proposals4, as well as the FOC Cat III
issues in order to arrive at a final complete text.
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35.  As in Evaluation Paper 175, the proposed text is a consolidation and development from the
previous Evaluation Papers and takes forward the ideas developed therein and in the Briefing
Papers as well as taking into account the further development of the Protocol text in the Ad
Hoc Group.  The Briefing Papers have considered key issues being addressed by the Ad Hoc
Group and have provided additional background information from which an analysis and
appreciation have been developed of how the particular issue might be taken forward.  In this
Evaluation Paper a transparent approach has again been adopted for this clean text in which
the additions to the latest Part I draft Protocol text are shown in bold.  For improved clarity,
as deletions generally occur only where there are additions, deletions are not normally
indicated although the symbol   has been inserted, where appropriate, to mark larger
deletions.
6.  In developing this revised proposed text we continue to recognise that the States Parties to
the BTWC in negotiating the Protocol have different aims and aspirations regarding the
details of what should be incorporated into the eventual Protocol.   The Ad Hoc Group has
now been working for 5 years and since July 1997 in negotiating mode.    By June 2000 it has
held 19 sessions during which all the States Parties have gained an understanding of the
backgrounds to these different aims and aspirations and have, in many areas, identified
compromise measures and language which have been acceptable to the great majority, if not
to all, of the States Parties.  Any international treaty is the result of negotiation and all States
Parties have to seek to accommodate, to the extent possible, the views of other States Parties.
The aim is to arrive at a Protocol that satisfies at least the minimum security and economic
interests of all States Parties.  In this proposed text, we have again sought to introduce
realism and to strike a balance between the different aspirations so as to achieve a worthwhile
and valuable Protocol that will be acceptable to all States Parties as well as meet the majority
of their individual objectives for the Protocol.
7.  The use of deliberate disease as a weapon of war would cause immense damage to
international peace and security and, in a world in which international trade and travel is
becoming ever more important, it is vital to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the
implementation of the BTWC through an effective Protocol, especially as we recognise that
the 21st century is indeed the age of biotechnology which will bring benefits to developed
and developing States worldwide, and if misused, could cause devastating harm and damage.
8.  The requirement is therefore for a Protocol that will indeed strengthen the Convention yet
will not result in an undue burden that is disproportionate to the benefits to peace and
security.   The negotiations over the past three years have seen the development and
elaboration of a Protocol which would indeed be efficient and effective and, through its
various measures, result in an integrated regime which would, over time, build confidence in
compliance between States Parties as well as reinforce the norm that biological weapons are
totally prohibited by all nations.
9.  In preparing this revised proposed complete text, we have continued to adopt the principle
of minimum change.  In other words, "if it isn't broken, don't fix it!"   It is, after all, unhelpful
at this late stage of the negotiations to reopen issues which have been negotiated and have
resulted in Part I text that is free from square brackets.   However, where there are areas
where we judge that the Protocol language has been over-elaborated to such an extent that the
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4Protocol is unduly restrictive and will, in our view, inhibit its effective implementation, then
we have proposed amendments.   We have also proposed amendments in a few places where
in our judgement there is still a risk of the Protocol being too weak.  We also recognise that
there are a number of areas in which there are political realities which require certain
elements to be incorporated into the Protocol in order to arrive at a complete text acceptable
to all States Parties even though from a strictly technical point of view, these additional
elements may contribute little to the effectiveness of the overall regime.   Finally, we have
offered occasional amendments for clarification of meaning where this remains obscure, and
for internal consistency of expression within the Protocol.
10.  In this Evaluation Paper, we first set out, in an introductory section, the overall approach
that we have adopted in regard to the FOC Cat III "strong conceptual differences in views"
issues.  The text that has been assigned to Category III wherever it has been reproduced in the
introductory section is highlighted in bold and, although the categorization was carried out by
the FOCs using the Protocol text in AHG/50 (Part I), the location of the Cat III language in
the latest Protocol text in AHG/51 (Part I) is provided for convenience.   The introductory
section is then followed by the proposed complete text which is based on the April 2000
AHG/51 (Part I) Protocol text.  Footnotes inserted at the relevant point in the text indicate
why particular language has been proposed.   Reference is made in these footnotes, as
appropriate, to the previous Evaluation Papers and to the Briefing Papers which are all
available at the University of Bradford website at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
Category III Issues "Strong Conceptual Differences in Views"
11.  These issues are considered in the three groups identified in paragraph 3 above.
A.  Key Issues
12. Red Light/Green Light Initiation Procedure for Investigations.   The Cat III language
occurs in paragraph 26 of Article III. G subsection (F) on page 82 of AHG/51 and reads as
follows:
26. The investigation shall proceed [in the case of a request for a facility
investigation] [if formally approved by at least a [two-thirds] [three-quarters]
majority [present and voting] of the Executive Council] [unless the Executive
Council decides by a three-quarters majority of [all] its members [present and
voting] against carrying out the investigation] [and, in the case of a request for a
field investigation, if formally approved by a simple majority of the Executive
Council members present and voting].
Investigations are the ultimate measure in the Protocol and, on the very rare occasions when
they are requested, they do need to take place.   These should have the presumption that they
will occur6 -- and the safeguards against abuse will be provided both by the Executive
Council voting to stop an investigation and by the Executive Council deciding on redress
should it conclude that there has been abuse.  The reality is that such investigations -- as with
challenge inspections or investigations of alleged use under the Chemical Weapons
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5Convention (CWC) -- will be extremely infrequent -- and provisions already in the text,
which mirror those in the CWC, to protect against abuse will suffice.  Consequently, a red
light initiation procedure is vital to ensure that the Protocol regime is a strong one.  A simple
green light initiation procedure is not equivalent to a simple red light procedure as the
presumption is quite different -- and it continues to be apparent from the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) experience under the CWC that a red light
procedure provides a strong regime.
13. Randomly-Selected Visits to All Declared Facilities.  The Cat III language occurs in
paragraph 11 of Article III D. Subsection II on page 42 of AHG/51 and relates to two points -
- first regarding the facilities to receive the randomly selected visits "to [declared]
[biodefence and BL4] facilities."  and second regarding the purpose of these visits and
whether these are [Promoting accuracy of declarations] [Promoting the accurate fulfilment
of the declaration obligations under this Protocol].   Infrequent randomly-selected visits to
all declared facilities are necessary to ensure that declaration obligations are consistently
fulfilled.7  If such visits were to be limited to biodefence and BL-4 facilities then there would
be very few visits to the majority of States Parties.   The consequence would be that, should
there be an investigation in one of those States Parties which has never been visited by the
Technical Secretariat, there is a greater probability that the investigations may reach an
incorrect conclusion because of a lack of understanding of the approaches to microbiology
and biotechnology in that country.   In addition, in regard to visits, it needs to be recognized
that the frequency of such visits will be controlled effectively by the Conference of the States
Parties through their annual scrutiny and approval  of the programme and budget of the
Protocol Organization, and it is unnecessary in the Protocol, as in the CWC, to specify an
overall limit for the number of visits, of whatever type.  Indeed, specification of such a limit
in the Articles of the Protocol would be unwise as it would reduce flexibility and further it is
inefficient as it removes any incentive for the future Organization to optimize its operations.
Additional visibility of the planned visits could be achieved through the Director-General,
every three months, notifying the Executive Council of the overall plan of visits for the
forthcoming three months;  the overall plan should not include sufficient detail to enable
States Parties to identify which States Parties would receive a visit in the next quarter.
14. Thresholds.  The Cat III language relating to thresholds includes all the language in
Article III. C on pages 27 to 28 of AHG/51 and in Annex A.III on pages 159 to 163. Because
of the nature of microorganisms and the ease with which they can be grown, there is less
technical justification for thresholds in the BTWC Protocol than in the CWC.8   However, as
in the CWC, there is a need for quantitative information in the declarations made under the
Protocol and there are therefore quantitative thresholds that will need to be exceeded in order
for a declaration to be required.   Consequently, reference has been included, where
appropriate, to the need for declarations when the stated threshold capacities have been
exceeded.  There is no requirement, however, for the determination of individual thresholds
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6for individual agents and toxins nor is there any requirement for the exceeding of a threshold
to be notified to the Organization.
15. Modification, particularly to Article I, of the BTWC (Protocol Art I General
Provisions, Art II Definitions, Art XI Relationship of the Protocol to the BTWC).   The Cat
III language relates to several elements of Article I General Provisions on page 14 of
AHG/51, to definitions of biological and toxin weapons in Article II Definitions on page 16
and to the relationship of the Protocol to the Convention in paragraph 1 of Article XI -- This
Protocol being [supplementary][and][additional] to the Convention.   The mandate for the
Ad Hoc Group is to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the
Convention through the consideration of appropriate measures, including possible
verification measures, to strengthen the Convention to be included, as appropriate, in a
legally binding instrument.   It is clear that the Ad Hoc Group has a mandate to develop a
Protocol to strengthen the Convention -- but does not have a mandate to amend the
Convention.  Consequently, it is beyond the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group to propose
language within the body of the Protocol which in any way amends the scope of the
Convention.   It is appropriate for the Preamble to set the Protocol in the wider framework of
the Convention and its Review Conferences but care needs to be taken within the Protocol --
such as in Article I General Provisions, Article II Definitions or Article XI Relationship of the
Protocol to the Convention -- not to amend the scope of the Convention.   The place for
considering an extended understanding of the Convention is in the Review Conferences of
the Convention where such extended understandings can be and are reflected in the Final
Declaration.
16.  In respect of Article II Definitions there has long been a divergence of views as to what
should be defined and what should not.  There is general recognition that care needs to be
taken to ensure that nothing in the Protocol might be perceived as modifying in any way the
basic prohibitions in Article I of the Convention.  There is also broad agreement that in order
to avoid ambiguity there is a need for definition of some of the terms used in the language
relating to the provision of declarations and in other measures.   The approach adopted has
been to limit definitions and objective criteria to those necessary for an unambiguous and
effective Protocol.  This is in accord with the mandate requirement for the consideration of
definitions and objective criteria where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen
the Convention. We have retained some definitions in Article II and have transferred most of
the definitions to a new subsection I to Annex A.   As for the relationship in Article XI of the
Protocol, we see no necessity to use either "supplementary" or "additional" and alternative
language avoiding this is proposed.
17.  Transfer Guidelines (Art III of The BTWC, Non-Impedance of Economic and
Technological Development Issues).   The Cat III language relates to several elements of
Article III. F. Measures to Strengthen the Implementation of Article III (of the Convention)
on page 73 to 75 of AHG/51 as well as to language in Article VII Section (C) referring to
maintainance of discriminatory measures or restrictions.  As the mandate of the Ad Hoc
Group is to consider measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the
implementation of the Convention it is both appropriate and necessary to consider measures
to strengthen Article III of the Convention.   It needs to be appreciated that in order to permit
a transfer, the State making a transfer will need to have confidence that the transfer to a State
Party to the Protocol is:
a.  only being used for permitted purposes;
7b.  not being retransferred, without approval, to another facility within the receiving
State Party; or
c.  not being retransferred, without approval, to another State Party to the Protocol.
The requirements are thus three.  First, that there should be transparency as to what the
transferred materials and equipment are being used for.  Secondly, that there should be
national internal controls on the facilities within a State Party to the Protocol in which
particular agents are handled and on transfers between such facilities.   Thirdly, that there
should be national controls of interstate transfers from the State Party to the Protocol to
other States Parties. The Protocol regime will establish minimum standards for transfers and
it will be a matter for individual States as to whether they decide that they need to adopt and
implement higher standards.   It is recognized that over time after the entry into force of the
Protocol for the requesting State, the State making the transfer should gain greater
transparency of activities in the requesting State together with greater confidence that the
requesting State has indeed the appropriate national internal and interstate controls both in
place and in operation  and thus the transfer is more likely to be approved.  Such confidence
will over time decrease in regard to States not party to the Protocol and it is evident from the
CWC experience that a regime in which transfers to non-States Parties to the Protocol
become increasingly controlled and prohibited both contributes to enhancing the safety and
security of States Parties to the Protocol and provides a strong incentive for non-States
Parties to become party to the Protocol.9
18.   Cooperation Committee Role.   Whilst there is general agreement about the
establishment of the Cooperation Committee, there is Cat III language in respect of some
aspects relating to the Committee.  Thus, in Art VII, para 13 on page 103 there is language
that:
[13. [The Committee shall be open to all States Parties] [The members of the
Committee shall be elected for a term of two years, on the basis of an equitable
geographical distribution, in accordance with Article IX, paragraph ... of this
Protocol].]
[13 bis  The Committee shall be a pluridisciplinary body open to the participation of
all States Parties and shall comprise government representatives competent in the
relevant fields of expertise.  The Committee may establish working groups on an ad
hoc basis.]
and in para 15 on the same page that:
15. The chairmanship of the Committee shall rotate annually between each
regional group, as defined in Article IX, paragraph ..., represented in the Committee.
[Decisions shall be taken [by consensus] [in the same manner as decisions by the
[Conference of State Parties] [Executive Council], in accordance with Article IX,
paragraph ...].] [Recommendations shall be agreed by consensus.]
19.  A Cooperation Committee open to the participation of all States Parties would rapidly
become unwieldy as the number of States Parties to the Protocol grew.  It is therefore
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8appropriate to require membership to be drawn on an equitable geographical basis from
among the States Parties to the Protocol.  The requirement that the Committee be a
pluridisciplinary  body comprising government representatives competent in the relevant
fields of expertise is a statement of the obvious as States Parties can be expected to appoint
appropriate representatives -- after all, there is quite correctly no comparable specification for
members of the Conference of the State Parties or for the Executive Council.  As to decisions
and recommendations, these should be taken by consensus.
20.  Biodefence in Art VII of the Protocol.   The Cat III language is in respect of all
mentions of biodefence in Article VII.  The measures in Article VII Scientific and
Technological Exchange for Peaceful Purposes and Technical Cooperation are an important
part of the Protocol contributing both to promoting technical cooperation between States
Parties to the Protocol and to increasing transparency and enhancing confidence in
compliance.10   The breadth of activities covered in Article VII including surveillance and
countering of infectious diseases, biosafety and good manufacturing practice is welcomed as
it is recognized that the infrastructure required by States Parties to carry out such activities
will indeed, over time, lead to increased transparency and enhanced confidence.11
Nevertheless, it is important to avoid unnecessary duplication and for the Protocol
Organization to concentrate on those measures for which it is particularly well fitted.  It is
inappropriate to address biodefence related activities in Article VII although in Article VI, it
is appropriate to note that the States Parties may  benefit from scientific and technological
exchanges pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol, including Article VII thereof.
21.  Clarification Procedures Regarding Facilities that Appear to Meet the
Requirements for Declaration and Have Not Been Declared.  The Cat III language
appears in paragraphs 52 and 56 of Article III. D. II subsection (B) on pages 53 and 54 of
AHG/51 and again in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article III. E on pages 70 and 71.   There is a
need for a non-controversial, non-confrontational and non-accusatory clarification procedure
in respect of any ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission in declarations whether of
declared facilities and/or activities or of facilities and/or activities which should have been
declared.  Such clarification requests should be initiated by the Protocol Organization or at
the request of a State Party.  It is evident from the OPCW experience that there are numerous
occasions on which clarification is needed of information provided in declarations received
from States Parties.12  Indeed, the Director-General of the OPCW in his address13 to the Fifth
Conference of the States Parties on 15 May 2000 spoke of "... certain implementation-related
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9inconsistencies and technicalities which, unfortunately, continue to occur.  However, they are
being addressed and corrected."  The vast majority of these ambiguities, uncertainties,
anomalies or omissions are resolved through correspondence or consultation with the State
Party concerned.  A visit to the facility and/or activity concerned may well be the most
efficient and effective way of resolving the ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission.
However, should a State Party consider that it has taken all reasonable steps to clarify the
ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission then it can refuse the proposed clarification
visit.  Such refusals should be reported to the Executive Council.    We recommend that
declaration clarification procedures should apply both to declared facilities and/or activities
and to facilities and/or activities that the Protocol Organization or a State Party believe
appear to meet the requirements for declaration and have not been declared.  Such procedures
will add significantly to the increase of confidence by States Parties over time that other
States Parties are in compliance with the Protocol. Consequently, resolution of such
ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies or omissions from declarations should not become
blurred into the C3 (Clarification, Consultation and Cooperation) process of Article III. E
which should be reserved as the first stage in addressing non-compliance concerns.
B.  Other Issues
22.  Declaration Triggers (BL-3, Work with Listed Agents, Other Production Facilities,
Other Facilities, Outbreaks).  A balance has to be struck between those facilities of most
relevance to the Convention and facilities of some relevance to the Convention.  In
considering declaration triggers and the associated declaration formats in Appendices A, B
and C it is important to bear in mind the information available from the BTWC Confidence-
Building Measures14 on the numbers of biological defence facilities, maximum containment
(BL-4) facilities and vaccine production facilities around the world as this gives a useful
indication, even though only about half the States Parties have provided information, of
which triggers and declaration formats will capture information from a greater number of
States Parties.   This information, based on the 1997 CBM responses, is provided in tabular
form below:
State Party
Biological
defence
facility
Maximum
containment
(BL-4)
Vaccine
production
facility
Argentina 7
Australia 1 3 1
Austria 1 1
Belarus 1
Belgium 1
Brazil 8
Bulgaria 1
Canada 1 2 2
China 1 7
Cuba 2 2
Czech Republic 2 3
                                                
14Iris Hunger, Article V: Confidence Building Measures, in Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R. Dando (eds),
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of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, September 1996.  Available on http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc  Iris
Hunger, Private communication, June 2000, Max Delbruck Centre for Molecular Medicine, Berlin.
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State Party
Biological
defence
facility
Maximum
containment
(BL-4)
Vaccine
production
facility
Denmark 1
Finland 2 3 1
France 1 5 4
Germany 2 4 4
Hungary 3
India 1 19
Iraq 3
Italy 1 1 9
Japan 2 11
Mongolia 1 1
Netherlands 1 2 2
Norway 1 4
Poland 1 4
Romania 2
Russia 9 2 16
Slovak Republic 2 1
South Africa 1 2
South Korea 7
Spain 1 1 10
Sweden 1 2 1
Switzerland 2 1
Turkey 4
Ukraine 3
United Kingdom 1 6 4
United States 19 3 11
Total Number of Facilities 43 49 162
Total Number of Countries 15 22 36
From this, it is evident that biological defence facilities are only likely to be declared in a
small number of countries (15), and that the addition of maximum containment facilities only
increases the number of countries by six.    It is only when vaccine production facilities are
considered that the number of countries increases by another 15 to a total of 36.   Given the
Protocol objective of increasing transparency and building confidence between States Parties,
triggers such as "Other Production Facilities" and "Work with Listed Agents and Toxins" are
necessary in order to increase the distribution and spread of relevant declared facilities both
within these countries and to additional countries.
The declaration triggers that are currently assigned to Cat. III are the following:
a.  BL-3 facilities. The focus on containment facilities is seen as basically flawed as
containment standards are primarily a manifestation of the more developed countries
within which there is generally a developed national infrastructure which will monitor
and inspect such maximum containment facilities.  It is also a fact that countries
which have in the past developed offensive biological weapons have done so without
11
using containment facilities.   Nevertheless, it is recognized that there is a perception
that the capabilities in maximum containment (BL-4) facilities might be misused and
therefore should be subject to appropriate compliance monitoring.  However, we
consider that high containment(BL-3) alone should not be a trigger for declarations
and we have therefore deleted this as a stand-alone trigger.
b.  Work with Listed Agents.  There is a need for the declaration of facilities
working on listed agents and toxins that also have one or more of the following
characteristics:
i.  A certain scale of production capability
ii.  Work on certain types of genetic modification
iii.  Work on aerosolization.
c. Other Production Facilities. It would be illogical to require declaration of vaccine
production facilities and not to require declaration of other production facilities
although the requirement for declaration needs to be precise so that only the most
relevant facilities are declared.
d. Other Facilities.  There is a need for the declaration of facilities which
i.  Possessed aerosol test chambers for work with microorganisms and toxins
ii. Possessed equipment for aerosol dissemination in the open air with a
particle mass median diameter not greater than 10 microns
iii.  Conducted genetic modification within a high containment facility (BL-3)
to enhance pathogenicity, virulence, stability or resistance to antibiotics or
which altered the host range, the infection route or the ease of identification or
diagnosis.
This declaration trigger might be combined with the trigger on work with listed agents
and toxins.
e.  Disease Outbreaks. There is a clear requirement for the future Protocol
Organization to have background information on human, animal and plant disease
profiles around the world.   It is also apparent that information on outbreaks of disease
is increasingly being reported both officially and unofficially at the national, regional
and international level.15   It is also evident that there is considerable variation
between States in which diseases are reported nationally, regionally and
internationally.  Consequently, a requirement for States Parties to report on outbreaks
of disease to the future BTWC Organization would necessarily result in different
reports from different countries because of the different national reporting systems
and would also be an unnecessary duplication of existing reporting systems.   Our
recommendation is that States Parties under the Protocol should be encouraged to
improve their disease surveillance systems and their national, regional and
international reporting of such information to organizations such as the WHO, FAO
                                                
15Briefing Papers No. 21, Outbreaks of Disease: Current Official Reporting, April 1999, No. 23, BTWC
Security Implications of Human, Animal and Plant Epidemiology, July 1999  and No. 24, Outbreaks of Disease:
Current European Reporting, September 1999 have described current official disease surveillance reporting.
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and OIE.   In addition, provision of copies of such disease surveillance information, to
the extent possible, to the future Protocol Organization would be encouraged.
It should be noted that in its consideration of Declaration Formats in the Appendices to the
Protocol, the Ad Hoc Group is engaged in far more detailed elaboration than in the
negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention where the detailed declaration formats
were addressed in the PrepCom phase.
23.  Date for Initial Declarations (1925/1946/1975).   The draft Protocol contains
alternative dates -- 17 Jun 1925 (the date of signature of the Geneva Protocol), 1 January
1946 (the date agreed by the States Parties at the Third Review Conferences for the
information to be provided under the Confidence-Building Measures) and 26 March 1975
(the date of Entry into Force of the BTWC) -- for the initial declaration of past offensive
programmes and  an even wider range of dates -- of 1 January 1946, 26 March 1975, the date
of Entry into Force for a State after 26 March 1975, 31 December 1991 and five years prior
to the first annual declaration for that State Party -- for the initial declaration of past
defensive programmes.   In considering these dates, it is important to recognise why these
declarations of past offensive and defensive programmes are required -- to build confidence
between and increase transparency within States Parties to the Protocol.  As the States Parties
to the Convention have already agreed that information shall be provided on both past
offensive and past defensive programmes since 1 January 1946, and States Parties are already
politically bound to provide this information, there is much logically to be said for adopting
the same date, 1 January 1946, for the Protocol initial declarations.   To adopt any later dates
would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol whilst there is no
compelling argument for the earlier date of 17 June 1925 especially given the uncertainty that
information would be available in full from that earlier date.   It is therefore recommended
that the date of 1 January 1946 be adopted for the initial declarations and that, as has been the
case with the information provided under the Confidence-Building Measures, individual
States Parties can provide earlier information where that is available thereby providing a
more complete appreciation of the past offensive and defensive programmes.
24.  Testing and Evaluation, Production Information in Declarations.   Whilst there is
general agreement that research and development activities should be declared under the
initial declarations of past offensive and defensive programmes and/or activities and under
current declarations of defensive programmes and/or activities, there is Cat III language
where the words "testing or evaluation, and production" occurs in the requirements for
these declarations as for example in paragraph 7 (b) of Article III. D. subsection I on page 31
of AHG/51.  This general agreement on the declaration of research and development
activities reflects the agreement that such declarations should be made under the politically-
binding Confidence-Building Measures agreed by the States Parties at the Second and Third
Review Conferences.  As the purpose of all the declarations in the Protocol is to increase
transparency in and confidence between States Parties, it is illogical to provide incomplete
information on past offensive and defensive programmes and on current defensive
programmes.  The information provided should cover all the activities within these past and
current programmes as comprehensive and complete information is vital to increasing
transparency and assuring other States Parties that activities within a State Party are for
permitted purposes.   However, the requirement for such comprehensive and complete
information should be tailored so as to provide transparency and to build confidence -- it does
not require and should not seek, for example, information about detailed performance
capabilities of current biodefence equipment.
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25.   Documentation Availability During Visits/Investigations.   There are differences in
views about the availability of documentation during visits and investigations.  For example,
in respect of randomly-selected visits, there is Cat III language in Article III D. II in
paragraph 38(c) on page 50 of AHG/51 that the visiting team may:
[(c) Examine, with the consent of the visited State Party, documentation relevant
to the mandate in order to facilitate the visiting team’s understanding of the
activities being conducted at the declared facility.  The visited State Party shall
endeavour to provide such documentation, or to provide alternative means to
address the questions of the visiting team if provision of any documentation is
denied;]
In the context of facility investigations, there is Cat III language in Annex D. III para 47 on
page 201 of AHG/51 that:
[47. If specific issues arise during the investigation, which in the opinion of the
investigation team could be resolved by the examination of specific documentation
and records not available at the investigated facility, the investigation team may
request the receiving State Party to provide access to these specific documents and
records for review at the investigated facility in accordance with the provisions of
Article III, section G, subsection G.]
26. As visits are non-confrontational measures aimed at building understanding and
confidence, it is counter-productive to introduce elements that may impede the achievement
of such goals.  The language in the Protocol in paragraph 38 (c) is helpful in that it enables
the visiting team to maximize the benefits from the visit whilst enabling the visited State
Party to provide alternative means if, for some reason, it decides not to provide the
documentation.
27.  Insofar as the documentation in the context of facility investigations is concerned, it is in
the interests of the investigated State Party to do all that it can to resolve any issues that arise
during an investigation -- and the provisions in Article III, section G, subsection G include
the option for the investigated State Party to provide alternative means should it decide not to
provide full access to information.
28.  Sampling During Visits/Investigations.  There are differences again in regard to
sampling in both visits and investigations.  In respect of visits, there is Cat III language in
Article III D. II in paragraph 38(h) on page 50 of AHG/51 that:
[(h) Sampling shall not be conducted unless offered by the visited State Party
and visited facility personnel and deemed useful by the visiting team.  Any mutually
agreed sampling and analysis shall be performed by facility personnel in the
presence of the visiting team and representatives of the visited State Party.  The
visiting team shall not seek to remove samples from the facility.]
In respect of investigations, differences are in respect of the detail regarding precisely where
analysis of a sample shall take place -- thus there is Cat III language in Annex D I para 18 on
page 170 regarding [Analysis [of a part of a sample] should, whenever possible, be carried
out on the territory of the receiving State Party], in Annex D II Field Investigations para 42
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on page 186 regarding Analysis [of one of the sealed duplicate samples referred to in
paragraph 40] shall, whenever possible be carried out on the territory of the receiving State
Party, in Annex D. II para 45 on page 187 regarding samples shall be analysed in two
designated and certified laboratories [in different States Parties] and in Annex D. III
Facility Investigations para 54 on page 203 regarding Where possible a sample [shall][may
also] be analysed in an accredited and certified laboratory on the territory of the receiving
State Party.
29.  Sampling is unlikely to be necessary or appropriate in the course of visits and the
language in Article III D. II paragraph 38 (c)  is therefore reasonable.  In the case of
investigations, it is of crucial importance that the analytical results of samples shall be
unequivocal and thus that the samples shall be analysed blind in designated and accredited
laboratories in at least two States Parties with the possibility of further samples being
analysed in a designated and accredited laboratory in a third State Party should the results
from the first analyses be inconsistent.   It is unsound and imprudent to suggest that samples
from an investigation be analysed only in a designated and accredited laboratory in the
receiving State Party -- and this would not be in the interests of the States Parties to the
Protocol as it could bring the Protocol into disrepute.
30.  In the context of sampling and analysis, attempts in the Protocol text to set deadlines, for
example, for the carrying out of the analysis in the designated and certified laboratories in
separate States Parties of samples taken during investigations are unwise as there can be no
certainty that these designated and certified laboratories will have the capacity available to
carry out these sample analyses within a set time.  The Protocol regime will fall into disrepute
if the analysis of samples is not carried out using the highest international standards.
31.  Access and Executive Council Procedures for Visits/Investigations.   There is Cat III
language at various points in Article III and in Annex D relating to access, to the report of the
visit/investigation and to Executive Council procedures.   Thus, there is Cat III language in
Art III D. II para 32 (f) on page 48 of AHG/51 that the visiting team shall:
[(f) Have the right to state the relevance of questions asked by the visiting team
and objected to by the visited State Party; the team leader may ask the visited State
Party to reconsider its objection.  The visiting team may note in the final report any
refusal to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered without any
justification given for any such refusal by the visited State Party.]
in paragraph 46 on page 52 that:
[The draft report shall also include an account of the degree and nature of access
and the cooperation provided by the visited State Party in order to fulfil the visit
mandate.]
and in paragraph 49 on page 52 that:
[The Director-General may, with the consent of the visited State Party, provide
copies of the final report, on request, to any other State Party.]  [The Director-
General shall, as a rule, provide copies of the final report, on request, to any other
State Party, taking into account the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 4 (d)
[, unless otherwise indicated by the visited State Party].]
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32.  Likewise in Art III. G para 46 on page 86, regarding access during investigations there is
language that:
[46. The investigation team may, during the course of the investigation, request
the receiving State Party to provide access to a facility, building or other structure
as objects of investigation within the area(s) designated for investigation [if the field
investigation mandate already specifies that access to such a facility, building or
other structure may be required, or] if access is required in order to fulfil the field
investigation mandate.  The investigation team shall, together with its request for
access, provide the receiving State Party with information substantiating its request.
and in para 54 on page 87 regarding the review by the Executive Council of the final report
of an investigation there is language that:
[54. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and functions as
determined in Article IX, section C, review and consider the final report of the
investigation team as soon as it is presented, and address [and decide on] any
concern as to whether:
(a) Any non-compliance has occurred;
(b) The request had been in accordance with the provisions of this
Protocol;
(c) The right to request an investigation has been abused.]
33.  The access provided during visits and investigations is a crucial element of the Protocol
regime as it is through access that transparency is demonstrated and confidence is built that
the receiving State Party is in compliance with the Protocol and the Convention provisions.
There are adequate provisions already in the Protocol to protect commercial proprietary
information or national security information enabling the receiving State Party to use
alternative means to meet the requirements of the visiting or investigating teams.  It is
important that the reports of visits and investigations include factual accounts of the access
provided by the receiving State Party as this will facilitate the accurate appreciation by other
States Parties of the effectiveness of the Protocol regime and, over time, build confidence.  It
should also be recalled that there are extensive provisions enabling the receiving State Party
to review the report of the visit or investigation and to comment upon that report so that any
inaccuracies can be readily countered and corrected.   Consequently, reports of visits and
investigations should be made available to other States Parties as it is through such reports
that transparency is increased and confidence is built that the regime is being applied
effectively and equitably to all States Parties.
34.  Waiver of Immunity for the Director-General and the OPBW.   There is Cat III
language in Article IV Confidentiality Provisions in para 6 on page 93 of AHG/51 that
In case of breaches of confidentiality, the immunity of [the Director-General and] the
staff members of the Technical Secretariat [as well as the immunity of the
Organization] may be waived in accordance with the provisions on privileges and
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immunities contained in Article IX of this Protocol and the agreement referred to in
paragraph 49 of that Article.
We recommend that the provisions for waiver of immunity for the Organization or the
Director-General should be deleted as to retain such language is tantamount to an expression
of no confidence in either the Organization or the Director-General.  Absence of an explicit
provision for waiver of the immunity of the Organization or the Director-General does not
prevent the Conference of the States Parties from taking such action at some future date
should it judge that this was necessary.
C.  Further Issues
35.  Preambular language.   There is Cat III language in two places in the Preamble.  The
first is in paragraphs (9) and (10) on page 11 of AHG/51
[(9) Determined to achieve effective progress toward the prohibition and
complete elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,
(10) Determined also to achieve effective progress toward general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control,]
OR
[(9+10)  Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress toward
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
including the prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction,]
and the second in paragraph (23) on page 12
(23) Convinced that to contribute as effectively as possible to the prevention of [the
proliferation of] [weapons of mass destruction, including] biological and toxin
weapons, and thereby to enhance international peace and security, all States Parties
to the Convention should become States Parties to this Protocol,
Our view, for the reasons developed in Evaluation Paper No. 1516, Preamble, March 2000, is
that paragraphs (9) and (10) are acceptable as they stand as they are closely similar to the
preambular language in the CWC and the BTWC and that the combined (9+10) could
disappear.  The reference to complete elimination in paragraph (9) should now be more
acceptable following the 2000 NPT Review Conference which in the Final Document17 in
subpara 6 to paragraph 15 records
6.  An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all
States Parties are committed under Article VI.
                                                
16Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Preamble, Evaluation Paper No. 15, University of Bradford, March
2000.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
17Arms Control Today, 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, Vol. 30, No. 5, pp. 28-34, June 2000.
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following the statement18 by the five nuclear weapons States in which they state that:
We reiterate our unequivocal commitment to the ultimate goals of the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective control.
Insofar as paragraph (23) is concerned our recommendation, as in Evaluation Paper No. 15, is
that this should be strengthened to read as follows:
(23) Convinced that to contribute as effectively as possible to the prohibition and
complete elimination of biological and toxin weapons, and thereby to enhance
international peace and security, all States Parties to the Convention should become
States Parties to this Protocol,
36.  Redress Situation -- Report to UN General Assembly/Security Council.  In Article V
Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance there is Cat III language in
paragraph 4 on page 94 of AHG/51 concerning which United Nations body the issue should
be brought to:
4. The Conference or, alternatively, if the case is particularly grave and urgent,
the Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and
conclusions, to the attention of the [General Assembly [and] [or] the Security
Council of the] [relevant organs of the] United Nations.
Our view is that it should be brought to both the General Assembly and the Security Council
in exactly the same way as for the CWC.
37.  Request for Assistance being Conditional on a Simultaneous Request for a Field
Investigation.    In Article VI Assistance and Protection against Biological and Toxin
Weapons there is Cat. III language in paragraph 9 on page 96 of AHG/51 which makes a
request for assistance effectively conditional on a similar request for a field investigation.
[Requests for assistance when a State Party considers that biological or toxin
weapons have been used against it shall [not be considered or otherwise acted upon
by the Director-General or the Executive Council unless a field investigation
request from the State Party making the Article VI request is submitted] [also be
accompanied, either simultaneously or within [12] hours, by a request for a field
investigation pursuant to Article III, section G].]
As there is no parallel requirement in the CWC, it is not apparent why assistance under the
Protocol should be conditional.   There is a failure to recognise that a State Party may well
require assistance at a much earlier time, well before it has sufficient information to request a
field investigation.    Our advice is that this conditional linkage should disappear.
38.  Seat of Organization.  Article IX The Organization has paragraph 3 on page 112 of
AHG/51 which states that 3.  The seat of the Organization shall be ... as Cat III language as
                                                
18United Nations, Letter dated 1 May 2000 from the representatives of France, the People's Republic of China,
the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America addressed to the President of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2000/21, 1 May 2000.
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two bids from the Netherlands for The Hague and from Switzerland for Geneva have been
lodged.   The detailed bids have not yet been called for and, until these are provided, it is
uncertain where the seat of the future Organization will be located.
39.  Executive Council representation from Asia/East Asia and the Pacific/West and
South Asia.  The alternatives in paragraph 23 (b) of Article IX on page 116 for ... States
Parties from Asia or ... States Parties from East Asia and the Pacific or ... States Parties from
West and South Asia are all shown as Cat III language.   This is primarily a matter for the
countries in the region to resolve.
40.  Dispute Procedure.  In Article XII Settlement of Disputes there is Cat III language,
highlighted in bold below, in paragraph 2 on page 128 concerning the procedure to address
disputes:
The parties to a dispute [shall] [may] inform the Executive Council of the
commencement of consultations, and shall keep the Executive Council informed of the
actions being taken [and their outcomes].
Our recommendation is that in parallel with the CWC Article XIV requirement that the States
Parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being taken it would be
logical under the Protocol to require that the parties shall inform the Executive Council of the
commencement of their consultations and shall also inform the Executive Council of the
outcomes.
41.  Frequency of Review Conferences (5/10 years).  In Article XIII Review of the
Protocol, the alternatives of [5][10] years for the convening of the first Review Conference
and the frequency of subsequent Review Conferences are shown as Cat III language.  Our
view is that the first Review of the Protocol should occur within 5 years after entry into force
and subsequent Review Conferences should occur at 5 year intervals because this frequency
has worked well for the BTWC and is also being used for the CWC -- and a first Review
Conference after 5 years is clearly not being regarded as too soon in the context of the
CWC19.
42.  Amendments to Annexes/Appendices.  There is Cat. III language in Article XIV
Amendments in both paragraph 1 and in paragraph 4 on page 130 regarding proposals for
changes in the technical sense of a simplified procedure, distinct from amendments, to
Annexes and Appendices of the Protocol:
[1. Any time after the entry into force of this Protocol any State Party may
propose amendments to this Protocol or its Annexes or Appendices.  Any State Party
may also propose changes, in accordance with paragraph 4, to [the Annexes and
Appendices of this Protocol] [specified parts of this Protocol or its Annexes or to its
Appendices].
and
                                                
19Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Opening Statement by the Director-General to the
Conference of the States Parties at its Fifth Session, C-V/DG.11, 15 May 2000.  Available at
http://www.opcw.org
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4. In order to assure the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol, provisions in
[sections ... of the Annexes and Appendices] [the Appendices, sections … of the
Annexes, and those sections of Article III, section D, which are so identified in that
Article,] shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 5, if the proposed
changes are related only to matters of a technical or administrative nature.
Our recommendation is that changes in this sense of a simplified procedure, distinct from
amendments, should apply only to specified parts of the Protocol or its Annexes and
Appendices, that all changes to Section I Lists and Criteria (Agents and Toxins) of Annex A
should be made in accordance with paragraph 5 (thereby paralleling the CWC Article XV
provisions in respect of the CWC Annex on Chemicals) and that changes should not apply to
Annex D or to section I of Annex E (thereby paralleling the CWC Article XV provisions
excluding parts of the Verification and the Confidentiality Annexes from the simplified
procedure for changes).
43.  Entry into Force.   There is Cat III language Article XX Entry into Force in paragraph 1
on page 137  regarding the conditions for entry into force:
1. This Protocol shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments
of ratification by [45] [50] [65] [75] [...] States [, including the Governments of the
Depositaries of the Convention,] [having advanced biological capabilities and
technologies listed in Annex ...] but not earlier than two years after its opening for
signature.
The paramount need is to achieve the earliest possible entry into force of the Protocol so that
the strengthening of the regime can begin to benefit from the operation of the Organization.
A requirement for a large number of ratification instruments before entry into force would
delay the strengthening of the regime.  With the Organization in existence, with full authority
to implement and promote the Protocol, in accordance with Article IX, the Protocol in our
judgement will gather momentum and the number of States Parties will increase significantly
as confidence grows in the Organization and its operations.  We therefore favour a simple
numerical condition for entry into force, with no requirement for particular ratifications
within this number, which should be kept low.  Our recommendation is thus that paragraph 1
should read as follows:
1. This Protocol shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments
of ratification by 20 States but not earlier than two years after its opening for
signature.
44.  Reservations.   There is Cat III language in Article XXI Reservations on page 138  as
follows:
[The Articles of this Protocol [shall not be subject to reservations] [incompatible
with its object and purpose or that of the Convention].  The Annexes and
Appendices of this Protocol [shall not be subject to reservations] [incompatible with
its object and purpose or that of the Convention].]
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Our advice is based on Evaluation Paper No. 6, Article XXI: Reservations, September 1999 as
further developed in Evaluation Paper No. 1720 when we recommended the following
language for Article XXI:
The Articles of and the Annexes and Appendices to this Protocol shall not be subject
to reservations.  In addition, no exceptions or conditions, however phrased or
named, including interpretative statements or declarations, which purport to
exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Articles and the Annexes
and Appendices to this Protocol in their application to any State, may be made by
any State upon signing, ratifying or acceding to this Protocol.
The additional final sentence is necessary in order to prevent, as comprehensively as possible,
any attempt to circumvent the ban on reservations by means of statements, declarations,
exceptions or conditions which similarly purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of any
part of the Protocol in its application to any State.
Proposed Complete Text
45.  The proposed complete text has been prepared to show how the April 2000 (AHG/51)
Part I Protocol text might be amended to arrive at a final complete text.   The proposals for
further consideration made in the April 2000 (AHG/51) Part II text have been taken into
account along with the amendments proposed in the previous Evaluation Papers in arriving at
the complete text.  Particular attention has been paid to language which had been categorized
by the FOC as being in Cat. III "strong conceptual differences in views".  New language is
shown in bold and footnotes, where appropriate, explain the basis for the amended language.
46.  The objective of the revised complete text is to introduce realism and to strike a balance
between the different aspirations of the individual States Parties so as to arrive at an
integrated, worthwhile and valuable Protocol that will be both acceptable to all States Parties,
bring significant benefits to all States Parties and meet the majority, if not all, of their
individual objectives for the Protocol.
                                                
20Evaluation Paper No. 17, The BTWC Protocol: Proposed Complete Text For An Integrated Regime, March
2000 provided a proposed clean text based on the February 2000 draft protocol text in AHG/50 (Part I).
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PREAMBLE21
The States Parties to this Protocol,
(1)22 Being Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, which was opened for signature on 10 April 1972, and entered into force on 26
March 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Convention,
(2) Reaffirming the purposes laid down in the preamble to the Convention as well as their
obligations under the Convention, and desiring to further its objectives,
(3) Emphasizing that the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and
the Convention represent an unequivocal determination for the sake of all humankind to
exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being
used as weapons,
(4) Mindful of their obligations under Article I of the Convention never in any
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other
biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes or
weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile
purposes or in armed conflict,
(5) Stressing the importance of the final declarations of successive Review Conferences
of the Convention, and emphasizing, in particular, the unanimous reaffirmation that the use
by States Parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of microbial or other biological
agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I of the Convention,
(6) Determined to implement all the provisions of the Convention in a comprehensive
and balanced manner in order to maintain and enhance regional and international peace and
security and promote international development,
(7) Convinced that strengthening and enhancing the preamble and the provisions of the
Convention, adopting specific measures to improve its implementation and effectiveness, and
encouraging universal adherence to the Convention and this Protocol, will deliver significant
benefits in terms of international security and development,
(8) Determined to achieve effective progress toward the prohibition and complete
elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,
(9) Determined also to achieve effective progress toward general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control,
                                                
21The amendments made to the Preamble are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 15, Preamble,
March 2000.
22Although in the final Protocol, the preambular paragraphs will not be numbered, the numbering has been
retained here for convenience.
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(10) Desiring to contribute to the realization and purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations,
(11) Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of and obligations
assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on
17 June 1925 (Geneva Protocol of 1925), and calling upon all States to comply strictly with
the principles and objectives of that Protocol and upon all States Parties to that
Protocol to comply strictly with their obligations assumed under it,
(12) Welcoming the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, signed at Paris on 13 January 1993,
(13) Recognizing the significant advances in the field of biotechnology since the entry into
force of the Convention, and the potential implications, both positive and negative, of these
advances for the implementation and effectiveness of the Convention,
(14) Determined to ensure that all achievements in this field are used exclusively for the
benefit of mankind,
(15) Conscious of the apprehension arising from relevant scientific and technological
developments as expressed by States Parties at Review Conferences of their use for purposes
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, and of their
reaffirmation that Article I is sufficiently comprehensive to cover all such
developments,
(16) Reaffirming the obligation of each State Party to the Convention under Article III not
to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture
or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery
specified in Article I of the Convention,
(17) Concerned with the increasing gap between the developed and the developing
countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related
areas,
(18) Recalling that, in accordance with the Declaration of Principles adopted at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, States should cooperate to
strengthen endogenous capacity-building for sustainable development by improving scientific
understanding through exchanges of scientific and technical knowledge, and by enhancing
the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new and
innovative technologies,
(19) Emphasizing the increasing importance of the implementation of the provisions of
Article X of the Convention and the obligations of each State Party under that Article,
especially in the light of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of
biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, which
have vastly increased the potential for cooperation between States to help to promote
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economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress particularly in
developing countries in conformity with their interests, needs and priorities,
(20) Determined to promote international cooperation on all developments in the field of
frontier science and high technology in areas relevant to the Convention, and urging all
States Parties possessing advanced biotechnology and knowledge in such fields as medicine,
public health and agriculture to adopt positive measures and to continue to promote
technology transfer and cooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular
with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind,
(21) Convinced that to contribute as effectively as possible to the prohibition and
complete elimination of biological and toxin weapons, and thereby to enhance international
peace and security, all States Parties to the Convention should become States Parties to this
Protocol,
(22) Convinced that the most effective way to ensure a world free of biological and toxin
weapons is to strengthen the Convention through appropriate measures, including provisions
for international verification of such measures,
(23) Determined to strengthen and improve the effective implementation of the
Convention,
Have agreed as follows:
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ARTICLE  I
GENERAL PROVISIONS23
1. Each State Party to this Protocol reaffirms its obligations under the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention24 and in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve
the implementation of the Convention undertakes to implement measures, as set out in
the Protocol, which include, inter alia:
(a) Declarations to be submitted and visits to be conducted in accordance with
Article III, section D of this Protocol;
(b) Investigations to be conducted in accordance with Article III, section G of this
Protocol;
(c) Measures to be taken in accordance with Article VII of this Protocol to
enhance compliance and ensure effective and full implementation of Article X of the
Convention.
                                                
23Our view is that the Protocol is concerned with strengthening the effectiveness and improving the
implementation of the BTWC and, as such, is not the place to amend the basic obligations under the
Convention. Such amendments are beyond the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group. The extension of the
understanding among States Parties to the Convention of their obligations under the Convention is appropriate
for consideration at the Review Conferences of the Convention.
24This is a Protocol to the BTWC and therefore references to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 are, with the sole
exception of the reference in Article XI, inappropriate in the operative part, or Articles, of the Protocol.  Such
references are rightly made within the Preamble which sets the Protocol in the wider context (see Evaluation
Paper No. 15, Preamble, March 2000).
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ARTICLE  II
DEFINITIONS25
For the purposes of this Protocol:
1. "Bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons"  means the following together or
separately:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
2. "Biological Agents" means
Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes;
(Biological agents and toxins which have been identified for the purpose of
declarations under this Protocol are listed in Annex A.)26
3. "Purposes not prohibited by the Convention"  means
Any purpose, which has prophylactic, protective or other peaceful intention.
4.  "Organization" means the Organization for the Prohibition of Biological and
Toxin Weapons established pursuant to Article IX of this Protocol.27
                                                
25As already noted above in respect of Article I General Provisions, the Protocol is concerned with
strengthening the effectiveness and improving the implementation of the BTWC and, as such, is not the place to
amend the understanding of the Convention.  It is recalled that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group required
consideration inter alia of definitions of terms and objective criteria ... where relevant for specific measures
designed to strengthen the Convention.  Those definitions necessary for the effective implementation of Article
III of the Protocol have been transferred to Annex A. I. Definitions.
26This language reflects that in the CWC, Article II Definitions and Criteria, paragraph 2.
27This language reflects that in the CWC Article II Definitions and Criteria, paragraph 11.
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ARTICLE  III
COMPLIANCE MEASURES
A.  LISTS AND CRITERIA (AGENTS AND TOXINS)
1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to subject agents and toxins
listed in Annex A, section I, to compliance measures as provided in Article III.28
2. The Conference of States Parties shall, taking into account scientific and technical
developments, and in accordance with Article XIV, examine proposals relating to changes
whereby microbiological or other biological agents and toxins are to be included in or
excluded from the lists, and shall take a decision thereon.
                                                
28This text has been amended to reflect more closely the language in the CWC relating the Schedules of
Chemicals to the verification measures as in the CWC Article VI, paragraph 2.
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B.  EQUIPMENT
1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to provide information
concerning equipment listed in Annex A, section II, as required in the compliance
measures provided in Article III.
2. The Conference of States Parties shall, taking into account scientific and technical
developments, and in accordance with Article XIV, examine proposals relating to
changes whereby equipment is to be included in or excluded from the list, and shall take a
decision thereon.
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C.  THRESHOLDS29
1.  Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to provide information as
required in the compliance measures provided in Article III.   The information required
for completion of the Declaration Formats specified in the Annexes referred to in
Article III will include provision of information as to whether production capability
exceeds certain specified threshold capacities.   In addition, information shall be
provided on aggregate quantities as specified in the Declaration Formats.
2. The Conference of State Parties shall, taking into account scientific and technical
developments, and in accordance with Article XIV, examine proposals for changes
whereby the threshold capacities and aggregate quantities specified in the Declaration
Formats shall be increased, reduced or excluded and shall take a decision thereon.
                                                
29This text has been amended to make it clear that the completion of the Declaration Formats will require States
Parties to provide information on whether specified threshold capacities are exceeded and on aggregate
quantities.  There is no requirement for the identification of specific quantities of individual listed agents as such
quantities have no significance as the question of whether or not a particular quantity of a specific agent is of a
type or quantity that has no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.  Judgement will
depend on the specific individual circumstances.
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D.  DECLARATIONS
I.  SUBMISSION OF DECLARATIONS
1. Each State Party shall declare to the Organization, regardless of the form of their
ownership or control, all activities and facilities listed below which exist or existed on its
territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control during the period specified.
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2. All declarations submitted in accordance with paragraphs 1 above shall be submitted
to the Organization, in accordance with the appropriate format in the Appendix, not later than
180 days after this Protocol enters into force for it and, in the case of annual declarations,
declarations for the previous calendar year shall be submitted not later than 30 April31 of
each successive year thereafter.  The terms used in this section are defined in Annex A,
section 1.32
3.33 The Executive Council may review periodically the declaration formats’ structure and
contents to ensure the effective implementation and operation of Article III, section D.  Any
State Party may propose modifications to the declaration formats which shall be subjected to
review by the Executive Council.  In reviewing the declaration formats, the Executive
Council shall consider, inter alia, scientific and technological developments that may affect
their operational structure and contents.
4. A State Party hosting a facility or facilities owned or controlled by another State
Party, shall have the right to gain access to information and/or to receive such information
required to fulfil its obligations under this section, from the other State Party.
INITIAL DECLARATIONS
(A) OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN PROGRAMMES AND/OR
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED PRIOR TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE
PROTOCOL FOR EACH STATE PARTY
5.  Each State Party shall declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above whether, at
any time since 1 January 194634 it has:
                                                
30Paragraph 2 of AHG/51 (Part I) Article III D. Declarations section I has been deleted as this is addressed in
Article III. H. Other Provisions.
31The choice of 30 April for the due date for submission of annual declarations is presumably to allow an
appropriate period of time to enable declarations for the last calendar year to be compiled.  In the CWC
Verification Annex, the requirement for annual declarations requires that these be submitted "not later than 90
days after the end of the previous calendar year."  The additional words are required to make it unambiguous
that the annual declaration is to provide a declaration for the previous calendar year.
32All definitions for use in Article III section D have been collected in Annex A section 1.
33Although it has been proposed that this paragraph is unnecessary because of the provisions of Article XIV
Amendments, we recommend that it be retained as there is no specific mention in either Article XIV, or Article
IX The Organization to review and amendment of declaration formats.  Such periodical review is necessary to
ensure that the Protocol declaration formats are kept up to date with developments.
341 January 1946 is appropriate because it is the date which was agreed for the CBM F agreed at the Third
Review Conference.  As the Protocol is intended to strengthen confidence in compliance, it would be contrary to
34
(a) Developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise acquired or retained, and
whether, during the same period, it has used:
(i) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(ii) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict;
The declaration shall provide summaries35 of any research and development activities, of any
use, and of any work36 performed on production, testing, evaluation, weaponization,
stockpiling or acquisition of microbial or other biological agents or toxins and equipment or
means of delivery for hostile purposes or in armed conflict, and on their destruction.  The
declaration shall also include a list of all participating facilities and test ranges that have been
converted/dismantled or destroyed since 1 January 1946.37
(B) DEFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN PROGRAMMES AND/OR
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE
PROTOCOL FOR EACH STATE PARTY
6. Each State Party shall declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 2 above, whether at
any time since 1 January 194638 it has conducted programmes39 and/or activities as part of
any effort to protect or defend humans, animals or plants against the use of microbial or other
biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  If so, the State Party
shall declare, in summary40 form:
(i) The general objectives of activities that were part of such programmes
and/or activities;
                                                                                                                                                       
that stated objective to adopt a later date.  An earlier date would be impractical as little information might be
available for the earlier years.  In any event, adoption of a date of 1 January 1946 does not prevent States from
making more comprehensive and informative declarations that provide information on earlier years as was done
by some States in making declarations under CBM F.
35The word "summaries" is important as this makes it explicit that excessive detail is not being sought in these
declarations.  It further implies that although the summaries should be as complete as possible, inadvertent
omissions will not be regarded as a failure to make a complete declaration.
36As the intention is to build confidence, the declaration should be comprehensive and should not omit any
aspect.  Omissions raise queries and potential concerns.
37There is a logical argument that, in the interests of building confidence, this date should also be 1 January
1946.   In addition, 1 January 1946 avoids uncertainties which would otherwise arise about what happened to
facilities and test ranges mentioned in the 1 January 1946 declaration.
381 January 1946 is appropriate because it is the date which was agreed for the CBM F agreed at the Third
Review Conference.  As the Protocol is intended to strengthen confidence in compliance, it would be contrary to
that stated objective to adopt a later date.
39As the intention is to build confidence, the declaration should be comprehensive and should not omit any
aspect.  Omissions raise queries and potential concerns.
40The word "summary" is important as this makes it explicit that excessive detail is not being sought in these
declarations.  It further implies that although the summaries should be as complete as possible, inadvertent
omissions will not be regarded as a failure to make a complete declaration.
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(ii) Any research and development, testing or evaluation, and production41
conducted as part of such programmes and/or activities that involved
prophylaxis, pathogenicity/virulence, diagnostic techniques, detection,
aerobiology, medical42 treatment or toxinology, physical protection,
and decontamination.
7. Each State Party shall declare any information that subsequently comes to its notice
that would have been required to have been declared pursuant to paragraph 5 and 6 above had
such information been known one year after this Protocol entered into force for that State
Party, not later than 180 days after such information is discovered.
ANNUAL DECLARATIONS
(C) DEFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN PROGRAMMES AND/OR
ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR
8. Each State Party shall declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above, whether
at any time during the previous calendar year it has conducted43:
(a) Activities44 as part of programmes or any other efforts to protect or defend
humans, animals, or plants against the use of microbial or other biological agents or toxins
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  If so, it shall declare:
(i) All such activities;
(ii) The general objectives and main elements, and funding arrangements
of such research and development, testing and evaluation, production
programmes and/or activities;
(iii) In summary form, the work conducted as part of such programmes
and/or activities including45 the following: prophylaxis,
pathogenicity/virulence, diagnostic techniques, detection, aerobiology,
medical treatment or toxinology, physical protection, and
decontamination46;
(b) Declare all facilities where five47 or more person years of technical and
scientific effort were devoted to the programmes and/or activities specified in
                                                
41As the intention is to build confidence, the declaration should be comprehensive and should not omit any
aspect.  Omissions raise queries and potential concerns.
42Amendment made for consistency with paragraph 8 (b) (iii) below.
43The requirement is for a simple unambiguous declaration that is clear and embraces all States Parties having
defensive programmes.
44As the intention is to build confidence, the declaration should be comprehensive and should not omit any
aspect.  Omissions raise queries and potential concerns.
45This is needed to avoid limiting the summary to only the selection of topics identified.
46Production fermentation capacities is deleted as this is different in nature from the other listed topics.
47Detailed information on facilities where less than five or more person years of technical and scientific effort
were devoted to the programmes and/or activities would run the risk of being an undue burden.  The aim should
be to declare all activities but to limit the detailed information to those with more than 5 person years of effort in
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subparagraph (a) above.  Where less than five facilities have to be declared, declare in
addition all facilities where more than 10 per cent of the total scientific and technical person
years were devoted by the State Party to such programmes and/or activities;
(D) VACCINE PRODUCTION FACILITIES
9. Each State Party shall declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above, each
facility which, during the previous calendar year with primary production containment
produced with the use of fermenters and/or bioreactors, embryonated eggs or other means, or
produced with the use of fermenters and/or bioreactors, embryonated eggs or other means
and recovered by concentration or isolation, microorganisms or substances, causing a specific
and protective immune response as an ingredient of:
(a) Any vaccine for humans for public use or for armed forces, or which was
licensed, registered or otherwise approved by a component of the government of the State
Party for distribution or sale;
(b) Any vaccine for animals for public use48 or any vaccine for animals which
was licensed, registered or otherwise approved by a component of the government of the
State Party for distribution or sale.
(E) MAXIMUM BIOLOGICAL CONTAINMENT FACILITIES
10. Each State Party shall declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above, all
facilities designated as maximum biological containment.
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(F) PLANT PATHOGEN CONTAINMENT
11. Each State Party shall declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above, all
facilities designated as plant pathogen containment facilities.
(G) WORK WITH LISTED AGENTS AND/OR TOXINS
12. Each State Party shall declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above, each
facility which, during the previous calendar year, has conducted any of the following
activities with agents and/or toxins listed in Annex A:
(a) Research and development performed in areas protected by high biological
containment (BL-3);
(b) Production of one or more agents and/or toxins listed in Annex A, using the
following techniques in which the stated threshold capacities are exceeded:
                                                                                                                                                       
those States Parties with relatively large defensive programmes whilst not excluding the need for declarations
from States Parties with small defensive programmes.
48The words in AHG/51 "for public sale" or "that is available to the general public" are more limiting than the
term in the earlier draft Protocol "for public use".
49High biological containment has been incorporated into (G) Work with Listed Agents and/or Toxins.
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(i) Any fermenter(s)/bioreactor(s) with a total internal volume of 50 litres
or more; or
(ii) Continuous or perfusion fermenters/bioreactors with a flow rate
capable of exceeding 2 litres an hour; or
(iii) A chemical reaction vessel or equipment used for recovery with a total
internal volume of 50 litres or more; or
(iv) More than 2,000 embryonated eggs on an annual basis; or
(v) More than 1,000 litres of tissue culture or other medium on an annual
basis;
(c) Insertion of a nucleic acid sequence into an agent listed in Annex A;
(d) Insertion of a nucleic acid sequence coding for any pathogenicity/virulence
factor from an agent or toxin listed in Annex A, or for a subunit of such toxin, into any
organism, resulting in a genetically modified organism with disease-causing or toxic
properties (including facilitating the production of the toxin or its toxic subunit(s));
(e) Intentional aerosolization of any agent and/or toxin listed in Annex A or any
work with aerosolized agents and/or toxins listed in Annex A;
(f) Administration of any agent and/or toxin listed in Annex A to animals via the
respiratory tract;
(g) Maintenance of culture collections in maximum containment installations.
Diagnostic facilities shall not be declared under this paragraph.
(H) OTHER PRODUCTION FACILITIES
13. Each State Party shall declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above, each
facility which, during the previous calendar year, under primary production containment
(i) Produced; or
(ii) Produced or recovered by concentration or isolation;
any microorganisms or other substances for use, directly or after chemical modification as an
active ingredient in:
(i) Any preparation, other than vaccine or food and beverages for humans and
animals, for the prevention or treatment of disease in humans and animals; or
(ii) Diagnostic reagents; or
(iii) Biocontrol agents or plant inoculants;
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using one of the following in which the stated threshold capacities are exceeded:
(a) Any fermenter/bioreactor exceeding 300 litres in volume; or
(b) Any continuous or perfusion fermenter/bioreactor with a flow rate exceeding
50 litres per hour; or
(c) More than 15,000 embryonated eggs annually; or
(d) More than 10,000 litres of tissue culture medium annually; or
(e) More than 10,000 litres of growth medium annually.
14. A facility shall not be declared under paragraph 13 above if such production of
microbial or biological agents or toxins was performed exclusively for:
(a) Bioremediation or waste treatment; or
(b) Manufacture for sale or use of soap, cosmetics, detergents, fertilizers, non-
biologically active ingredients of pharmaceuticals, or foods or beverages for
humans or animals; or
(c) Research and development of the products listed in subparagraph (b) above; or
(d) Teaching the manufacture of the products listed in subparagraph (b) above.
(I) OTHER FACILITIES
15. Each State Party shall declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above, each
facility which, during the previous calendar year, conducted activities with any biological
agent and/or toxin and which also:
(a) Possessed aerosol test chambers of 1 m3 or above for work with
microorganisms or toxins;
(b) Possessed equipment with a capacity of 1 litre or more for aerosol
dissemination in the open air with a particle mass median diameter not exceeding 10 microns
excluding those for agricultural, health or environmental use;
(c) Conducted genetic modification to enhance pathogenicity, virulence, stability
or resistance to antibiotics or chemical or physical methods of disinfection, or which altered
the host range, the infection route or the ease of identification or diagnosis, within a high
biological containment facility.
(J) OTHER DECLARATIONS50
                                                
50 It is important to provide language in Article III, Section D Declarations which refers to all declarations
required under the Protocol --this is achieved by Section (J) Other Declarations -- as such inclusion will bring
all declarations within the provisions to ensure submission of declarations.  It is evident from the experience
under the CWC that States Parties have been very dilatory in meeting some of their declaration obligation.
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16. Each State Party shall declare, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the
following:
(a) All international transfers during the previous calendar year of agents and/or
toxins, equipment listed in Annex A.
(b) Declarations pursuant to Article III, section F.
(c) Declarations pursuant to Article VII and Appendix E.
(d) Declarations pursuant to Article X.
(e)  A list of the number, dates and titles of legislation, regulations , directives, orders
or other administrative and legal measures that govern, regulate, provide guidance on or
otherwise control:
(a) Access to buildings or other structures in which pathogens or toxins
are being produced, handled or stored;
(b) Access to buildings or other structures or areas in which an outbreak of
infectious disease affecting humans, animals or plants is suspected or is known to be
occurring.
17.  Each State Party shall provide to the relevant competent international body, such as the
WHO, OIE and FAO, information, in accordance with the requirements of that
international body on outbreaks of disease occurring on its territory.   Should the State
Party not be a member State of the WHO, OIE or FAO then it shall provide
comparable information to the Organization.51
                                                
51Briefing Papers No. 21,  Outbreaks of Disease: Current Official Reporting, April 1999, No. 24, Outbreaks of
Disease: Current European Reporting, September 1999, and No. 23, BTWC Security Implications of Human,
Animal and Plant Epidemiology, July 1999 have shown that there is no justification for dual reporting of
outbreaks of disease.  It is evident that reporting to the relevant international body -- WHO, OIE and FAO --
should be encouraged.  Consequently, we recommend that reporting to the Organization only be made by States
Parties who are not member States of the international bodies WHO, OIE and FAO.
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II.  FOLLOW-UP AFTER SUBMISSION OF DECLARATIONS52
1. The Technical Secretariat shall receive, process, analyse, and store declarations
submitted by States Parties in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.
2.   Upon receipt of a request by a State Party which has submitted its own
declarations, the Director-General shall make available to that State Party in accordance with
the provisions on confidentiality contained in Article IV and Annex E of this Protocol copies
of the initial and/or annual declarations of other States Parties, as specified in the request.
The Director-General shall simultaneously inform the State(s) Party(ies) concerned that
copies of their declarations have been made available to the requesting State Party.
3. The Technical Secretariat shall, in order to determine that the declarations
submitted by States Parties are complete and accurate, and to promote the accurate fulfilment
of the declaration obligations under this Protocol:
(a) Process and make a technical analysis of the declarations;
(b) Conduct a limited number per year of visits to declared53 facilities in
accordance with the procedures set out in part A below;
(c) If it, in its analysis pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) above, identifies any
ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission related solely to the content of the declaration,
seek clarification from the State Party concerned, in accordance with the procedures set out in
part B below;
(d) Provide technical assistance to States Parties to help them compile individual
facility and national declarations including, if requested, by means of visiting a State Party, in
accordance with the procedures set out in part C below.
4. A State Party which identifies any ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission in
the declaration of another State Party may seek clarification from the State Party concerned,
in accordance with the provisions of section E of this Article, or it may initiate the
clarification process set out in part B below.
Visit schedule
5. The total number of all visits conducted pursuant to this Article as an initial
provision54 shall not exceed 10055 in each calendar year of which two-thirds of the total
                                                
52The text in AHG/50 (Part II) has been used as the baseline for this section.
53For the reasons set out in a number of Briefing Papers (No. 2, 10, 18, 20,25, 26), we consider that in order to
determine that declarations are complete and accurate it is necessary that a limited number of randomly-selected
visits are made to declared facilities each year.
54It is considered inadvisable to set firm numbers for the overall number of visits conducted under the Protocol
as the States Parties will have more than enough control of the actual number in any year through their annual
scrutiny and approval of the programme and budget of the BTWC Organization.  It is prudent to make it clear
that the numbers in this paragraph are an initial provision which can be amended at subsequent Review
Conferences in accordance with paragraph 6.
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are to be allocated56 to visits pursuant to paragraph 3 (b) above and one-third are to be
allocated to other visits pursuant to this Article.  The Director-General shall submit the
schedule containing the details for voluntary assistance visits57 already known, to the
Executive Council at its first session of each year.
6. Each Review Conference held pursuant to Article XIII may revise the figures for
the overall number of visits carried out in a calendar year pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5
of this subsection, taking into account the resources available and the implementation of this
Protocol.58
7. At the end of each year, the Director-General shall prepare a visits schedule for the
following year. States Parties shall, wherever possible, submit invitations for voluntary
assistance visits and, where known, clarification visits volunteered, not later than 1 December
each year to enable the Director-General to prepare the visit schedule for the subsequent year.
On receipt of an invitation for such a visit, the Director-General shall include the visit in
his/her schedule for visits for the following year.  The Director-General shall submit the
schedule containing the details for the voluntary assistance visits and voluntary clarification
visits already known to the Executive Council at its first session of each year.  If the number
of invitations exceeds the ceiling prescribed above, the Director-General shall report this fact
to the Executive Council at its first session of each year.  If during the year, the numbers of
invitations for voluntary assistance visits exceed the initial provision pursuant to paragraph 5,
the Director-General shall report this fact to the Executive Council.  The Director-General
shall also include recommendations on the priority of each visit in light of the information
submitted by the State Party and available resources.
8. The Executive Council shall decide on the programme for the year including, if
necessary, how to proceed if the number of invitations exceeds the overall ceiling provided
for in this section.
9. The Director-General shall not later than seven days after the first session of the
Executive Council notify all States Parties of the schedule for the voluntary assistance visits
and any outstanding voluntary clarification visits or visits approved by the Executive Council
planned for that year.
                                                                                                                                                       
55This figure is based on a realistic assessment of what the BTWC Organization will be able to carry out
effectively each year.  See Briefing Paper No. 20, Visits: An Essential Portfolio, April 1999, para 69.
56The word "allocated" is important because language such as that in AHG/51 (Part II), page 23 in 5 bis stating
that "The number of visits pursuant to paragraph 3 (d) shall be at least one quarter of the total for visits" fails to
recognize that with time after entry into force of the Protocol the need for visits under paragraph 3(d) will
decrease and can be expected eventually to approach zero.  It is imprudent to use unnecessarily strong language
-- at least one quarter -- that is likely to impede the ability of the Review Conferences to amend the numbers
below one quarter.
57The schedule submitted by the Director-General should not contain any detail which would enable States
parties to identify in advance which would receive either randomly-selected or declaration clarification visits in
the coming year.  The requirements for the different types of visits will change over time and it is important to
allow the BTWC Organization to have sufficient flexibility to operate efficiently.  See Briefing Paper No. 20,
Visits: An Essential Portfolio, April 1999, para 72.
58A requirement to review the number of visits by each Conference of the States Parties will result in
micromanagement and inefficient operations by the BTWC Organization.  Reviews at each Review Conference
will be frequent enough when it is recalled that the States Parties will have more than enough control of the
operations of the BTWC Organization through their annual scrutiny and approval of the programme and budget
of the BTWC Organization.
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10. The Director-General shall submit to the Executive Council every three months, or
earlier if necessary, a report on the implementation of visits of each type and on outstanding
invitations for voluntary assistance and voluntary clarification visits.  If it judges it necessary,
the Executive Council may decide to adjust the initial allocations, between the types of visits,
proposed by the Director-General in accordance with paragraph 5.  If a clarification visit is
authorized by the Executive Council, the Director-General shall reduce the provision for
visits pursuant to paragraph 3 (b) in order to accommodate the proposed visit(s).  The
Director-General shall notify the Executive Council of all changes to the visit schedule at its
next session.
(A) VISITS
Purpose
11. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct, in accordance with this Article, visits
pursuant to paragraph 3 (b) of this subsection, which shall be confidence-building in nature.
These visits shall, through cooperation with the State Party to be visited, promote the
Protocol’s overall objectives by:
(a) Enhancing transparency of facilities subject to the provisions of this section;
(b) Promoting the consistent and accurate fulfilment of the declaration
obligations under this Protocol; and
(c) Helping the Technical Secretariat to acquire and retain a comprehensive and
up-to-date understanding of the facilities and activities declared globally.
12. In addition, if so requested by the State Party to be visited in its acknowledgement
of receipt of notification of the visit, the visit shall be extended by up to two working days for
the visiting team to provide to the extent possible technical advice or information to the
visited State Party and/or to visited facility personnel on any of the subjects listed in Article
VII or to provide any of the technical assistance and cooperation activities contained in
programmes as specified in Article VII.
Selection of facilities
13. During the course of each calendar year, the Technical Secretariat shall randomly
select facilities specified in paragraph 3 (b) of this subsection for a visit.  The mechanism of
selection shall ensure that:
(a) Such visits shall be spread among a representative range of facilities subject to
the provisions of this section in terms of their scientific and technical characteristics;
(b)  Such visits are distributed as widely and equitably as possible among States
Parties submitting declarations;
(c) No facility shall be subject to more than two such visits in a five year period;
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(d) No State Party shall receive more than 5 plus 5 per cent of the total number
of facilities declared by the State Party or 20 visits whichever of these two figures is the
lower in a five year period;59
(e) Such visits are distributed among the categories of declared facilities to
reflect the risk posed by that category of facilities to the Convention;60
(f) The prediction of when any particular facility will be subjected to such a visit
shall be precluded.
The mechanism of selection may be changed  at any time by the Conference of States Parties
in light of experience gained from the operation of this provision.
Duration
14. Visits pursuant to this part may last up to two consecutive working days.  This time
excludes the inspection of approved equipment.  The duration of the visit may be extended if
the visited State Party and visiting team so agree.
15. If so requested by the State Party to be visited in its acknowledgement of receipt of
notification of the visit, the visit shall be extended by up to two days pursuant to paragraph
12 of this section.   The resources required for this extension of the visit shall be charged
against the technical assistance portion of the budget of the Organization.61
Equipment
16. The visiting team shall bring to the visited facility from the list of approved
equipment, only instant developing cameras, tape recorders, personal computers and
protective equipment.  Any other items of approved equipment may be brought only with the
prior approval of the visited State Party.  Any request for additional items of approved
equipment shall be kept to the minimum necessary and shall be included in the notification.
The visited State Party shall indicate its response in its acknowledgement of the notification.
17. Instant developing cameras and tape recorders shall only be used for collecting factual
information for the visit report.  The use of instant developing cameras and tape recorders
shall be at the discretion of the visited State Party and such cameras shall only be operated by
the representatives of the visited State Party.  The use of additional items of approved
equipment at the declared facility shall be with the agreement of the visited State Party.
Administrative arrangements
18. The visited State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the
visiting team such as communication means, interpretation services to the extent necessary
for the performance of interviewing and other tasks, in-country transportation, working
                                                
59The language reflects that of the Chemical Weapons Convention.  See Briefing Paper No. 26, Visits: The
Emerging Portfolio, November 1999, para 36.
60Different categories of facilities reflecting different levels of risk are set out in Bradford Briefing Paper No.
26, Visits: The Emerging Portfolio, November 1999, para 38.
61This provision has been moved from paragraph 14 of AHG/51 (Part II), page 25.
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space, lodging, meals and urgent medical care.  The visited State Party may, to the extent
possible, provide approved equipment as requested by the visiting team.  The visited State
Party shall be reimbursed by the Organization for any assistance provided pursuant to this
paragraph within 30 days after receipt of a detailed and validated claim from the visited State
Party.
PRE-VISIT ACTIVITIES
Mandate
19. The Director-General shall issue a standard mandate for the visit.  The mandate shall
be confined to the purposes set out in paragraph 11 of this section.  The mandate shall
contain:
(a) The name of the visited State Party;
(b) The name of the host State Party/State, if applicable;
(c) The name and location of the facility to be visited;
(d) The declaration submitted by the facility;
(e) The names of the leader and other members of the visiting team;
(f) The approved equipment proposed to be brought to the facility in accordance
with paragraph 16 above; and any additional equipment approved by the visited State Party
pursuant to paragraph 17;
(g) Operational instructions to the visiting team necessary for the visiting team to
fulfil its mandate.
20. If the visited State Party has requested in its acknowledgement of receipt of the visit
notification, that the visiting team provide technical advice or information, or that it provide
any of the technical assistance and cooperation activities contained in the programmes
pursuant to Article VII, such activities shall, as appropriate, be added to the visit mandate to
be conducted at the end of the visit activities.  The addendum to the visit mandate shall be
made available to the visited State Party as soon as possible before the commencement of the
visit.
21. The mandate for each visit shall be issued by the Director-General to the visiting team
leader.
Notification
22. The Director-General shall notify the visited State Party and, if applicable, the host
State Party two weeks before the arrival of the visiting team at the point of entry, of its
intention to conduct a visit to a declared facility; and at the same time, shall make available to
the State Party to be visited the mandate for the visit.  The visited State Party shall
acknowledge receipt of the notification within 24 hours after receipt of the notification.  The
notification shall include:
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(a) The name of the State Party to be visited;
(b) The name of the host State Party/State, if applicable;
(c) The name and location of the facility to be visited;
(d) The point of entry where the visiting team will arrive as well as the means of
arrival;
(e) The date and estimated time of arrival of the visiting team at the point of
entry;
(f) The names of the leader and of the other members of the visiting team;
(g) Additional approved equipment the visiting team requests to bring to the
visited facility pursuant to paragraph 18 above;
(h) Information on the existing cooperation and assistance activities or
programmes, if any, which the Technical Secretariat considers may be applicable to the
facility to be visited and from which the facility could benefit.
23. In its acknowledgement of receipt, the State Party shall provide its response to the
request for additional approved equipment. The visited State Party may also indicate whether
it requires technical advice and information and specify which technical assistance and
cooperation activities contained in the programmes pursuant to Article VII, it requests to be
provided by the visiting team, without prejudice to its right to request technical advice and
information at any time during the visit which shall be provided to the extent possible after
conclusion of the visit.
Appointment of visiting team
24. The Director-General shall appoint the members of the visiting team from among
only the full-time personnel of the Technical Secretariat designated in accordance with
Annex D, section I, paragraphs 1 to 10, taking into account the specific nature of the facility
to be visited.  The members of the visiting team shall be selected on as wide an equitable
geographical basis as possible.  The Director-General shall limit the size of the visiting team
to the minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the mandate.  In any event the team
shall not exceed four members.  No national of the visited State Party or, if applicable, the
host State Party, shall be a member of the visiting team.
Designation of visited State Party representatives
25. The visited State Party may designate personnel to assist visited facility personnel
prepare for and host the visiting team.  The visited State Party shall designate visited facility
personnel to accompany the visiting team for the duration of the visit.
ACTIVITIES UPON ARRIVAL OF THE VISITING TEAM
Inspection of approved equipment
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26. Equipment shall be sealed by the Technical Secretariat to indicate that the items of
equipment are properly authenticated as items of approved equipment.  The visited State
Party shall have the right to inspect the equipment of the visiting team, including the
additional equipment the visited State Party approved, to ensure that it is properly sealed,
appears on the list of approved equipment and conforms to the standards as set out in
Annex D, section I, paragraph 35.  The visited State Party may exclude items of equipment
that do not conform to the provisions set out in Annex D, section I, paragraph 40, as well as
paragraph 16 above, and may retain them at the point of entry for the duration of the visit.
CONDUCT OF THE VISIT
27. The visiting team and the visited State Party shall cooperate with each other to fulfil
the mandate while protecting the interests of the visited State Party.
28. In this regard the visited State Party shall:
(a) Provide access to the visiting team to the facility to be visited and sufficient
access to fulfil its mandate within the visited facility.  The nature and extent of all access
inside the facility, and to the information it contains, shall be at the discretion of the visited
State Party;
(b) Allow the visiting team to conduct the activities, described in paragraph 34 of
this section, proposed by the visiting team as necessary to fulfil its mandate;
(c) Have the right to take measures to protect national security and commercial
proprietary information;
(d) Wherever possible, endeavour to provide the information necessary to enable
the visiting team to fulfil the general purpose of the visit in accordance with paragraph 11.
29. The visiting team shall:
(a) Collect only that information necessary to carry out its mandate and treat any
information, documents and data obtained during the visit, which contain commercial
proprietary or national security information and which are identified as such by the visited
State Party, as confidential and handle such information, documents and data in accordance
with the confidentiality provisions of this Protocol;
(b) Arrange its activities so as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its
duties in accordance with the visit mandate in the least intrusive manner possible, and make
every reasonable effort to avoid inconvenience to the visited State Party and disturbance to
the visited facility;
(c) Make every effort to avoid hampering or delaying the operation of the facility.
In particular, the visiting team shall not operate any facility equipment;
(d) Strictly observe established safety and working practices at the facility,
whether instituted for the protection of personnel, animals, plants, the environment or of the
processes performed or their products;
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(e) Provide the visited State Party with copies of all the information and data
obtained during the course of the visit.
Briefing
30. Upon arrival at the facility to be visited, the visiting team shall be briefed on the
facility and the activities carried out there by a facility representative and, at their discretion,
the representatives of the visited State Party.  The facility representative may be supported by
any other facility personnel, as required.
31. The briefing shall not exceed three hours.  It shall include, inter alia:
(a) The scope and a general description of current declared activities of the
facility including a description of the main scientific and technical information relating to the
declared activity(ies), including written and visual documentation, if available, such as
photographs, brochures, drawings, as appropriate;
(b) Short background description of the declared facility covering the date of
establishment, current ownership, organizational structure and, wherever possible, general
information on the declared facility’s role within the overall structure of the company or
government agency or entity operating the declared facility; organizational structure of the
facility and any previous uses or changes in ownership;
(c) General information on the physical layout , including laboratories, equipment
and other relevant characteristics of the visited facility, including a map or sketch showing all
structures and significant geographic features;
(d) Numbers and types of personnel involved in the declared activity(ies) and
whether they are military or civilian, scientific or administrative;
(e) General information concerning the safety regulations in force, including rules
of observation and quarantine and vaccination policy, and on any other regulatory
frameworks which may apply;
(f) General information on any relevant changes in activities or equipment at the
facility since the submission of the most recent declaration;
(g) Explanation for any levels of containment and the rationale for operating or
not operating at such levels; and for work involving listed agents and/or toxins, including
main objectives and rationales;
(h) A description of the technical assistance and cooperation activities requested
by the visited State Party pursuant to paragraph 23 above;
(i) General information on the method used for any treatment or disposal of waste
or effluent from the declared facility;
(j) General information on any experimental animal usage related to the declared
activities;
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(k) The administrative and logistical arrangements necessary for the visit.
32. The visited facility shall provide to the visiting team a written summary of the key
points of the briefing.  It may also provide additional information, such as documentation
related to either the briefing or tour, at its discretion.  At its discretion, the visited facility may
also provide in writing any additional information contained in the briefing.  The visiting
team may discuss with the visited State Party and the visited facility personnel the content of
the briefing and any other information made available by the visited State Party and visited
facility personnel.
Tour of the visited facility
33. To complement the briefing, the visited State Party shall invite the visiting team to
tour areas within the declared facility relevant to the visit mandate. The scope and nature of
the tour shall be at the discretion of the visited State Party.  The duration of the tour shall not
exceed two hours.
Visit activities
34. After the briefing and the tour the visiting team may conduct one or more of the
following activities:
(a) Review the information contained in the visited facility’s declaration and
matters that arise from these discussions;
(b) Interview, with the consent of the visited State Party, facility personnel who
are able to address a specific factual point on the activities of the declared facility. The visited
State Party may make available national representatives to respond to questions on matters
relating to national health and safety legislation and other regulatory matters, or to provide
information on such matters.  All interviews shall be conducted in the presence of
representatives of the visited State Party.  The visiting team shall only request information
and data which are necessary for the fulfilment of the visit mandate;
(c) Examine, with the consent of the visited State Party, documentation relevant
to the mandate for the sole purpose of  facilitating the visiting team’s understanding of the
activities being conducted at the declared facility;
(d) Revisit parts of the facility, and observe equipment, relevant to the facility’s
declaration;
(e) The visited State Party and/or the visited facility may, at their discretion, offer
access to other areas within the declared facility;
(f) The visited State Party may allow the visiting team, at any time during the
visit, any other on-site activities which the visited State Party believes may assist the visiting
team to fulfil its mandate.
35. If the visiting team identifies any technical inaccuracies in the declaration format it
may indicate these to the visited State Party.
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Debriefing
36. At the completion of the agreed activities, the visiting team, facility personnel and
visited State Party representatives shall meet to discuss the outcome of the visit and, if
necessary, to confirm any details of fact for inclusion in the preliminary report which shall be
a factual account of the visit.  Such a meeting shall not take place if the visited State Party
and the visiting team agree that it is not necessary.
POST-VISIT ACTIVITIES
Cooperation and assistance activities
37. If requested in accordance with paragraph 12, after the conclusion of the other
activities related to the visit, the visiting team shall provide the technical advice and
information and any of the cooperation and assistance activities contained in the programmes
specified in the addendum to the visit mandate pursuant to paragraph 20 above or requested
during the visit.
Preliminary report
38. Within 24 hours of the completion of the visit, the visiting team shall provide to the
representatives of the visited State Party a preliminary report in written form.  The
preliminary report shall only contain a  description of the visit activities and the factual
findings of the visiting team. The preliminary report shall be signed by the visiting team
leader.  In order to indicate that he/she has taken note of the contents of the preliminary
report, the representative of the visited State Party shall sign the preliminary report.
39. If, during the visit, the visited State Party has provided to the visiting team any
information which the visited State Party has identified as commercial proprietary or national
security information not already included in the declaration, the visited State Party may
require that any such information shall not be included in the draft or final report.
Departure
40. On completion of the debriefing and, if applicable, the relevant cooperation and
assistance activities, the visiting team shall depart from the territory of the visited State Party
as soon as possible.
REPORTS
Draft report
41. Not later than 14 days after the visit, the visiting team shall prepare a draft report
which shall include the contents of the preliminary report and an account of the cooperation
and assistance activities of the visiting team during the visit. At the request of the visited
State Party, the draft report may identify technical recommendations and possible follow-up
cooperation and assistance activities of the Organization. The report may also include
comments from both the visited State Party and visiting team on the extent to which the
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information provided during the visit furthered the purpose of  the visit as specified in
paragraph 11 of this subsection.
42. The draft report shall immediately upon completion be submitted to the visited State
Party.  The visited State Party may make any comments or suggestions on the draft report to
ensure factual and technical accuracy and the full protection of any commercial proprietary
and national security information.  The visited State Party may identify any information
contained in the report which it considers confidential and to be handled as such.  The visited
State Party may also identify any information which due to its confidential nature, or because
it is in the visited State Party’s view not related to the visit mandate, should not be included
in the final report.  Any such comments shall be submitted to the visiting team not later than
seven days after receipt of the draft report.
43. The visiting team shall consider comments received from the visited State Party.  In
preparing the final report, the visiting team shall, as a rule, adjust the draft report to reflect
those comments. If the visited State Party identifies any information as confidential, the
visiting team shall remove such information from the report.  The final report shall include as
an annex all the comments made by the visited State Party on the draft report, unless
otherwise requested by the visited State Party.
Final report
44. The final report shall be the draft report adjusted by the visiting team in accordance
with paragraph 43.  The visiting team shall submit the final report to the Director-General
and the visited State Party not later than seven days after receipt of any comments from the
visited State Party.  The Director-General shall remove all information identified as
confidential as provided for in paragraph 43. The Director-General shall, as a rule, provide
copies of the final report, on request to any State Party, unless otherwise indicated by the
visited State Party, taking into account the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 5 (d).
45. If the Director-General considers it necessary that the visited State Party redresses its
declaration by revising or supplementing it or submitting a new declaration, the Director-
General shall attach to the final report the details of, and reasons for, the points on which the
declaration concerned should be redressed, which shall be submitted to the visited State
Party. This attachment shall not be provided with the copies of the final report provided
to any other State Party.62
(B) DECLARATION CLARIFICATION PROCEDURES
46. Concerns related to the declaration of a State Party shall be resolved through the
procedures set out in this section63.  The State Party to which the concern is related may
                                                
62It would be inappropriate to provide to other States Parties the details of the specific inadequacies of a
declaration by a particular State Party.
63Our recommendation is that clarification of any ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies, or omissions relating to
facilities that appear to meet the criteria for declaration but which have not been declared should be addressed
through Declaration Clarification Procedures.  See Briefing Paper No. 26 Visits: The Emerging Portfolio,
November 1999, para. 43.  Consequently, the process of consultation, clarification and cooperation in Article
III, section E should be used to address any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose of the
Convention, or the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol and to clarify and resolve any matter which
may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the obligations of this Protocol or the Convention.
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volunteer for the Technical Secretariat to conduct a visit in accordance with the provisions set
out in this section to the facility in question with a view to resolving the concern.
Requests for clarification
47. When a State Party considers that there is an ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or
omission in the declaration concerning any declared facility or activity of another State Party,
or identifies any facility which it believes meets the criteria for declaration as set forth in
Article III, section D, and that facility has not been included in the declaration(s) concerned,
it may submit a request in writing to the Director-General to initiate the clarification
procedures set out in this section on its behalf.  The request shall include all relevant
information on which it is based including, in the case of the possible omission of a facility
from a declaration, the reasons why it is believed that the facility may be required to be
declared and a delimitation of the location of the facility.
48. Any State Party which has not taken any necessary measures it may have been
required to take in accordance with a decision of the Executive Council pursuant to part III of
this section shall not have the right to seek clarification from another State Party under this
section until any measures required pursuant to paragraphs 94 and 95 of this subsection are
implemented.
49. Upon receipt of a request pursuant to paragraph 47 above, or if as a result of his/her
analysis pursuant to paragraph 3 (a) above, the Director-General considers that there is an
ambiguity, uncertainty, anomaly or omission of a purely technical nature related solely to the
content of the declaration submitted by a State Party or identifies any facility which he/she
believes meets the criteria for declaration as set forth in Article III, section D, and that facility
has not been included in the declaration(s) concerned, the Director-General shall submit a
written request for clarification to the State Party concerned (hereinafter referred to as the
requested State Party).  The request shall include all relevant information on which it is based
including, in the case of the possible omission of a facility from a declaration, the reasons
why it is believed that the facility may be required to be declared and a delimitation of the
location of the facility.
Consultations including a consultative meeting
50. The requested State Party shall provide the clarification in writing to the Director-
General not later than 20 days after receipt of the request.  In cases where a State Party
initiated the clarification procedures, such response shall be forwarded to the requesting State
Party by the Director-General not later than 24 hours after its receipt by the Director-General.
51. If within 14 days of receipt of the written response either the requesting State Party,
for reasons which it shall set out in writing to the Director-General, or the Director-General
himself/herself considers that the written response does not resolve the matter, the Director-
General shall submit to the requested State Party a written request for a consultative meeting
between staff of the Technical Secretariat and representatives of the requested State Party,
which may include representatives of the facility concerned, in order to resolve the matter.
52. Upon receipt of such a request, the requested State Party shall make arrangements for
the consultative meeting.  The consultative meeting shall take place at any location agreed by
the Director-General and the requested State Party.  Wherever possible, the consultative
52
meeting shall take place in the capital or at any other location on the territory of the requested
State Party, beginning not later than 10 days after receipt of the request for such a meeting,
and its duration shall not exceed 48 hours.
53. In cases where a State Party initiated the clarification procedures, the Director-
General shall inform the requesting State Party of the outcome of the consultative meeting
not later than 24 hours after the end of that meeting.
54. Information regarding on-going or completed clarification procedures (consultations)
conducted pursuant to this subsection, including requests for such consultations, and
information resulting therefrom shall be restricted to the Technical Secretariat, the requested
State Party, and, if applicable, the requesting State Party unless further release is expressly
authorized by the requested State Party without prejudice to the right of the requesting State
Party to refer the issue to the Executive Council.
55. If a voluntary clarification visit is offered, the Director-General shall provide the
members of the Executive Council with such information on a confidential basis.  In the
event of such a visit, information related to it shall be restricted to the members of the
Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat, the requested State Party, and, if applicable, the
requesting State Party unless further release is expressly authorized by the requested State
Party.  If an on-site activity occurs pursuant to the section, the final report of the visit shall
only be distributed to the members of the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat, the
requested State Party, and, if applicable, the requesting State Party unless further release is
expressly authorized by the requested State Party.  Information that the requested State Party
considers to be commercial proprietary information or national security information shall not
be included in the final report.
VOLUNTARY CLARIFICATION VISIT
56. The visit shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner and shall as far as possible
not affect or interrupt in any way the activities taking place in the facility.  The inviting State
Party and the visiting team shall cooperate with each other in the achievement of the
objectives of the mandate.
Offering of a voluntary clarification visit
57. The requested State Party may, at its discretion and at any time during the
clarification procedures, invite the Technical Secretariat to conduct a voluntary clarification
visit to the facility in question which shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions set
forth in paragraphs 72 to 93, with a view to resolving satisfactorily and expeditiously any
matter which has been raised pursuant to paragraph 47 above.
58. The invitation to visit the facility shall be addressed to the Director-General in writing
at any time during the consultations pursuant to paragraphs 47 to 52 above or as soon as
possible, but in no case later than seven days after the completion of the consultative meeting
pursuant to paragraph 51 above.  The invitation shall be accompanied by an explanation for
the invitation, the purpose of the proposed visit, the specific issue(s) to be clarified, the
location of the facility to be visited and a diagram identifying and describing the specific
place(s) and facility where the visit would occur.
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59. The Director-General shall ensure that the visit request is acceded to, if necessary by
making adjustments in the overall programme of visits for that year.64
60. The Director-General shall handle the invitation in accordance with the provisions set
out in paragraphs 5 to 10 of this subsection. The Director-General and the inviting State Party
shall decide by mutual consent on the time of the visit taking into account the overall visit
schedule. If consensus cannot be reached on the dates for the visit, every effort shall be made
by the Director-General and the State Party to be visited to make the visit possible at the
earliest possible opportunity.
61. If offering a visit, the inviting State Party shall ensure necessary access to the facility
so as to enable the visiting team to fulfil its mandate.  The voluntary visit shall be conducted
according to the procedures set forth in paragraphs 72 to 102 of this subsection.  The inviting
State Party may, at its discretion, offer additional access and rights to the visiting team.
62. In the event that a request for an investigation is submitted to the Director-General in
connection with the same matter as a voluntary clarification visit invitation, the Director-
General shall continue with the preparations for but not proceed with the voluntary visit,
pending an Executive Council determination on the investigation request.  If the Executive
Council does not approve the investigation request, then the voluntary clarification visit shall
proceed.
CONSULTATIVE MEETING FOLLOW-UP
63. If the requesting State Party or the Director-General considers that the consultative
meeting has not resolved the matter, the Director-General shall submit a report to the
Executive Council.
64. The requesting State Party, if applicable, shall inform the Director-General in writing
within seven days after the conclusion of the consultative meeting if it believes that the
consultative meeting has not resolved the issue.  Any such proposal shall include an
explanation of why the requesting State Party considers that the previously conducted
clarification procedures have not resolved the matter.
65. If the condition set out in paragraph 63 applies, the Director-General shall request the
requested State Party to offer a voluntary clarification visit within a specified time frame.
He/she shall also submit a full report on the matter in writing to the Executive Council,
including all relevant information pertaining to the implementation of the clarification
procedures set out in this section.
Executive Council review
66. If the requested State Party declines to offer a clarification visit, the Director-General
shall inform the Executive Council which shall consider the matter at its next regular session
and may decide, inter alia:
(a) That no further action is justified;
                                                
64It is anticipated that the frequency of such visits will decline appreciably over time as States Parties resolve
initial difficulties.  See Briefing Paper No. 20, Visits: An Essential Portfolio, April 1999, para 74.
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(b) To recommend further consultations with the requested State Party;
(c) To request further information from the requested and/or requesting State(s)
Party(ies);
(d) To seek the assistance of other relevant international organizations in
resolving the matter;
(e) To refer the matter to a special session of the Conference of States Parties;
(f) To request the requested State Party to offer a clarification visit within a
specified time frame taking into account the specific circumstances of each case;
(g) By a majority of all its members present and voting, to initiate a clarification
visit to be conducted according to the procedures set out in this subsection.
67. During the Executive Council’s consideration of the matter, the requested and, if
applicable, the requesting State Party shall have the right to participate in the discussions but
shall not have the right to participate in any decision on further action.
Duration
68. The inviting State Party and the Director-General shall determine the duration of the
visit, but in no case shall the duration exceed two days.  The period of visit means the
consecutive period of time from the arrival of the visiting team at the visited facility until the
completion of their visit activities provided for in this section.
Equipment
69. The visiting team shall bring to the visited facility from the list of approved
equipment only developing cameras, tape recorders, personal computers and protective
equipment.  Any other items of approved equipment may only be brought with the prior
approval of the visited State Party.  Any request for additional items of approved equipment
shall be kept to the minimum necessary and shall be included in the notification.  The visited
State Party shall indicate its response in its acknowledgement of the notification.
70. Instant developing cameras and tape recorders shall be used only for collecting factual
information for the visit report.  The use of cameras shall be at the discretion of the visited
State Party and such cameras shall only be operated by the representatives of the visited State
Party.  The use of additional items of approved equipment at the declared facility shall be
with the agreement of the visited State Party.
Administrative arrangements
71. The visited State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the
visiting team such as communication means, interpretation services to the extent necessary
for the performance of interviewing and other tasks, in-country transportation, working
space, lodging, meals and urgent medical care.  The visited State Party may, to the extent
possible, provide approved equipment on request to the visiting team.  The visited State Party
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shall be reimbursed by the Organization for any assistance pursuant to this paragraph within
30 days after receipt of a detailed and validated claim from the visited State Party.
PRE-VISIT ACTIVITIES
Mandate
72. The Director-General shall issue a mandate for the visit which shall be limited to the
clarification of the specific issue in the declaration of the requested State Party which was the
subject of the prior consultations held pursuant to this subsection. The mandate shall be
included in the notification of the visit made by the Director-General.  The mandate shall be
made available to the representative of the State Party to be visited immediately upon the
arrival of the visiting team at the point of entry.  The mandate shall contain at least the
following:
(a) The name of the visited State Party;
(b) The name of the host State Party/State, if applicable;
(c) The name and location of the facility to be visited specified as precisely as
possible;
(d) The objectives of the visit and the possible means to resolve the issue related
to the declaration of the requested State Party which was the subject of the consultative
meeting pursuant to this subsection;
(e) The names of the leader and other members of the visiting team;
(f) The list of approved equipment to be used during the visit pursuant to
paragraphs 69 and 70 above;
(g) The declaration submitted by the facility.
Notification
73. The Director-General shall notify the State Party to be visited and, if applicable the
host State Party, confirming the visit not later than seven days in advance of the planned
arrival of the visiting team at the point of entry.  The notification shall include, inter alia:
(a) The name of the State Party to be visited;
(b) The name of the host State Party/State, if applicable;
(c) The name and location of the facility to be visited;
(d) The purpose of the visit and the specific issue(s) to be clarified;
(e) The point of entry;
(f) The means of arrival;
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(g) The date and estimated time of arrival of the visiting team at the point of
entry;
(h) The names of the leader and of the other members of the visiting team;
(i) The visit mandate.
74. The State Party to be visited shall acknowledge receipt of the notification not later
than 48 hours after receipt of such notification.  The State Party shall confirm acceptance of
the proposed dates for the visit or propose alternative dates occurring within seven days of
the Director-General’s proposed visit date. If the dates suggested by the State Party to be
visited cannot be met by the Director-General, the original dates shall be the dates of the
visit.
Appointment of visiting team
75. The Director-General shall appoint members of the visiting team from among only
the full time personnel of the Technical Secretariat designated in accordance with Annex D,
section I, taking into account the specific nature of the facility to be visited.  Members of the
visiting team shall be selected on as wide an equitable geographical basis as possible.  The
Director-General shall limit the size of the visiting team to the minimum necessary for the
proper fulfilment of the mandate.  In any event the team shall not exceed four members.  No
national of the requesting State Party, the visited State Party or, if applicable, the host State
Party shall be a member of the visiting team.
Designation of visited State Party representatives
76. The State Party to be visited shall designate personnel to assist visited facility
personnel prepare for and host the visiting team and to accompany the visiting team for the
duration of the visit.
ACTIVITIES UPON ARRIVAL OF THE VISITING TEAM
Inspection of approved equipment
77. The visited State Party shall have the right to inspect the equipment of the visiting
team to ensure that it is properly sealed, appears on the list of  approved equipment, and
conforms to the standards as set out in Annex D, section I.  The visited State Party may
exclude equipment that does not conform to the provisions set out in Annex D, section I and
may retain them at the point of entry for the duration of the visit.
CONDUCT OF THE VISIT
78. The visiting team and the visited State Party shall cooperate with each other to fulfil
the mandate while protecting the interests of the visited State Party.
79. In this regard, the visited State Party shall:
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(a) Provide access to the visiting team to the facility to be visited and sufficient
access to fulfil its mandate within the visited facility.  The nature and extent of access inside
the facility shall be negotiated between the visiting team and the visited State Party;
(b) Allow the visiting team to conduct the activities, described in paragraph 85 of
this subsection, proposed by the visiting team as necessary to fulfil its mandate;
(c) Have the right to take measures to protect national security and commercial
proprietary information;
(d) Have the right to object to questions posed to the facility personnel if those
questions are deemed not relevant to the objectives of the visit mandate or compromise
commercial proprietary or national security information;
(e) Make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to allow the visiting
team to fulfil its mandate if any of the activities proposed by the visiting team in accordance
with paragraphs 84 and 85 are not possible.
80. The visiting team shall:
(a) Collect only that information necessary to carry out its mandate and treat any
information, documents and data obtained during the visit, which contain commercial
proprietary or national security information and which are identified as such by the visited
State Party, as confidential and handle such information, documents and data in accordance
with the confidentiality provisions of this Protocol;
(b) Arrange its activities so as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its
duties in accordance with the visit mandate in the least intrusive manner possible, and every
reasonable effort shall be made to avoid inconvenience to the visited State Party and
disturbance to the visited facility;
(c) Avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of the facility.  In
particular, the visiting team shall not operate any facility equipment;
(d) Strictly observe established safety and working practices at the facility;
(e) Provide the visited State Party with copies of all the documented and
electronic information and data obtained during the course of the visit;
(f) Have the right to state the relevance of questions asked by the visiting team
and objected to by the visited State Party.  The team leader may ask the visited State Party to
reconsider its objection.  The visiting team may note in the final report any refusal to permit
interviews or to allow questions to be answered without any justification given for any such
refusal by the visited State Party.
Briefing
81. Upon arrival at the facility to be visited, the visiting team shall be briefed by the
facility representatives and/or the representatives of the visited State Party.  The briefing shall
include the scope and a general description of activities of the facility relevant to the issue(s)
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to be clarified as specified in the visit mandate, details of the physical layout and other
relevant characteristics of the facility, including a map or sketch showing the relevant
structures and significant geographic features.  It shall include information concerning the
safety regulations in force, including rules of observation and quarantine.  It may also include
an indication of areas the visited State Party considers sensitive or not related to the visit
mandate.  The briefing shall not exceed three hours.
82. The visited facility shall provide to the visiting team a written summary of the key
points of the briefing.  At their discretion, the visited facility may also provide in writing any
additional information contained in the briefing.  The visiting team may discuss with the
visited State Party and the visited facility personnel the content of the briefing and any other
information made available by the visited State Party and visited facility personnel.
83. The visited State Party may offer or the visiting team may request an orientation tour
of areas within the facility relevant to the issue(s) to be clarified as specified in the visit
mandate.  The visiting team and the visited State Party shall discuss the arrangements for the
tour.  The scope and nature of the tour shall be at the discretion of the visited State Party. The
orientation tour shall not exceed two hours.
84. After the briefing and any orientation tour, the visiting team shall, in consultation with
the representatives of the visited State Party, prepare an initial visit plan and immediately
make it available to the visited State Party.  The visit plan shall specify the activities the
visiting team proposes to carry out, including the specific areas of the facility to be visited
and any proposals for the visiting team to subdivide.  The visiting team may propose changes
to the visit plan at any time to the visited State Party.  Any changes to the visit plan made
during the visit and any proposals for the visiting team to subdivide shall be agreed by the
visited State Party.
85. One or more of the following activities may be conducted:
(a) Ask questions about the declaration relevant to the facility and on the issue to
be clarified;
(b) With their consent, interview those individuals responsible, or their
representatives, or other knowledgeable personnel in respect of the scientific, technical,
medical, accounting or managerial activities relevant to the issue to be clarified as specified
in the mandate.  At the discretion of the visited State Party, the visiting team may interview
other facility personnel who may be able to assist in clarifying the issue specified in the visit
mandate.  All interviews shall be conducted in the presence of representatives of the visited
State Party, with the purpose of establishing relevant facts.  The visiting team shall only
request information and data which are necessary for the fulfilment of the visit mandate;
(c) Visually observe parts of the facility as well as equipment, relevant to the
mandate.
86. The visited State Party may at the suggestion of the visiting team invite the visiting
team, at any time during the visit, to visit any other on-site activities which the visited State
Party believes may assist the visiting team to fulfil its mandate.
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87. The visited State Party shall, at the request of the visiting team, make available
documentation which in the judgement of the visited State Party and visiting team may help
clarify the issue in the mandate. The nature and extent of any examination shall be agreed
between the visited State Party and the visiting team.
POST-VISIT ACTIVITIES
Debriefing and preliminary findings
88. Upon completion of the visit the visiting team shall meet with representatives of the
visited State Party and the visited facility at the visited facility to review the preliminary
findings of the visiting team and to clarify any remaining ambiguities.  The visiting team
shall provide to the visited State Party its preliminary findings in written form, together with
a list and copies of documents and other material obtained, that it proposes, subject to the
agreement of the visited State Party, to remove from the facility.  The document shall not
contain any information or data unrelated to the issue to be clarified as stated in the visit
mandate.  It shall, as a rule, not contain information or data identified as confidential by the
visited State Party and not related to the issue to be clarified as stated in the visit mandate.
The document shall be signed by the visiting team leader.  In order to indicate that the visited
State Party has reviewed the contents of the document, the visited State Party representative
shall countersign it.  This meeting shall be completed not later than 24 hours after completion
of the visit.
Departure
89. On completion of the visit the visiting team shall depart from the territory of the
visited State Party in the minimum time possible.
REPORT
Visit report
90. The visiting team shall prepare and process a draft report.  The draft report shall be
considered confidential.  The draft report shall summarize the general activities undertaken
during the visit and the factual findings of the visiting team.  It shall only contain facts
relevant to the clarification of the issue to be clarified as stated in the visit mandate.  The
draft report shall be submitted to the visited State Party not later than 14 days after the end of
the visit.  The visited State Party may submit to the visiting team any written comments on
the draft report not later than 21 days after receipt of the draft report.  In particular, it may
identify any information and data which, in its view, should not be contained in the final
version of the report, because it is considered to be not relevant to the issue to be clarified as
stated in the visit mandate, or due to its confidential nature.
91. The visiting team shall consider any comments received from the visited State Party
and incorporate those comments and, as a rule, remove any information and data as requested
pursuant to paragraph 90 before submitting the draft final report to the Director-General and
the visited State Party and, if applicable, the requesting State Party not later than seven days
after receipt of such comments.
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92. The visited State Party may submit further comments to the Director-General on the
draft final report within 14 days after receipt of the draft final report.  The Director-General
shall annex any such comments to the draft final report, which together shall become the final
report.  The Director-General shall provide copies of the final report to the visited State Party
and, if applicable, to the requesting State Party.
93. The Director-General shall submit the final report to the Executive Council for its
consideration when either:
(a) The Director-General or, if applicable, the requesting State Party consider that
the matter to be clarified has not been resolved; or
(b) The clarification visit resulted from the provisions set forth in paragraph 66
above.
In all other cases, no further action shall be taken.
Executive Council review and decision on any follow-up action
94. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and functions, review the
final report of the visiting team and consider and decide on whether the matter to be clarified
has been resolved.  If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion that the matter has not
been resolved and, in keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may be
necessary, it shall take appropriate measures to redress the situation, which may include
requiring the visited State Party to take any necessary measures such as revision of, or
addition to, the declaration concerned or submission of a new declaration and the time limit
of fulfilment.
95. The Director-General shall inform the visited State Party of the outcome of the review
of the report and on any decision on any subsequent measures pursuant to paragraph 100 as
soon as possible.  The visited State Party shall take the necessary measures as required by the
Executive Council.  If applicable, the Director-General shall also inform the requesting State
Party of the outcome of the review of the report and on any decision on any subsequent
measures pursuant to paragraph 94.
(C) VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE VISITS
96. Each State Party may, through the Director-General, invite the Technical Secretariat
to undertake a visit(s) to a facility(ies) on its territory or in any other place under its
jurisdiction or control.  In its invitation the State Party shall indicate the purpose(s) of the
visit, which shall be to enhance transparency and promote confidence among States Parties
and one or more of the following:
(a) To obtain relevant technical assistance and information;
(b) To obtain any of the technical assistance and cooperation activities contained
in programmes pursuant to  Article VII;
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(c) To obtain from the Technical Secretariat technical advice or information on
the implementation of the declaration obligations of this Protocol with respect to specific
facilities.
Invitations for visits
97. Each invitation for a voluntary assistance visit shall be addressed to the Director-
General and shall be accompanied by an explanation for the invitation and the purpose(s) of
the proposed visit.  The Director-General shall handle the invitations in accordance with the
provisions set out in paragraphs 5 to 10 of this subsection.
98. The Director-General shall issue a mandate for each visit which shall be written in
cooperation with the State Party to be visited.
99. The visited State Party and the visiting team shall cooperate with each other in the
achievement of the objectives of the mandate.
100. The detailed arrangements for, and contents of, a voluntary visit, such as size and
composition of the visiting team, duration of the visit, and procedures upon arrival of the
visiting team at the point of entry, shall be agreed beforehand between the Director-General
and the State Party to be visited.
101. The costs of scheduled voluntary assistance visits incurred by the Technical
Secretariat shall be borne by the Technical Secretariat. The costs of voluntary assistance
visits additional to those provided for in the initial schedule pursuant to paragraph 5 shall be
shared by the visited State Party and the Technical Secretariat.
102. A visit report, prepared jointly by the visiting team in consultation and cooperation
with the visited State Party, shall be submitted to the Director-General not later than 14 days
after the completion of the visit.  The Director-General shall submit the report to the
Cooperation Committee for consideration.
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III.  MEASURES TO ENSURE SUBMISSION OF DECLARATIONS
1. As soon as possible after the deadline for the submission of the initial or annual
declarations specified in paragraph 2 of section D, subsection I, of this Article has passed, the
Director-General shall issue a written request to States Parties which have not submitted all
their declarations, as required in section D, subsection I, of this Article, to submit the required
declarations and/or a written explanation of why the submission of the declarations is
delayed.  Such declarations and/or explanation shall be submitted as soon as possible after
receipt of the request.
2. On receipt of such an explanation, the Director-General may offer to provide
assistance in the preparation of declarations in accordance with Article III, section D,
subsection II and Article VII.
3. The Director-General shall provide a report to each regular session of the Conference
of the States Parties, to each regular session of the Executive Council and to any special
session, as appropriate, of the Executive Session on the status of the implementation of the
declaration obligations set out in section D, subsection I, of this Article.  The Director-
General shall include in this report information relating to paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
4. Notwithstanding the action taken by the Director-General specified in paragraphs 1
to 3 above, if any State Party has not submitted its initial declarations by the expiry of a
one year period, or its annual declarations by the expiry of a six month period, following the
relevant deadline for submission established under paragraph 2 of section D, subsection I, of
this Article, the State Party may not have access to the declarations of other States Parties.
The Executive Council shall consider any explanations provided by the State Party and, if not
satisfied, may decide whether to apply one or more of the following measures until the
Director-General confirms receipt of the declarations concerned:
(a) The State Party may not invoke the declaration clarification procedure, as
provided for in section D, subsection II, of this Article, or a facility investigation;
(b) The State Party may not request from the Technical Secretariat technical
assistance under Article VII other than assistance in the preparation of declarations including
the establishment and functioning of the National Authority;
(c) The State Party may not invoke those provisions on consultation, clarification
and cooperation as provided for in section E of this Article which directly involve the
Organization.
5. At any time the Executive Council may decide in light of the explanations submitted
by the State Party concerned to suspend the operation of any of the measures in paragraph 4
and specify a prescribed time frame for remedial action.  The Executive Council shall keep
the operation of these provisions under review.
6. The State Party concerned may participate in any Executive Council consideration or
review of the operation of these measures, but may not vote on the issue.
7. If a State Party has not submitted its initial declarations by the expiry of a two year
period, or its annual declarations by the expiry of a 12 month period, following the relevant
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deadline for submission established under paragraph 2 of section D, subsection I, of this
Article, the following provisions shall apply until the Director-General confirms receipt of
the declarations concerned:
(a) The State Party shall have no vote in the Conference of the States Parties;
(b) The State Party shall not be eligible for election as a member of the Executive
Council or, if already a member of the Executive Council, shall be suspended from
membership.
8. The Conference of States Parties shall consider the operation of these provisions.  The
Conference of States Parties may decide in light of the explanations submitted by the State
Party concerned to suspend the operation of any of the measures in paragraph 7 and specify a
prescribed time frame for remedial action.
9. The State Party concerned may participate in any Conference of States Parties
consideration or review of the operation of these measures, but may not vote on the issue.
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E.  CONSULTATION, CLARIFICATION AND COOPERATION
1. States Parties shall without prejudice to their rights and obligations under Article V of
the Convention, and without prejudice to their right to request an investigation, consult and
cooperate, directly among themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate
international procedures, including within the framework of the United Nations and in
accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object and
purpose of the Convention, or the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol and to
clarify and resolve any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with
the obligations of this Protocol or the Convention.65   For these purposes, States Parties shall
follow, inter alia, one or more of the following procedures:
(a) Seek clarification from another State Party directly, or through the offices of a
third State Party, or other appropriate international procedures.  In the case of a written
request for clarification, the requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the
requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 15 days after receipt
of the request.  The requesting and requested States Parties may, if they agree, keep the
Executive Council and Director-General informed of the request and the response;
(b) Submit a written request for clarification concerning another State Party,
together with information upon which the request is made, to the Director-General. The
Director-General shall immediately forward the request to the State Party concerned. The
requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Director-General as soon as
possible, but in any case not later than 15 days after receipt of the request.  The Director-
General shall immediately forward the clarification to the requesting State Party.  If agreed
by both the requesting and requested States Parties, the Director-General shall keep the
Executive Council and/or all other States Parties informed of the request and the basis for the
request as well as the response;
(c) If the case is particularly serious, submit a written request for clarification
concerning another State Party, together with information upon which the request is made, to
the Executive Council which shall forward the request to the requested State Party through
the Director-General not later than 24 hours after its receipt.  The requested State Party shall
provide the response to the Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case not later
than 15 days after receipt of the request.  The Executive Council shall take note of the
response and forward it to the requesting State Party not later than 24 hours after its receipt.
The Executive Council shall inform without delay all other States Parties about any such
request for clarification and the basis for this request as well as the response provided by the
requested State Party.
2. For the purposes of obtaining further clarification, the Executive Council may call on
the Director-General to consult the Scientific Advisory Board and/or establish a group of
                                                
65Our recommendation is that clarification of any ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies, or omissions relating to
facilities that appear to meet the criteria for declaration but which have not been declared should be addressed
through Declaration Clarification Procedures.  See Briefing Paper No. 26 Visits: The Emerging Portfolio,
November 1999, para. 43.  Consequently, the process of consultation, clarification and cooperation in Article
III, section E should be used to address any matter which may be raised relating to the object and purpose of the
Convention, or the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol and to clarify and resolve any matter which
may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the obligations of this Protocol or the Convention.
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experts from the list of investigation personnel designated and approved in accordance with
the procedures set out in Annex D, section I, to examine all available information and data
relevant to the situation causing concern.  The Scientific Advisory Board or the group of
experts shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council on its findings as soon as
possible; if a final report cannot be submitted within 30 days, an interim report shall be
provided.
3. If, following receipt of the clarification obtained pursuant to paragraph 1, the
requesting State Party considers that the response does not resolve the concern, and that it
needs to seek further clarification, or if it has not received the clarification within the times
specified in paragraph 1, or if the requested State Party makes it clear to the requesting State
Party, that it will not provide the requested clarification, the requesting State Party may
request in writing, providing reasons why the clarification does not resolve the concern:
(a) The Executive Council to obtain further clarification from the requested State
Party or to obtain from the requested State Party the reasons as to why it has not provided the
clarification as required under the provisions of this Article within the times specified in
paragraph 1, or why the requested State Party will not provide the requested clarification;
and/or
(b) A special session of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved
that are not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part.  In such a special
session the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend to the States
Parties involved any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the situation.
4. If the concern of a State Party about possible non-compliance has not been resolved
within 60 days after the submission of the request for clarification to the Executive Council,
and if the State Party believes its concern warrants urgent consideration, notwithstanding its
right to request an investigation, it may request in writing a special session of the Conference
of States Parties in accordance with Article IX.  At such a special session, the Conference
shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve
the situation.
5. The requested State Party may at any time during the consultation, clarification and
cooperation process:
(a) Request the Executive Council to consider the matter on the basis of the
information which was made available in the request as well as on information which has
been made available by the requested State Party, and, if appropriate, also on the basis of
information received from the Technical Secretariat based on the declarations submitted by
the States Parties and any other relevant information which it has acquired in the performance
of its functions;
(b) In the case of a concern involving compliance with the declaration obligations
of this Protocol, request the Director-General to mandate the Technical Secretariat to conduct
a visit for the sole purpose of resolving the concern.  The visit shall be conducted according
to the procedures for voluntary clarification visits set out in section D, subsection II of this
Article;
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6. If requested by all the States Parties concerned, other States Parties or relevant
international organizations may undertake to assist in clarifying or resolving matters related
to a concern about non-compliance which has been raised as a matter for consultation,
clarification and cooperation.
7. Nothing in the above arrangements shall prejudice States Parties’ rights to arrange by
mutual consent for any procedures among themselves.
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F.  MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE III OF
THE CONVENTION66
(A) GENERAL PROVISIONS67
1.  Each State Party undertakes to implement specific measures, including those set
out in this section, designed to enhance compliance and ensure effective and full
implementation of Article III of the Convention among the States Parties to the
Protocol.  The implementation of such measures shall be aimed at ensuring that
transfers of dual-use microbial and other biological agents, toxins and equipment will
only be used for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.
2. The Organization shall assist States Parties to develop and implement
procedures for transfers of dual-use microbial and other biological agents, toxins and
equipment for peaceful purposes.  The Organization may also provide a forum for
consultation on matters related to the transfer of dual-use microbial and other
biological agents, toxins and equipment for peaceful purposes and the implementation
of Article III  provisions of the Convention among the States Parties to the Protocol.
3.  The Organization shall also develop a regime for transfers of dual-use microbial
and other biological agents, toxins and equipment to States not party to the Protocol.
(B)  TRANSFERS TO STATES PARTIES TO THE PROTOCOL
4. States Parties, in order to ensure compliance with Article III of the Convention and
with the objective of preventing dual-use items from being utilized for purposes
prohibited by the Convention68, shall only transfer to other States Parties dual-use
microbial and other biological agents, toxins and equipment for purposes not prohibited by
the Convention, in accordance with the following guidelines:
(a) Any request made by a State Party for the procurement of microbial and
other biological agents and/or toxins listed in Annex A shall be accompanied by
information on purpose, quantity required, site or facility for proposed use, quantity to be
produced at the site or facility, place where intended to be stored and end-use certificate;
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(b) Any request made by a State Party for the procurement of equipment listed in
Annex A shall be accompanied by information on proposed application, quantity required,
site or facility for proposed use, quantity of biological material to be produced at the site or
facility, place where intended to be stored if different from the site or facility for proposed
use and end-use certificate;
                                                
66The proposals for this Section are based upon the analysis in Briefing Paper No. 28, The BTWC Protocol:
Improving the Implementation of Article III of the Convention, January 2000.
67This paragraph is similar to and based upon the introductory text relating to several Articles of the Protocol.
68Text from paragraph 2 of AHG/51 Part 1, Article III Section F.
69As has been argued in Briefing Papers, containment is not a necessary prerequisite for possible misuse of
dual-use microbial and other biological agents, toxins and equipment.
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(c) Any transfer of equipment in the following categories shall be notified to
the Organization;
(i) Fermenters or bioreactors designed to prevent the release of aerosols
with a total internal volume of 100 litres or more;
(ii) Aerosol chambers designed for use for the dissemination of aerosols of
microorganisms or toxins;
(iii) Equipment designed for use in experimental aerobiology studies to
generate aerosols of microorganisms or toxins;
(iv) Aerosol analytical equipment designed to determine the size of aerosol
particles up to 20 microns in diameter that contain microorganisms or toxins.
5.70  The end-user certificate to be provided in the request of the State Party for agents,
toxins and equipment listed in Annex A shall state the following:
(i) That they will only be used for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention;
(ii) That they will not be retransferred without prior authorization from
the supplier State(s) Party(s);
(iii) Their types and quantities;
(iv) Their end-use(s); and
(v) The name and address(Es) of the end-user(s).
6. In fulfilment of the obligation in paragraph 3 above each State Party shall take into
account as appropriate the stated end-use of the transfer and any supporting information; the
nature and implementation in the State Party requesting the transfer of the measures specified
in paragraph 8 of this section; and the extent to which these measures are effective in
fulfilling the obligations of Articles III and IV of the Convention.
(C) NOTIFICATIONS
7. In order to promote transparency and to enhance confidence-building among States
Parties, each State Party shall, according to the standardized formats for reporting
international transfers contained in Appendix G, notify the Technical Secretariat annually of
any imports or exports of the following equipment which have been completed for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, during the previous calendar year:
                                                
70Text from paragraph 11(c) of AHG/51 Part 1, Article III Section F has been modified to be consistent with the
end-use certificates required under the Chemical Weapons Convention (see Briefing Paper No. 28, The BTWC
Protocol: Improving the Implementation of Article III of the Convention, January 2000, paragraphs 20 and 21).
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(a) Fermenters or bioreactors with a total internal volume of 100 litres or more for
which the end-use indicated by the State Party requesting the transfer is use in a maximum
biological containment laboratory or facility;
(b) Chambers designed for aerosol challenge testing with microorganisms or
toxins, and having a capacity of one cubic metre or more.
8. Each State Party shall notify the Technical Secretariat on the national laws,
regulations and administrative measures it has adopted to implement Articles III and IV of
the Convention and Article X of this Protocol not later than 180 days after entry into force
of this Protocol for that State Party.  Each State Party shall also notify the Technical
Secretariat of the national laws, regulations and administrative measures it has adopted
to control the internal transfers of microbial or other agents and toxins within its
territory.71  Each State Party shall submit to the Technical Secretariat annually any
modifications or additions made to such national laws, regulations and administrative
measures during the previous calendar year together with reports on the national
implementation of those laws, regulations and measures relating to interstate transfers.
9. Following submission of the national reports pursuant to paragraph 7 and 8 above,
States Parties may, if they deem it appropriate, consult and exchange among themselves
further information on an ad hoc basis, in order to improve clarity and avoid discrepancies in
the data and information reported.
10. Information submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 and 8 above shall be made available to
States Parties on request.
(D)  TRANSFERS TO STATES NOT PARTY TO THE PROTOCOL
11. States Parties, in order to ensure compliance with Article III of the Convention and
with the objective of preventing dual-use items from being utilized for purposes
prohibited by the Convention, shall only transfer to States Parties to the Convention and
not to the Protocol dual-use microbial and other biological agents, toxins and equipment for
purposes not prohibited by the Convention, in accordance with the guidelines specified
above, and shall in addition:
(a) Declare annually to the Technical Secretariat all transfers to States
Parties to the Convention and not to the Protocol of microbial and other biological
agents and toxins and equipment listed in Annex A.  Such declarations shall provide
information specifying which microbial and other biological agents, toxins and
equipment have been transferred, the quantity, recipient and purpose.72
12.  Five years after entry into force of this Protocol, the Conference shall consider the
need to establish other measures regarding transfers to States Parties to the Convention
and not party to the Protocol of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever
their origin or method of production, or equipment or material which is capable of
                                                
71A State Party in deciding whether or not to make a transfer needs to know about the laws and regulations
within the recipient State Party in respect of both internal and interstate transfers.
72Text developed from language in the Chemical Weapons Convention (see Briefing Paper No. 28, The BTWC
Protocol: Improving the Implementation of Article III of the Convention, January 2000, paragraphs 19, 20 and
21).
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using such agents or toxins for purposes which would contravene Article I of the
Convention.
13. No transfer of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or
method of production, or equipment or material which is capable of using such agents or
toxins for purposes which would contravene Article I of the Convention, shall be allowed to
non-States Parties of the Convention and the Protocol except for humanitarian purposes
with the prior approval of the Organization or in emergency circumstances to provide
humanitarian assistance.   Any such transfers in emergency circumstances shall be
notified within 30 days to the Organization.
(E) CONSULTATION, CLARIFICATION AND COOPERATION
10.73    Pursuant to Article III, Section E. Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation,
States Parties shall without prejudice to their rights and obligations under Article V of
the Convention, or their rights and obligations under this Protocol, consult and
cooperate, directly among themselves, or through the Organization, on any matter
which may be raised relating to the object and purpose of the Convention, or the
implementation of the provisions of this Protocol including those relating to this Article
and to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause concern about possible non-
compliance with the obligations of this Protocol.
                                                
73This is based upon paragraph 1 of Article III, Section E Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation.
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G.  INVESTIGATIONS74
(A) TYPES OF INVESTIGATIONS
1. Each State Party shall have the right to request an investigation which shall be carried
out for the sole purpose of determining the facts relating to a specific concern about possible
non-compliance with the Convention by any other State Party.
2. Each State Party shall be under the obligation to keep all requests within the scope of
the Convention and refrain from unfounded or abusive requests.
3. The requesting State Party shall specify in each request which one of the following
types of investigations it is seeking:
(a) Investigations to be conducted in geographic areas where the exposure of
humans, animals or plants to microbial or other biological agents and/or toxins has given rise
to a concern about possible non-compliance under Article I of the Convention or alleged use
of biological weapons, hereinafter referred to as “field investigations”;
(b) Investigations of alleged breaches of obligations under Article I of the
Convention, to be conducted inside the perimeter around a particular facility at which there is
a substantive basis for a concern that it is involved in activities prohibited by Article I of the
Convention, hereinafter referred to as “facility investigations”.
(B) OUTBREAKS OF DISEASE
Exclusion of all outbreaks of disease which are due to natural causes
4. All outbreaks of disease which are due to natural causes do not pose a compliance
concern under the Convention and shall not be a reason for an investigation of a non-
compliance concern.
5. Nothing in this Protocol shall prejudice the right of a State Party to investigate, as per
its national regulations, outbreaks of disease which occur on its territory or in any place under
its jurisdiction or control, or if it so wishes, with the assistance of other State(s) and/or
relevant international organizations.
Investigation of disease outbreaks relating to specific concern about possible non-compliance
with the Convention
6. If a State Party has a concern that an outbreak of disease is directly related to
activities prohibited by the Convention, it shall have the right to request a field investigation
to address the non-compliance concern.  In accordance with the requirements of Annex D,
section II, such request shall contain detailed evidence, and other information, and analysis
substantiating why, in its view, it considers the outbreak of disease not to be naturally
occurring and directly related to activities prohibited by the Convention.  Information coming
                                                
74The text in AHG/51 (Part II) has been used as the baseline for this section.
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from the mass media75 can not be considered as evidence on the basis of which the request
shall be made. Relevant information from private persons who have direct knowledge of the
alleged event(s) or of the results and/or details of any prior national or international
investigation of the event(s) can be considered as evidence.
7. The Executive Council shall not consider a request for a field investigation of an
outbreak of disease, unless it determines that there is a basis for concern substantiated by
detailed evidence, and other information, and analysis that the outbreak(s) of disease, is not
naturally occurring and is directly related to activities prohibited by the Convention.  The
Executive Council, if it deems it appropriate for its consideration of the above request, shall
also request from the most relevant international organization(s) such as, but not limited to,
the WHO, OIE, FAO, all available information in its/their possession, that may be relevant to
the outbreak. When a State Party requests a field investigation of an outbreak(s) of disease on
the territory or in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party, the State
Party where the investigation is proposed to occur shall have the right to provide evidence,
and other information, and analysis that indicates that the outbreak of disease is naturally
occurring or otherwise unrelated to activities prohibited by the Convention. If deemed
appropriate by the Executive Council as a matter of procedure under Article IX, paragraph
30, other State(s) Party(ies) may also provide information relevant to whether the outbreak(s)
of disease is naturally occurring and/or whether it is related to activities prohibited by the
Convention.  All of the evidence, and other information, and analysis submitted, shall be
taken into account by the Executive Council in its consideration of the investigation request
in accordance with the request procedures of this section of Article III.
Unusual outbreaks of disease
8. The diseases which are endemic in the region and present the expected
epidemiological features shall not be considered as an unusual outbreak of disease.  Such
outbreaks of disease may be investigated by the affected State Party.
(C) ALLEGED USE OF A BIOLOGICAL WEAPON
9. A State Party has a right to request a field investigation of an alleged use of a
biological weapon if it believes that a biological weapon was used against it on the territory
under its jurisdiction and control.
(D) CONSULTATION, CLARIFICATION AND COOPERATION
10. States Parties may, without prejudice to their right to request an investigation, and
prior to the submission of any request for an investigation make use of and follow the
relevant procedures set out in section E of this Article on consultation, clarification and
cooperation in order to clarify and resolve satisfactorily any matter which may cause concern
about possible non-compliance with the obligations of the Convention.
(E) INITIATION OF INVESTIGATIONS
11. An investigation may be requested to be conducted on the territory of a State Party, or
in any other place under its jurisdiction or control, regardless of the form of ownership of the
                                                
75The words "or private persons" are deleted because of the contradiction with the subsequent sentence.
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facility or the area subject to the investigation, in accordance with the provisions of this
Protocol.
12. An investigation may also be requested to be conducted in any place on the territory
of a non-State Party which is under its jurisdiction or control, if any State Party has a
concern(s) that another State Party, which shall be identified in the request, is the alleged
cause of the non-compliance concern.  Upon receipt of such a request, the Director-General
shall immediately contact the non-State Party concerned to seek:
(a) Its consent to the conduct of the investigation; and, subject to such consent
(b) Its agreement that the provisions of this Protocol governing the conduct of
investigations shall apply to the investigation or, alternatively, its agreement to different
procedures for the conduct of the investigation which the Director-General is satisfied would
enable the facts relating to the specific concern about non-compliance raised in the request to
be determined.
The Director-General shall inform the Executive Council and the requesting State Party of
the outcome of such consultations as soon as possible.
13. Requests for investigations to be conducted in accordance with this Protocol shall be
submitted in writing by the requesting State Party to the Executive Council and at the same
time to the Director-General for processing in accordance with procedures as set out in this
section.
14. If, during the course of a field investigation, the investigation team has acquired
information (as a result of the conduct of the activities specified in Annex D, section II,
subsection D) indicating that a facility on the territory or in any other place under the
jurisdiction or control of a State Party, is directly relevant to the alleged non-compliance
concern that has been identified in the field investigation mandate, the investigation team
leader shall provide a factual statement of the information and a factual description of how
the information was obtained, to the receiving State Party.  The receiving State Party may
within 24 hours comment on the factual statement.  The investigation team leader shall then
submit the factual statement, description of how the information was obtained and the
comments of the receiving State Party to the Executive Council through the Director-General.
15. Upon receipt of the information, the Executive Council shall provide the information
to the receiving State Party, the requesting State Party, and, if appropriate, the State Party on
whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or control the facility in question is located. Only
these States Parties may submit a request for a facility investigation which involves this
information. Such request shall be considered in accordance with the provisions contained in
paragraphs 10 to 13 and 18 to 20 of this section.
16. The Executive Council’s consideration of the information or any request for a facility
investigation received from a State Party which received its information in accordance with
paragraph 15 above and any decision made there-on shall be conducted in accordance with
the provisions set out in paragraphs 19 to 27 of this section.
17. If the Executive Council decides that a facility investigation must be conducted, the
investigation shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions for facility investigations
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set out in this section, and Annex D, sections I and III. The reports of the field and facility
investigations shall be considered independently or simultaneously as determined by the
Executive Council depending on the specific circumstances involved.
(F) INFORMATION TO BE SUBMITTED WITH A REQUEST FOR AN
INVESTIGATION TO ADDRESS A CONCERN OF NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH THE CONVENTION
18. A State Party requesting an investigation shall provide supporting evidence and other
information required in accordance with the provisions set out in Annex D.  All such
evidence and other information shall be as precise as possible.
(F) FOLLOW-UP AFTER SUBMISSION OF AN INVESTIGATION REQUEST AND
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DECISION-MAKING
19. The Director-General, after receiving an investigation request, shall acknowledge
receipt of it to the requesting State Party within two hours and shall provide a copy of the
investigation request to the State Party sought to be investigated within 6 hours.
20. The Director-General shall ascertain within six hours after receipt of the investigation
request whether the investigation request meets the requirements set out in section II of
Annex D, for field investigations, and section III of Annex D, for facility investigations.  If
the Director-General is satisfied that the investigation request meets these requirements,
he/she shall so inform the Executive Council immediately, and the State Party sought to be
investigated and, if applicable, the potential host State Party/State, within six hours.  If the
Director-General determines that the investigation request does not meet these requirements,
the Director-General shall so inform the Executive Council and the requesting State Party,
and shall inform the requesting State Party of the reasons for this determination.  The
requesting State Party may submit a revised request, which shall be submitted and processed
in the same way as an original request.
21. When the investigation request fulfils the requirements, the Director-General may
begin with appropriate preparations for the investigation.
22. The Director-General, may upon receipt of an investigation request referring to an
investigation area under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, propose to the requesting
State Party to immediately seek clarification from the State Party sought to be investigated in
order to clarify and resolve the concern raised in the request. A State Party which receives a
request for clarification pursuant to this paragraph shall provide the requesting State Party
and the Director-General with explanations and with other relevant information as soon as
possible but no later than 24 hours after receipt of the request for clarification without
prejudice to its rights to provide additional relevant information during the entire process of
the consideration of the investigation request by the Executive Council. Unless the requesting
State Party considers the concern raised in the investigation request to be resolved and
withdraws the request, the Executive Council shall take a decision on the request in
accordance with paragraph 24.
23. The Executive Council shall begin its consideration of an investigation request
immediately after it is informed by the Director-General, in accordance with paragraph 19,
that the request meets the requirements and shall complete its consideration not later than
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1276 hours after it is so informed.  Upon the conclusion of the Executive Council’s
consideration of an investigation request, the Director-General shall provide a copy of the
request and the decision to all States Parties within 24 hours.
24. The investigation shall proceed unless the Executive Council decides by a three-
quarters majority of all its members against carrying out the investigation77.
25. The State Party sought to be investigated shall have the right to inform the Executive
Council about the nature of the facility or area indicated in the investigation request, and
provide information to indicate why, in its view, this facility is unrelated to the Convention.
It may also state, if it believes it necessary to do so, why in its view the investigation request
is unfounded or abusive.
26. In its examination of the investigation request, the Executive Council shall consider
all the evidence and other information as well as analysis provided by the requesting State
Party and the State Party sought to be investigated, as well as any information resulting from
any prior consultation or clarification process and may also take into account other relevant
information available to it.  In doing so, the Executive Council may also decide, without
prejudice to the time-line set out in paragraph 23, to seek more information from the
requesting State Party, the State Party sought to be investigated and from other relevant
international organizations.  If such information cannot be provided by other relevant
international organizations within the time-line set out in paragraph 23, the Director-General
shall inform the Executive Council as appropriate.  In the case of the Executive Council not
approving the request for investigation, it may recommend other actions to resolve the matter
such as bilateral or multilateral consultations to resolve the issue.
27. The requesting State Party as well as the State Party sought to be investigated, and, if
applicable, in the case of a request for a field investigation, the State Party identified in the
request as the alleged cause of the non-compliance concern, may participate in the Executive
Council’s consideration of an investigation request, but shall not have the right to vote on the
request, whether or not such States Parties are members of the Executive Council.
28. The investigation mandate shall be made available to the receiving State Party
immediately after the mandate is issued to the investigation team by the Director-General
which shall be no later than 12 hours before the team’s arrival at the point of entry.
(H) ACCESS AND MEASURES TO GUARD AGAINST ABUSE DURING THE
CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS
General principles
29. Investigations shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.
30. The receiving State Party shall provide access to the investigation team and at the
same time have the right to take such measures it deems necessary in accordance with the
                                                
76This language reflects that of the CWC, Article IX, paragraph 17 as there is no logical reason for a delay.
77The presumption should be that an investigation, once requested and meeting the requirements of Annex D,
will take place unless the Executive Council votes to stop the investigation.  See Briefing Paper No. 15, Non-
Compliance Concern Investigations: Initiation Procedures, October 1998.  This is vital for a strong Protocol as
the ultimate measure available to the States Parties is the carrying out of an investigation.
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provisions of this section to protect its national security interests and/or to protect
confidential information and data (including commercial proprietary information) during an
investigation within the relevant time frames specified in Annex D in accordance with the
following:
(a) All such access shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol for
the sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the investigation mandate;
(b) The receiving State Party shall have the right to inform the investigation team
about the areas, facilities or buildings which it considers sensitive and/or not related to the
Convention;
(c) The investigation team and the receiving State Party shall also negotiate the
activities to be performed during the investigation; all activities shall be performed in
accordance with the relevant provisions for these activities contained in Annex D, sections II
and III;
(d) The receiving State Party shall have the right to make the final decision on the
nature and extent of such access, taking into account its rights and obligations under this
Protocol;
(e) In meeting the requirements to provide access, the receiving State Party shall
be under the obligation to provide the greatest degree of access possible, taking into account
any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and
seizures;
(f) The receiving State Party shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its
compliance with the Convention and, to this end, to enable the investigation team to fulfil its
mandate.
31. The receiving State Party shall have the right to take measures, as it deems necessary
to protect national security and/or to protect confidential information and data (including
commercial proprietary information) in accordance with the provisions of this section and
taking into account its obligations under this Protocol. Such measures may include but shall
not be limited to the following:
(a) Making the final decision on the nature and extent of such access as provided
for in paragraph 30, including to deny access to particularly sensitive places, or rooms not
related to the investigation mandate, within the facility or area specified in paragraph 38;
(b) Removal of sensitive papers from office spaces and direct view;
(c) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment;
(d) Shrouding sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic
systems;
(e) Logging off of computer systems and turning off data indicating devices;
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(f) Using random selective access techniques whereby the team is requested to
select a given percentage or number of buildings of their choice to investigate; the same
principle can apply to the interior and content of sensitive buildings or documents;
(g) Limiting the number of team members who have access to certain buildings,
structures or places within the area specified in paragraphs 38 and 44;
(h) Limiting the viewing angle;
(i) Limiting the time investigation team members may spend in any area or
building;
(j) At any time during the investigation, notifying the investigation team of the
products and processes which involve national security and/or the protection of confidential
information and data (including commercial proprietary information) and its rights to
safeguard it.  It may request that if a specific piece of information is released to the team, it
should be accorded the most stringent protection measures in conformity with the
confidentiality provisions.
32. If the receiving State Party provides less than full access to places, activities or
information, it shall make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means to demonstrate
compliance and to clarify the possible non-compliance concern that generated the
investigation.  The nature and extent of access, including any alternative means to
demonstrate compliance, provided by the receiving State Party, and the extent to which this
enabled the investigation team to fulfil its mandate, shall be recorded factually in the
investigation report.
33. These provisions may not be invoked by the receiving State Party to conceal any
evasion of its obligations not to engage in activities prohibited under the Convention.
34. In carrying out the investigation in accordance with the investigation mandate, the
investigation team shall use only those methods necessary to provide sufficient relevant facts
to clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention,
and shall refrain from activities not relevant thereto.  It shall request, collect and/or document
only such facts as are related to the investigation mandate, but shall neither seek nor
document information which is clearly not related thereto, unless the receiving State Party
expressly requests it to do so.  Any material collected and subsequently found not to be
relevant shall not be retained.
35. The investigation team shall conduct the investigation in the least intrusive manner
possible consistent with the effective and timely implementation of its mandate.  As a rule, it
shall begin with the procedures it deems least intrusive and proceed to more intrusive
procedures only as required to fulfil its mandate.
36. The investigation team shall take into consideration suggested modifications of the
investigation plan and proposals which may be made by the receiving State Party, at any
stage of the investigation, including the pre-investigation briefing, to ensure, inter alia, that
sensitive equipment, information or places are protected.  The investigation plan shall be
handled in accordance with section II and section III of Annex D.
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37. If the investigation team considers it necessary in order to fulfil its mandate, the
investigation team shall have the right to request clarification in connection with ambiguities
that may arise during an investigation.  Such requests shall be made promptly to or through
the representative of the receiving State Party.  The representative shall make every
reasonable effort to provide the investigation team with such clarification as may be
necessary to remove the ambiguity.
Field investigations
38. The receiving State Party shall provide access within the investigation area within 24
hours after arrival at the point of entry in order to conduct activities pursuant to this Article
and sections I and II of Annex D for the duration of the investigation as specified in Annex
D, section II.
39. The receiving State Party shall provide access to places within the investigation area
external to buildings or other structures for the sole purpose of enabling the investigation
team to conduct specific on-site activities identified in, and in accordance with, Annex D,
section II.  The extent and nature of access within a particular place(s) within the
investigation area shall be negotiated between the investigation team and the receiving State
Party in accordance with paragraphs 29 to 37 of this section.  Such negotiated access in
accordance with paragraphs 29 to 37 of this section, shall allow access to all humans, animals
and/or plants that may have been affected by microbial or other biological agents or toxins
directly related to the non-compliance concern being investigated.
40. The receiving State Party shall allow the investigation team to conduct only the
following on-site activities identified in Annex D, section II inside buildings, hospitals, other
structures or places:
(a) Interviewing in accordance with Annex D, section II;
(b) Disease/intoxination-related examination in accordance with Annex D,
section II;
(c) Collection and examination of background information and data in accordance
with Annex D, section II;
(d) The analysis of samples collected in accordance with Annex D, section II;
41. The access provided for in these paragraphs shall not interfere or impede with any
national measures taken to deal with the outbreak of disease.
42. The investigation team may, during the course of the investigation, request the
receiving State Party to provide access to a facility, building or other structure as objects of
investigation within the area(s) designated for investigation if access is required in order to
fulfil the field investigation mandate. The investigation team shall together with its request
for access provide the receiving State Party with information substantiating its request.
43. If the request of the investigation team is accepted, the rules governing the conduct of
activities inside any facility, building or structure shall be those specified in this section and
Annex D, section III. If the receiving State Party denies the investigation team’s request, the
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investigation team may submit the request to the Director-General for submission to the
Executive Council for consideration.
Facility investigations
44. The receiving State Party shall provide access within the requested and, if different,
final perimeter not later than 36 hours after receipt of notification pursuant to Annex D,
section III for the conduct of activities pursuant to this Article and sections I and III of Annex
D for the duration of the investigation as specified in Annex D, section III.
(I) FINAL REPORT
45. The preparation and handling of the final report shall be conducted in accordance with
Annex D.
(J) REVIEW AND CONSIDERATION OF THE FINAL REPORT
46. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and functions as
determined in Article IX, section C, review and consider the final report of the investigation
team as soon as it is presented, and address any concern as to whether:
(a) Any non-compliance has occurred;
(b) The request had been in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol;
(c) The right to request an investigation has been abused.
47. With respect to any concerns raised under paragraph 46 (c), one or more of the
following factors could be taken into account, where relevant:
(a) Information relating to the investigated site available prior to the investigation
request (the authenticity and reliability of any information would need to be carefully
assessed);
(b) Whether any of the information submitted as part of the investigation request
was shown to be false;
(c) Information from and/or outcome or results of prior consultations/
clarifications relevant to the request, if applicable;
(d) Whether any investigation(s) (including any instituted under Article VI of the
Convention) had previously been requested by the same State Party vis-ˆ-vis the same
investigated site, and if so, their number, frequency and outcome (including any follow-up
action).
48. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and
functions, that there has been abuse, it shall consider and decide on, inter alia, whether:
(a) The requesting State Party shall bear some or all of the financial implications
of the investigation, including those which have been borne by the receiving State Party;
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(b) To suspend the right of the requesting State Party to request an investigation
for a period of time, as determined by the Executive Council;
(c) To suspend the right of the requesting State Party to serve on the Executive
Council for a period of time.
49. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and
functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 45, it shall take the
appropriate measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance, including, if
appropriate, specific recommendations to the Conference which shall consider the
recommendations in accordance with Article IX and take the appropriate measures in
accordance with Article V.
50. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and
functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 46 (a), it shall
distribute the investigation report to all States Parties before the next session of the
Conference.
51. The receiving State Party, the requesting State Party and any other State Party that has
been identified in an investigation request as the alleged cause of the non-compliance
concern, shall have the right to participate in the review process in the Executive Council but
shall have no vote.
52. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties and the next session of the
Conference of States Parties of the outcome of the process.
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H.  ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS78
1. In the specific case of a declaration, a visit or an investigation provided for in this
Article, in which more than one State Party/State is involved, the following provisions shall
apply.
(A) DECLARATIONS
2. In cases where the programmes and/or activities or facilities subject to declarations in
accordance with the provisions of this Article exist/existed in places on the territory of a State
Party, but which are/were under the jurisdiction or control of another State not party to the
Protocol, the provision of paragraph 1, section D, of this Article shall not apply to that State
Party.  The State Party concerned shall seek confirmation from the State under whose
jurisdiction or control the programmes and/or activities or facilities fall, whether they are
subject to the provisions of paragraph 1, section D, subsection I, of this Article.  If so, the
State Party in its initial and annual declaration shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the
existence of such programmes and/or activities or facilities on its territory.
3. In cases where the programmes and/or activities or facilities subject  to declarations in
accordance with the provisions of this Article exist/existed in places on the territory of a State
Party, but which are/were under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party, the
provision of paragraph 1, section D of this Article shall only apply to the latter State Party.
The latter shall provide the former with information on the presence of such programmes
and/or activities or facilities and with a copy of its declaration relating to such programmes
and/or activities or facilities simultaneously with the submission of the declaration to the
Organization.  The State Party on whose territory aforementioned places are/were shall
inform the Organization about the fact of the presence of such programmes and/or activities
or facilities in cases where such fact of their presence is known to this State Party.
4. In cases where the programmes and/or activities or facilities which are subject to
declarations in accordance with the provisions of this Article exist/existed in places on the
territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, but are/were
conducted or administered by another State Party, the former shall have the right to gain
access to information and/or to receive such information required to fulfil its obligations
under this section, from the latter State Party.  The State Party on whose territory there exist
programmes and/or activities or facilities subject to declarations shall seek confirmation from
the State Party responsible for such programmes and/or activities or facilities whether it has
fulfilled its obligations under the Protocol, and include in its own declarations a report to that
effect.
                                                
78The text in AHG/51 (Part II) has been used as the baseline for this section.
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(B) VISITS
Visits on the territory of a host State Party
6. In cases where a facility of a visited State Party is located on the territory of a host
State Party, the visited State Party and the host State Party shall cooperate and make
arrangements to allow the visit to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this
Protocol.
7. In the case of visits on the territory of a host State Party/State, the host State Party
shall be notified by the Director-General in the same manner as the visited State Party is, and
the host State should be notified in an appropriate manner.  In this case, the visit mandate and
notification shall contain the name of the host State Party/State.
(C) INVESTIGATIONS
Access and conduct of investigations involving States other than the receiving State Party
9. In cases where a facility or area of a receiving State Party is located on the territory of
a host State Party or where the transport from the point of entry to a facility or area subject to
investigation requires transit through the territory of another State Party, the receiving State
Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such investigations in
accordance with this Protocol.  The host State Party shall facilitate the investigation of that
facility or area and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the investigation team to
carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner.  States Parties through whose territory
transit is required to a facility or area to be investigated of a receiving State Party, shall
facilitate such transit.
10. In cases where a facility or area of a receiving State Party is located on the territory of
a host State not party to this Protocol, the receiving State Party shall take all necessary
measures to ensure that investigations of that facility or area can be carried out in accordance
with the provisions of this Protocol.  A State Party that has one or more facilities or areas on
the territory of a host State not party to this Protocol shall take all necessary measures to
ensure acceptance by the host State of the designated investigation personnel accepted by the
receiving State Party in accordance with the provisions set out in Annex D, section I,
paragraphs 2 to 16.  If a receiving State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate
that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.
11. In cases where a facility or area sought to be investigated is located on the territory of
a State Party, but in a place under the jurisdiction or control of a State not party to this
Protocol, such a State Party shall take all necessary measures as would be required of a host
State Party in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 9 above.
12. In cases where the investigation is related to paragraphs 9 to 11, the host State Party
shall be notified by the Director-General in the same manner as the receiving State Party is,
and the host State shall be notified in an appropriate manner.  In this case, the investigation
mandate and notification shall contain the name of the host State Party/State.
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 ARTICLE  IV79 80
CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS
1. The Organization shall conduct its activities provided for under this Protocol in the
least intrusive manner consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their
objectives.  It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its
responsibilities under this Protocol and shall use this data and information only for the
purpose of this Protocol.  It shall avoid, to the extent possible, any access to information and
data not related to the aims of this Protocol.  It shall take every precaution to protect the
confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities in the
implementation of this Protocol and, in particular, shall abide by the confidentiality
provisions set forth in this Protocol.
2. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures as it deems necessary to protect
confidential information in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol.
3. The Director-General shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring the protection
of all confidential information which comes into possession of the Technical Secretariat.
Based on guidelines provided for within this Protocol, the Director-General shall establish
and maintain a stringent regime governing the handling of confidential information by the
Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as "the Confidentiality Regime") including
measures to protect confidential information obtained in the course or as a result of on-site
activities as well as the necessary procedures to be followed in case of breaches or alleged
breaches of confidentiality to ensure effective protection against unauthorized disclosure.
This regime shall be approved and periodically reviewed by the Conference of the States
Parties.
4. States Parties shall be entitled to receive in accordance with the relevant provisions of
this Protocol the following data:
(a) The initial and annual declarations provided by States Parties on a reciprocal
basis in accordance with Article III, section D;
(b) Reports on the activities of the Technical Secretariat as compiled and issued
by the Director-General;
(c) Reports on investigations as well as observations and comments on these
reports, if any, from the receiving States Parties in accordance with Annex D;
(d) Reports on visits in accordance with Article III, section D, subsection II;
(e) Annual declarations required under Article VII;
(f) Other information and data to be supplied to States Parties in accordance with
the provisions of this Protocol.
                                                
79The text in AHG/51 (Part II) has been used as the baseline for this section.
80The amendments made to Article IV and Annex E are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 16,
Article IV: Confidentiality Provisions, March 2000.
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Each State Party shall treat information and data received from the Organization in
accordance with the level of confidentiality established for that information and data and
shall treat it exclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Protocol and
in accordance with its provisions.
5. The relevant organs and subsidiary organs of the Organization shall be entitled to
receive from the Technical Secretariat information and data necessary for the performance of
the functions entrusted to them by the provisions of this Protocol.  The provision of any
confidential information and data shall be strictly limited to the minimum necessary for the
performance of these functions and shall be in conformity with the procedures of the
Confidentiality Regime.
6. Any State Party to this Protocol which considers that it has been affected by a breach
of confidentiality or that its natural or legal persons have suffered from damage through such
a breach may seek to settle the dispute in accordance with the provisions set forth in
Article XII.  In case a dispute related to confidentiality cannot be settled between the States
Parties or between States Parties and the Organization directly, a commission for the
settlement of disputes related to confidentiality (hereinafter referred to as “Confidentiality
Commission”), set up as a subsidiary organ of the Conference in accordance with Article IX
shall consider the case.  The Confidentiality Commission shall have the powers and functions
as set forth in this Protocol.  The Commission shall be appointed by the Conference.  Rules
governing its composition and its operating procedures shall be adopted by the Conference.
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ARTICLE  V81
MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE
1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3
and 4, to ensure compliance with the Convention and this Protocol and to redress and remedy
any situation which contravenes their provisions.  In considering action pursuant to this
paragraph, the Conference shall take into account all information and recommendations on
the issues submitted by the Executive Council.
2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or by the
Executive Council, taking into account their respective powers and functions, to take
measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and where the
State Party fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, upon the
recommendation of the Executive Council, inter alia, restrict or suspend the State Party’s
rights and privileges under this Protocol until the Conference decides it has undertaken the
necessary action to conform with its obligations under the Convention and this Protocol.
3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of the Convention may result
from non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention or this Protocol, in particular
Article I of the Convention, the Conference may recommend to States Parties cooperative
measures which are in conformity with international law and designed to ensure the
fulfilment of the object and purpose of the Convention.
4. The Conference or, alternatively, if the case is particularly grave and urgent, the
Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to
the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations.
                                                
81The amendments made to Article V are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 8, Article V: Measures
to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, November 1999.
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ARTICLE  VI82
ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS
1. For the purposes of this Article, “Assistance” means the coordination and delivery to
States Parties of protection against biological and toxin weapons, including, inter alia, any of
the following: detection equipment including biosensors; alarm equipment; protective
equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants; prophylactic, diagnostic and/or
therapeutic medical measures and materials, and/or advice on any of these protective
measures.
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party
to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection
against biological and toxin weapons, for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information
concerning means of protection against biological and toxin weapons and to benefit from
scientific and technological exchanges pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol,
including Article VII thereof.83
4. The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later than 180 days after entry into force
of this Protocol and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data bank
containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against
biological and toxin weapons as well as such information as may be provided by States
Parties.
5. The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources available to it, and at the
request of a State Party, provide expert advice and assist the State Party in identifying how its
programmes for the development and improvement of a protective capacity against biological
and toxin weapons could be implemented.
6. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as impeding the right of States Parties to
request and provide assistance bilaterally and to conclude individual agreements with other
States Parties concerning the emergency procurement of assistance.
7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance to the extent possible through the
Organization and to this end may elect to take one or more of the following measures:
(a) To contribute to the voluntary fund for assistance to be established by the
Conference at its first session;
                                                
82The amendments made to Article VI are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 13, Article VI:
Assistance and Protection Against Biological and Toxin Weapons, January 2000.
83This language makes it clear that States Parties to the Protocol can benefit from scientific and technological
exchange under Article VII.
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(b) To conclude, if possible not later than 180 days after this Protocol enters into
force for it, agreements with the Organization concerning the procurement, upon demand, of
assistance;
(c) To declare, not later than 180 days after this Protocol enters into force for it,
the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the Organization.  If,
however, a State Party subsequently is unable to provide the assistance envisaged in its
declaration, it is still under the obligation to provide assistance in accordance with this
Article.
8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedure set forth in
paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 to receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of
use of biological and toxin weapons if it considers that:
(a) Biological and toxin weapons have been used against it;
(b) It is threatened by imminent actions that are prohibited for States Parties by
Article I of the Convention;
(c) It has credible reason to believe it is confronted by imminent actions or serious
threat with respect to actions that are prohibited for States Parties by Article I of the
Convention.
9. The request for assistance, substantiated by relevant information, shall be submitted to
the Director-General, who shall transmit it immediately to the Executive Council and to all
States Parties, requesting those States Parties which have volunteered assistance, in
accordance with subparagraphs 7 (b) and (c) to begin preparations to dispatch emergency
assistance in case of use of biological and toxin weapons, or humanitarian assistance in case
of serious threat of use of biological and toxin weapons to the State Party concerned, not later
than 12 hours after receipt of the request. 84
10.  The Director-General shall initiate, not later than 12 hours after receipt of a request
for assistance, from a State Party, an examination of the request in order to provide
foundation for further action by the Organization.  The Director-General shall complete the
examination within 72 hours and forward a report to the Executive Council and to States
Parties.  If necessary, the time required for completion of the examination may be extended
by periods of 72 hours with reports being submitted at the end of each 72 hour period, to the
Executive Council and to all States Parties.  The examination shall, as appropriate and in
conformity with the request and the information accompanying the request, establish relevant
facts related to the request as well as make recommendations on the type and scope of
supplementary assistance and protection needed.  In the case of request for assistance when a
State Party considers that biological or toxin weapons have been used against it, the Director-
General shall, when possible, incorporate into the examination report relevant factual
information from the affected area(s) and, as appropriate, progress reports from any
                                                
84The language proposing that provision of assistance should be conditional on submission of a simultaneous
request for a field investigation is deleted as it is not apparent why assistance under the Protocol should be
conditional -- there is no parallel requirement in the CWC.   Such a proposed conditionality fails to recognise
that a State Party may well require assistance at a much earlier time, well before it has sufficient information to
request a field investigation.
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investigation team which may be conducting a field investigation in the State Party
concerned.
11. The Executive Council shall meet not later than 24 hours after receiving an
examination report to consider the situation and shall take a decision by simple majority
within the following 24 hours on whether to instruct the Technical Secretariat to provide
supplementary assistance.  The Technical Secretariat shall immediately transmit to all States
Parties and relevant international organizations the examination report and the decision taken
by the Executive Council.  When so decided by the Executive Council, the Director-General
shall provide assistance immediately.  For this purpose, the Director-General may cooperate
with the requesting State Party, other States Parties and relevant international organizations.
The States Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to provide assistance.
12. If the information available from the ongoing examination or other reliable sources
would give sufficient proof that there are humans, animals or plants affected by the use of
biological and toxin weapons and immediate action is indispensable, the Director-General
shall notify all States Parties and shall take emergency measures of assistance, using the
resources the Conference has placed at his/her disposal for such contingencies.  The Director-
General shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions undertaken pursuant to this
paragraph.
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ARTICLE  VII85
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE FOR PEACEFUL
PURPOSES AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
(A) GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. Each State Party undertakes to implement specific measures, including those set out
in this Article, designed to enhance compliance and ensure effective and full implementation
of Article X of the Convention among the States Parties to the Protocol.  The implementation
of such measures shall be aimed at:
(a) Promoting scientific and technological exchanges and fostering international
cooperation, as appropriate, on a multilateral, regional or bilateral basis, directly or through
the Organization, in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) and toxin activities;
 (b) Facilitating free trade and the fullest possible exchange in biological agents,
toxins, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes in order to enhance the economic and
technological development of States Parties and ensuring the right of States Parties to
participate in such exchanges to the fullest extent possible;
(c) Avoiding hampering the economic and technological development of States
Parties by any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the
Convention and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and
the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and
materials.
2. The Organization shall provide a forum for consultation and creation of opportunities
for cooperation on matters related to the promotion of scientific and technological exchange
in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) and toxin activities and review of the
implementation of this Article86 by the States Parties to the Protocol.  The Organization shall
also develop a framework for activities aimed at promoting scientific and technological
cooperation and exchange and providing technical assistance, including Protocol
implementation assistance, upon request, to States Parties, in particular to developing
countries which are States Parties.  Such a framework may include activities conducted in
collaboration with relevant international organizations and agencies.
                                                
85The amendments made to Article VII are based on the analyses in Briefing Papers No. 6 Article X : Some
Building Blocks, March 1998, No. 7 Article X : Further Building Blocks, March 1998, No. 8 Article X :
Pharmaceutical Building Blocks, July 1998, No. 9 Article X : Specific Measures to Achieve Implementation,
July 1998 and No.22 Article VII Measures: Optimizing the Benefits, July 1999 as well as taking into account
subsequent development of the text by the Ad Hoc Group.
86This review should address the implementation of all the provisions in Article VII of the Protocol.
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(B) MEASURES TO PROMOTE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
EXCHANGES
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes
and, in its implementation of these measures, to ensure that any transfers or exchanges of
materials, equipment, technology, and any information pursuant to this Article shall take
place in compliance with the provisions of Articles III and X of the Convention.
4. Each State Party shall promote and support, as appropriate87 and in furtherance of
any current endeavours relevant to and in accordance with the Convention, individually,
jointly, through arrangements, with relevant international organizations and agencies88, or the
institutional mechanisms provided for under section D of this Article:
(a) The publication, exchange and dissemination of information, including
through workshops, training programmes and conferences, on current and recent
developments, as well as on research and development on the peaceful uses of
microorganisms and toxins, biosafety,  89 biotechnology, good laboratory practice and current
good manufacturing practice, and diagnosis, surveillance, detection, treatment and prevention
of diseases caused by biological agents or toxins, in particular infectious diseases;
(b) The work of existing laboratories on the prevention, surveillance, detection
and diagnosis of diseases caused by biological agents or toxins, in particular infectious
diseases, to improve the capabilities of such laboratories and their effectiveness, through,
inter alia, the provision of training and technical advice, equipment and reagents;
(c) The improvement of States Parties’ capabilities , including the establishment
and operation of new facilities90 upon the specific request of the State Party concerned, in the
surveillance, prevention, detection, diagnosis and treatment of diseases caused by biological
agents or toxins, in particular infectious diseases, as an integral part of a global effort to
improve the monitoring of emerging and re-emerging diseases in humans, animals and plants;
(d) The improvement of research capabilities in relevant fields of biosciences and
biotechnology for peaceful purposes, through collaborative research programmes and
projects, including, where necessary the establishment and operation of new research
                                                
87The qualification "as appropriate" is necessary as the efforts of each State Party cannot realistically be seen
as being to promote and support each item listed.
88It is unnecessary to list the international organizations and agencies twice in the same Article. The list is
retained in the most appropriate Section (D) Cooperative Relationships with Other International Organizations
and Among States Parties.
89It is inappropriate to have specific mention of "biodefence" in Article VII.  However, a cross reference in
Article VI to the benefits to biodefence arising from technical cooperation under the Protocol is appropriate and
has been inserted in Article VI.
90The term "facilities" is preferred because facility can refer to a new piece of equipment such as a glove box
within a room within an existing building or to a new building or a new institute.
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facilities91 upon the specific request of the State Party concerned, in particular in the use of
microorganisms and toxins for medical, agricultural, veterinary and industrial purposes;
(e) The establishment, operation and updating of biological databases including
those maintained by the Technical Secretariat on information relevant to the purposes of the
Convention as well as accessibility to such databases;
(f) The monitoring, diagnosis, detection, prevention and control of outbreaks of
diseases, and international cooperation on the research, development and production of
vaccines;
(g) Transfer among States Parties of technology for the peaceful uses of genetic
engineering, the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of diseases caused by biological agents
or toxins, in particular infectious diseases, and for other relevant fields of biosciences and
biotechnology for peaceful purposes;
(h) Participation at the bilateral, regional or multilateral levels in the application
of biotechnology and scientific research and development, for the prevention, surveillance,
detection, diagnosis and treatment of diseases caused by biological agents or toxins, in
particular infectious diseases;
(i) The establishment and conduct of training programmes on the diagnosis,
surveillance, detection, prevention and treatment of diseases caused by biological agents or
toxins, in particular infectious diseases;
(j) The establishment of a framework amongst States Parties to enhance the
cooperative activities contained in this Article and pursuant to the Protocol;
(k) Any other specific measure(s) approved by the Conference of States Parties
on the further strengthening of the implementation of Article X of the Convention and this
Article in accordance with Article IX.
(C) MEASURES TO AVOID HAMPERING THE ECONOMIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STATES PARTIES
5. Nothing in this Protocol shall prejudice the rights of States Parties to, individually or
collectively, conduct research with, develop, produce, acquire, retain, transfer and use
biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.
                                                
91The term "facilities" is preferred because facility can refer to a new piece of equipment such as a glove box
within a room within an existing building or to a new building or a new institute.
92
6. Each State Party shall:
(a) Undertake not to establish, maintain or use, either individually or
collectively, any discriminatory measure(s), including regimes, agreements or measures,
incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, which would restrict or
impede trade and the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for
peaceful purposes, inter alia, in the fields of biological research, microbiology,
biotechnology, genetic engineering, and their industrial, agricultural, medical, pharmaceutical
applications, and other related areas for peaceful purposes;
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(b) Undertake to review periodically, and amend or adopt as necessary, national
regulations governing exchanges and transfers of bacteriological (biological) agents and
toxins, and equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of
such agents and toxins in order to ensure their consistency with the objectives and relevant
provisions of the Convention and this Protocol.  The first review by the State Party shall be
completed no later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Protocol for that State
Party. The outcome of this review and of any subsequent reviews shall be reported
annually to the Director-General.93  The Director-General shall collate on an annual basis
and, for the information of States Parties, report on the implementation of this subparagraph.
The Conference of States Parties shall consider the report of the Director-General and
may make recommendations to States Parties on the implementation of national
regulations to ensure their consistency with the objectives and provisions of the
Convention and this Protocol.
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(D) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
AND PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION ASSISTANCE
The Cooperation Committee
7. The Cooperation Committee (hereinafter referred to as “the Committee”), established
by the Conference of States Parties in accordance with Article IX shall be a forum for
consultation aimed at promoting the effective and full implementation among the States
Parties to the Protocol of the provisions of Article X of the Convention and this Article. The
Committee shall consult on, monitor and review activities fostering international cooperation
and assistance under Article X of the Convention and this Article.  The Committee shall
assist the efforts of the Organization to develop a framework for activities aimed at
promoting scientific and technological exchanges for peaceful purposes and technological
cooperation for peaceful purposes.
                                                
92The subparagraph in AHG/50 (Part I) has been deleted as it is always open to States Parties to adopt
nationally any measures that they judge appropriate.
93This sentence has been added to provide clarity and to require the necessary reporting to the Director-General
of the outcomes of the reviews carried out by the State Party to enable the Director-General to discharge the
requirement to provide an annual collation.
94This paragraph in AHG/50 (Part I) has been deleted as it is more appropriate for consideration under Section
(E) of this Article.
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8. The Committee shall review the implementation of measures, pursuant to section B of
this Article, to promote scientific and technological exchanges and make recommendations
thereon to the Conference of States Parties.
9. The Committee shall review and make recommendations to the Executive Council on:
(a) Cooperative relationships of the Organization with other international
organizations and agencies, pursuant to section F of this Article;
(b) The programmes and activities of the Technical Secretariat, pursuant to this
Article;
(c) The operation of the regular budget where it relates to activities of the
Organization in the implementation of this Article and the use of voluntary contributions
for cooperative activities under Article X of the Convention and this Article.
10. The Committee shall prepare an annual report on its activities.  The annual report
shall include the results of its review of measures agreed upon or taken by the relevant
organs of the Organization and its recommendations pursuant to paragraphs 7, 8 and 9
above.  The report shall be forwarded to the Executive Council for consideration at its next
regular session. 95  The Executive Council may, as appropriate, take action on any
recommendations by the Committee pursuant to paragraph 9.  The report of the
Committee, together with any comments, decisions and recommendations by the
Executive Council, shall then be submitted to the Conference of States Parties.
11. The Committee shall receive and consider the annual declarations made by States
Parties to the Director-General96 in accordance with section H of this Article and
Appendix E.
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12. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of two years, on the basis
of an equitable geographical distribution, in accordance with Article IX of this Protocol.  The
Committee may establish working groups on an ad hoc basis.
13. The Committee shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the
Conference of States Parties for approval.
14.  The Committee shall initially meet at least twice a year.98  Additional meetings may be
convened in accordance with the rules of procedure referred to in paragraph 13 above.
                                                
95It is inappropriate to prescribe the format in which the Executive Council should forward its comments,
decisions and recommendation.
96This amendment is to make it clear that the declarations are made to the Director-General and not to the
Cooperation Committee.
97The reference to a pluridisciplinary body made up of government representatives competent in the relevant
fields of expertise has been deleted as an unnecessary statement of the obvious.  States Parties do not have to be
told to appoint appropriate representatives.
98As the Cooperation Committee will make recommendations to the Executive Council, a requirement to hold a
meeting immediately prior to the Conference of States Parties is not logical.
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15. The chairmanship of the Committee shall rotate annually between each regional
group, as defined in Article IX represented in the Committee. Recommendations shall be
agreed by consensus.
Role of the Technical Secretariat
16. The Director-General, assisted by the Technical Secretariat, shall promote and
facilitate scientific and technical cooperation and exchange among States Parties and shall
develop a framework of programmes and activities to implement the decisions of the relevant
organs of the Organization.  The Technical Secretariat shall, where appropriate99:
(a) Provide information on the availability of and accessibility to publications
and other publicly available forms of information containing the results of recent and current
research programmes on the uses of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for
industrial, pharmaceutical, medical and agricultural purposes;100
(b) Promote the exchange, dissemination and the publication of information on
research centres, current research and training programmes and conferences on the diagnosis,
treatment and prevention of diseases caused by biological agents and toxins, in particular
infectious diseases;101
(c) Convene regional or international seminars with a view to optimizing
cooperation on the peaceful uses of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins;
(d) Establish and maintain a network to facilitate contact and communications,
using the available electronic systems between States Parties, other relevant international
organizations and the Technical Secretariat, for the purposes of enabling and promoting
scientific cooperation and exchange among States Parties;102
(e) Develop a framework for donor countries to support an international system
for the global monitoring of emerging diseases in humans, animals and plants, and to
support other specific programmes to improve the effectiveness of national and international
efforts on the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of diseases caused by biological agents
and toxins, in particular infectious diseases;103
(f) Implement at the request of States Parties, programmes of support and
assistance for upgrading laboratories nominated for designation and certification pursuant
to Annex D, section I, part B;104
(g) Implement programmes of support and assistance for designation and
certification of laboratories pursuant to Annex D, section I, part B.105
                                                
99The functions of the Technical Secretariat have been reordered.
100Previously (h)
101Previously (g)
102Previously (b)
103Previously (d)
104Previously (j)
105Previously k
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(h) Provide advice on the establishment and operation of collaborative
vaccine research and development programmes, and on the requirements for vaccine
production facilities meeting  106 Good Manufacturing Practice standards;107
(i) Advise and assist States Parties to promote the objective of, employment of
personnel on a wide and equitable geographical basis, on the design and conduct of training
programmes to help develop and enhance the expertise and skills necessary for their
nationals to serve on the staff of the Technical Secretariat;108
(j) Conduct internship programmes for appropriately qualified personnel, on the
basis of equitable geographical distribution, to optimize cooperation on the peaceful uses of
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and technical cooperation amongst the States
Parties;109
(k) Facilitate programmes amongst States Parties, upon request, on equipment and
technology exchanges relevant to the peaceful uses of bacteriological (biological) agents and
toxins.110
Cooperation and assistance in the context of visits
17. If specifically requested by a State Party in the context of visits pursuant to Article III
and of paragraph 2 of this Article, the visiting team shall provide information and advice on,
and implement, where appropriate, any cooperation and assistance activities contained in
programme(s) of the Organization in, inter alia:
(a) Biosafety, including environmental protection and occupational health issues;
(b) The principles of Good Laboratory Practice and  111 Good Manufacturing
Practice;
(c) Diagnostic techniques for infectious diseases and the availability of
vaccines and the possible timetable for the introduction of new vaccines;
(d) The principles and requirements of national and international regulatory
mechanisms governing the production, validation, marketing and sale of biological products
for prophylactic, diagnosis and treatment of diseases caused by biological agents or toxins, in
particular infectious diseases, and pharmaceutical products and vaccines;
(e) Training requirements for facility and national regulatory personnel, and
sources of such training;
                                                
106Limitation to "current" Good Manufacturing Practice standards is unnecessary.  Provision of advice on Good
Manufacturing Practice standards, present and future, is appropriate.
107Developed from previous (a)bis and (a) ter.
108Previously (e)
109Previously (f)
110Previously (i)
111Limitation to "current" Good Manufacturing Practice is unnecessary.  Provision of advice on Good
Manufacturing Practice, present and future, is appropriate.
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(f) The evaluation of the methodology underpinning the State Party’s or facility’s
declaration process and the formulation of suggestions, if necessary, for methodological
improvements to future declarations;
(g) The provision of information, guidance or the identification of any specific
training opportunities for facility personnel on efficient biosafety, occupational health and
safety practices and environmental protection relevant to the facility.  This may include
facilitating contact with relevant international bodies;
(h) The provision of information on publications and other publicly available
forms of information containing current research programmes in the biosciences and
biotechnology, conferences, research centres, information databases and other scientific and
technological developments and activities about which the visiting team are cognizant of
relevance to the Convention and facility;
(i) The provision of information and guidance as well as the identification of any
specific training opportunities for facility personnel to facilitate the development, evaluation
or licensing of products;
(j) The identification of national, regional and international sources of
information for more detailed follow-up enquiries and specialized assistance on these topics.
Protocol implementation assistance
18. Upon a specific request by a State Party, the Technical Secretariat shall provide
advice and assistance, either by itself or in cooperation with other States Parties on:
(a) The establishment and functioning of national authorities;
(b) The preparation of declarations required under Article III of this Protocol;
(c) The drawing up of internal legislation necessary under the provisions of this
Protocol;
(d) The content and conduct of training courses and seminars for National
Authority and declared facility personnel on the compilation of declarations and the planning
and hosting of visits.
Requests for assistance
19. All requests for assistance by States Parties shall be submitted to the Director-General
and shall include detailed information and reasons for the assistance sought.  Where requests
for assistance exceed the available resources of the Technical Secretariat, the Director-
General shall take into the account one or more of the following factors:
(a) The effective implementation of this Protocol;
(b) The relative capacities and needs of individual States Parties, particularly of
developing countries being States Parties;
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(c) The specific details of each request;
(d) Whether the State Party seeking assistance has benefitted from technical and
assistance programmes established by the Technical Secretariat within the last two years,
and, if so, the financial extent of them;
(e) The extent to which the assistance requested would improve the operation and
utility of existing national, regional and international efforts in the area of the assistance
sought.
(E) REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE X OF THE CONVENTION AND
THIS ARTICLE
20. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with Article IX of the Protocol, consider
concerns raised by a State Party on the implementation of Article X of the Convention and
this Article.
21. The State Party which raises concerns related to the implementation of Article X of
the Convention and this Article shall provide the Executive Council with supporting evidence
and other information substantiating its concerns.  Any other State Party may provide
relevant information to support or clarify the concern.
22. The Executive Council may make recommendations to the States Parties concerned
on ways in which they may wish to resolve the situation.   The Executive Council may also,
where appropriate, bring the issue to the attention of the Conference of States Parties.   The
Conference of States Parties may make recommendations to the States Parties concerned on
ways in which they may wish to resolve the situation.112
(F) COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND AMONG STATES PARTIES
23. The Organization may, where appropriate, conclude agreements and arrangements
pursuant to Article IX with relevant international organizations and agencies, including, but
not limited to, the FAO, ICGEB, IVI, OIE, OPCW, UNEP, UNIDO, WHO, and the
Secretariat of the CBD, taking into account their relevant competences and existing
agreements, as well as the activities of States Parties in order to avoid duplication as well
as to ensure an effective and coordinated use of resources for the effective
implementation of the measures identified in this Article. Such agreements and
arrangements shall be to enhance compliance and ensure effective and full implementation
of Article X of the Convention and this Article in order to, inter alia:
(a) Derive the greatest possible synergy in, and benefits from:
(i) The collection and dissemination of information on the peaceful uses
of biological agents and toxins;
                                                
112This text has been developed from paragraph 23 and 23 ter.
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(ii) Sharing information on environmental release of genetically modified
organisms;
(iii)  113 Good Manufacturing Practice, Good Laboratory Practice,
biological containment and other biosafety regulations and practices;
(iv) Facilitation of access to databases containing information on the
peaceful uses of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins,
biosafety, and results of scientific research in the life sciences in areas
of particular relevance to the Convention;
(v) The collection and dissemination of information on the diagnosis,
surveillance, detection, treatment and prevention of diseases caused by
biological agents or toxins, in particular infectious diseases;
(vi) Regulations governing the handling, transportation, use and release of
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins;
(vii)114 Facilitating harmonization of relevant115 national regulatory and
administrative procedures for the peaceful uses of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins;
(b) Coordinate its activities with those of international organizations and agencies
on the peaceful uses of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, and on the diagnosis,
detection, treatment and prevention of diseases caused by biological agents or toxins, in
particular infectious diseases, and raise awareness of and facilitate access to those activities
by States Parties to the Protocol;
(c)116 Support and enhance the objectives of section B of this Article by a
framework for multilateral cooperation among the States Parties, including exchange of
information among scientists and technologists, with the aim of assisting developing
countries which are States Parties to strengthen their scientific and technological capabilities
in the fields of biosciences, genetic engineering and biotechnology;
24. The Conference of States Parties may consider and decide on possible ad hoc
collaborative relationships with relevant non-governmental organizations for the purposes set
out in paragraph 23 above117. Such consideration shall be preceded by detailed
examination by the Executive Council, assisted, where necessary, by the Technical
Secretariat, of the terms and conditions of the proposed agreements or arrangements,
taking into account the qualification, competence, impartiality and sources of financing
of the non-governmental organization(s) in question.
                                                
113Limitation to "Current" Good Manufacturing Practice is unnecessary.  Provision of advice on Good
Manufacturing Practice, present and future, is appropriate.  The abbreviations are deleted as there is no
reference to them elsewhere in the Protocol.
114Developed from the previous subparagraph (c) (ii) and (d).
115Limitation to "existing" is unnecessary.
116Developed from the previous subparagraph (c) incorporating (i) and (ii).
117This language enables the Conference of the States Parties to have the option, where appropriate, of
entering into an ad hoc collaborative relationship with a relevant non-governmental organization.
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25. The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a record of cooperative activities with other
relevant international organizations and agencies, pursuant to paragraph 25, and shall make
such a record available to States Parties on request, as well as to the Cooperation Committee.
26. The Technical Secretariat, including upon request by the Executive Council, after
consultation with relevant international organizations and agencies with which the
Organization has cooperative relationships, pursuant to paragraph 25, may make
recommendations, as appropriate, to the Cooperation Committee, the Executive Council or
the Conference of States Parties for further practical steps with a view to the effective
implementation of the cooperative relationships envisaged in this section.
(G) SAFEGUARDS
27. The obligations set out in this Article are subject to, and limited by, the right of each
State Party to protect commercial proprietary information and national security.
(H) DECLARATIONS
28. Each State Party shall submit a declaration annually to the Director-General, in
accordance with the format set out in Appendix E, with a general description of measures
taken, individually or together with other States and international organizations and agencies,
in order to implement the provisions of Article X of the Convention and this Article.  At the
recommendation of the Cooperation Committee, the Director-General shall consider these
declarations with the aim of suggesting specific practical steps for the enhanced effectiveness
and improved implementation of Article X of the Convention and this Article.  The
Cooperation Committee shall receive and consider these declarations and any other
suggestions, including those from the Director-General, in the preparation of its annual report
to the Conference of States Parties, as specified under paragraph 10 of this Article.
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ARTICLE VIII
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
1.  The States Parties undertake to submit full and timely declarations in respect of each
of the confidence-building measures within the framework of the Convention, as agreed
upon at the Second and Third Review Conferences and subsequent Review Conferences
of the Convention.
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ARTICLE  IX118
THE ORGANIZATION
(A) GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The States Parties to this Protocol hereby establish the Organization for the
Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons (hereinafter referred to as
“the Organization”) in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (hereinafter
referred to as “the Convention”) and to ensure the implementation of this Protocol, including
its provisions for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum
for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.
2. All States Parties shall be members of the Organization.  A State Party shall not be
deprived of its membership in the Organization.
3. The seat of the Organization shall be ... .
4. There are hereby established as organs of the Organization: the Conference of the
States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat.
5. Each State Party shall cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of its functions
in accordance with this Protocol.  States Parties shall consult directly among themselves or
through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures
within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter
which may be raised relating to the goal and purpose of the Convention or the
implementation of this Protocol.
6. The Organization, as an independent body, shall seek to utilize existing expertise and
facilities, as appropriate, and to maximize cost efficiencies, through cooperative
arrangements with other international organizations as referred to in Article VII, section E,
including, but not limited to, FAO, ICGEB, IVI, OIE, OPCW, UNEP, UNIDO, WHO.  Such
arrangements, excluding those of a minor and normal commercial and contractual nature,
shall be set out  in agreements to be submitted to the Conference of the States Parties for
approval.
7. The costs of the activities of the Organization shall be met annually by the States
Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted to take into
account differences in membership between the United Nations and the Organization.
8. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its assessed
contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Conference or the Executive
Council, if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due
from it for the preceding two full years.  The Conference of the States Parties may,
                                                
118The amendments made to Article IX are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 14, Article IX: The
Organization, January 2000.
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nevertheless, permit such a State Party to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to
conditions beyond the control of the member.
(B) THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES
Composition, procedures and decision-making
9. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as “the Conference”)
shall be composed of all States Parties.  Each State Party shall have one representative in the
Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
10. The initial session of the Conference shall be convened by the Depositary119 no later
than 30 days after the entry into force of this Protocol.
11. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually, unless it
decides otherwise.
12. A special session of the Conference shall be convened:
(a) When decided by the Conference;
(b) When requested by the Executive Council; or
(c) When requested by any State Party and supported by a majority of the States
Parties.
The special session shall be convened not later than 30 days after the decision of the
Conference, the request of the Executive Council, or the attainment of the necessary support,
unless specified otherwise in the decision or request.
13. The Conference may also be convened in the form of a Review Conference, in
accordance with Article XIII.
14. The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference, in
accordance with Article XIV.
15. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides
otherwise.
16. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure.  At the beginning of each regular
session, it shall elect its President and such other officers as may be required.  They shall hold
office until a new President and other officers are elected at the next session.
17. A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum.
18. Each State Party shall have one vote.
                                                
119As in the analysis on Article XXII in Evaluation Paper No. 7, Article XXII: Depositary/ies, September 1999.
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19. The Conference shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a simple majority of
members present and voting.  Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken as far as
possible by consensus.  If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision,
the President of the Conference shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of
deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to
the Conference before the end of this period.  If consensus is not possible at the end of
24 hours, the Conference shall take a decision by a two-thirds majority of members present
and voting unless specified otherwise in this Protocol.  When the issue arises as to whether
the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance
unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
Powers and functions
20. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization.  It shall consider any
questions, matters or issues relevant to the provisions of this Protocol, including those
relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat,
in accordance with this Protocol.  It may make recommendations and take decisions on any
questions, matters or issues relevant to the provisions of this Protocol raised by a State Party
or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.
21. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this Protocol, and review
compliance with, the Convention and this Protocol and act in order to promote their object
and purpose.  It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical
Secretariat and may issue guidelines to either of them for the exercise of their functions.
22. The Conference shall:
(a) Consider and adopt the report of the Organization on the implementation of this
Protocol and the programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive
Council, as well as consider other reports;
(b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in
accordance with paragraph 7;
(c) Elect the members of the Executive Council;
(d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred
to as “the Director-General”);
(e) Consider and approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council
submitted by the latter;
(f) Establish such subsidiary organs, including the Cooperation Committee, as it
finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Protocol;
(g) Consider and review scientific and technological developments that could
affect the operation of this Protocol.  In this context, the Conference may direct the Director-
General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board to render specialized advice in areas of
science and technology relevant to this Protocol to the Conference, the Executive Council or
to States Parties.  In that case, the Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of
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independent experts and appointed, in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the
Conference, on the basis of their expertise and experience in the particular scientific fields
relevant to the implementation of this Protocol and on as wide an equitable geographic basis
as possible;
(h) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with the Convention and
this Protocol and to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of the
Convention and this Protocol, in accordance with Article V;
(i) Consider and approve at its first session any draft agreements, provisions,
procedures, operational manuals, guidelines and any other documents;
(j) Consider and approve agreements or arrangements negotiated by the Technical
Secretariat with States Parties, other States and international organizations to be concluded by
the Executive Council on behalf of the Organization in accordance with paragraph 32 (k);
(k) Establish at its first session the Voluntary Fund in accordance with Article VI;
(l) Promote scientific and technological exchange for peaceful purposes and
technical cooperation among States Parties in accordance with Article VII.
(C) THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
Composition, procedures and decision-making
23. The Executive Council shall consist of ... members120.  Each State Party shall have
the right, in accordance with the principle of rotation, to serve on the Executive Council.  The
members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference for a term of two years.
In order to ensure the effective functioning of this Protocol, due regard being specially paid
to equitable geographical distribution, to the importance of the biotechnological industry and
biotechnology related pharmaceutical industry sectors, as well as to political and security
interests, the Executive Council shall be composed as follows:
(a) ... States Parties from Africa to be designated by States Parties located in this
region.  As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these ... States Parties,
... members shall be the States Parties with the most significant national biotechnological
industry and biotechnology related pharmaceutical industry sectors in the region as
determined by internationally reported and published data as well as with the highest number
of declared facilities; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account
other regional factors in designating these ... members;
(b) ... States Parties from Asia to be designated by States Parties located in this
region.  As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these ... States Parties,
... members shall be the States Parties with the most significant national biotechnological
industry and biotechnology related pharmaceutical industry sectors in the region as
determined by internationally reported and published data as well as with the highest number
                                                
120As noted in Evaluation Paper No. 14, Article IX: The Organization, January 2000, our recommendation is
that the membership of the Executive Council should be kept as small as possible in order to maximise the
effectiveness and efficiency of the Executive Council.  We therefore recommend a total membership of 41 as
with the OPCW.
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of declared facilities; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take into account
other regional factors in designating these ... members;
OR
(b) ... States Parties from East Asia and the Pacific to be designated by States
Parties located in this region.  As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these
... States Parties, ... members shall be the States Parties with the most significant national
biotechnological industry and biotechnology related pharmaceutical industry sectors in the
region as determined by internationally reported and published data as well as with the
highest number of declared facilities; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take
into account other regional factors in designating these ... members;
(b) bis... States Parties from West and South Asia to be designated by States Parties
located in this region.  As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these
... States Parties, ... members shall be the States Parties with the most significant national
biotechnological industry and biotechnology related pharmaceutical industry sectors in the
region as determined by internationally reported and published data as well as with the
highest number of declared facilities; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take
into account other regional factors in designating these ... members;
(c) ... States Parties from Eastern Europe to be designated by States Parties located
in this region.  As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out of these ... States
Parties, ... members shall be the States Parties with the most significant national
biotechnological industry and biotechnology related pharmaceutical industry sectors in the
region as determined by internationally reported and published data as well as with the
highest number of declared facilities; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take
into account other regional factors in designating these ... members;
(d) ... States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean to be designated by
States Parties located in this region.  As a basis for this designation it is understood that, out
of these ... States Parties, ... members shall be the States Parties with the most significant
national biotechnological industry and biotechnology related pharmaceutical industry sectors
in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data as well as with the
highest number of declared facilities; in addition, the regional group shall agree also to take
into account other regional factors in designating these ... members;
(e) ... States Parties from among Western European and other States to be
designated by States Parties located in this region.  As a basis for this designation it is
understood that, out of these ... States Parties, ... members shall be the States Parties with the
most significant national biotechnological industry and biotechnology related pharmaceutical
industry sectors in the region as determined by internationally reported and published data as
well as with the highest number of declared facilities; in addition, the regional group shall
agree also to take into account other regional factors in designating these ... members.
24. For the first election of the Executive Council ... members shall be elected for a term
of one year, due regard being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in
paragraph 23.
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25. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one representative on the Executive
Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
26. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the
Conference for approval.
27. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its members.
28. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions.  Between regular sessions it
shall meet as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions.
29. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote.
30. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of
all its members.  The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a
two-thirds majority of all its members unless specified otherwise in this Protocol.  When the
issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be
treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for
decisions on matters of substance.
Powers and functions
31. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Organization.  It shall carry
out the powers and functions entrusted to it in accordance with this Protocol.  It shall be
responsible to the Conference.  In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the
recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure their proper and
continuous implementation.
32. The Executive Council shall:
(a) Promote effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Protocol;
(b) Supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat;
(c) Supervise the scientific and technological exchange for peaceful purposes and
technical cooperation activities and measures stipulated in Article VII;
(d) Facilitate cooperation among States Parties, and between States Parties and the
Technical Secretariat, relating to the implementation of this Protocol through information
exchanges;
(e) Facilitate, as appropriate, consultation and clarification among States Parties in
accordance with Article III, section E;
(f) Receive, consider and take action on requests for, and reports on, visits and
investigations in accordance with Article III, sections D and G;
(g) Receive, consider and take necessary action on the recommendations made by
the Cooperation Committee;
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(h) Make recommendations as necessary to the Conference for consideration of
further proposals for promoting the object and purpose of this Protocol;
(i) Cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party;
(j) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft programme and budget of the
Organization, the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Protocol, the
report on the performance of its own activities and such other reports as it deems necessary or
that the Conference may request;
(k) Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference, including the
preparation of the draft agenda;
(l) Conclude, subject to prior approval of the Conference, agreements or
arrangements with States Parties, other States and international organizations on behalf of the
Organization and supervise their implementation; and
(m) Consider and recommend to the Conference for approval any new operational
manuals and any substantive changes to the existing operational manuals that may be
proposed by the Technical Secretariat.
33. The Executive Council may request a special session of the Conference.
34. The Executive Council shall consider concerns raised by a State Party regarding
compliance and cases of possible non-compliance and abuse of the rights established by this
Protocol.  In doing so, the Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved
and, as appropriate, request a State Party to take measures to redress the situation within a
specified time.  To the extent that the Executive Council considers further action to be
necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures:
(a) Notify all States Parties of the issue or matter;
(b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;
(c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures to redress the
situation and to ensure compliance in accordance with Article V.
The Executive Council may, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the issue or
matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the
United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.  It shall at the
same time inform all States Parties of this step.
(D) THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT
35. The Technical Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the implementation of this
Protocol.  The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in
the performance of their functions.  It shall carry out the compliance and other functions
entrusted to it by this Protocol, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference or
the Executive Council in accordance with this Protocol.
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36. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to the implementation of the
Protocol including Article III and the Annexes shall include, inter alia:
(a) Receiving, processing and analysing of declarations, and collecting,
processing and analysing relevant epidemiological information, in accordance with the
provisions of Article III, section D;
(b) Assisting the Executive Council in facilitating consultation, clarification and
cooperation among States Parties;
(c) Processing, preparing, conducting and reporting on visits in accordance with
the provisions of Article III, section D;
(d) Receiving requests for investigations to address non-compliance concerns,
making technical evaluations of those requests, submitting the requests to the Executive
Council for consideration, carrying out the preparations for, providing technical support
during the conduct of, and conducting investigations in accordance with the provisions of
Article III, section G, and of Annex D, and reporting the outcome to the Executive Council;
(e) Maintaining and updating a list of ad hoc experts as investigation personnel
and notifying all States Parties of any additions to or alterations in the list in accordance with
paragraphs 11 to 16 of Annex D, section I;
(f) Negotiating on behalf of the Organization, subject to the prior authorization of
the Executive Council, draft agreements and arrangements, as appropriate, between the
Organization and States Parties, other States and international organizations.  Such draft
agreements and arrangements shall be submitted to the Executive Council for consideration
and to the Conference for approval;
(g) Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other matters
relating to the implementation of this Protocol.
37. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by the
Executive Council and, if required, by the Conference, operational manuals in accordance
with Article III and the Annexes.  These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this
Protocol or the Annexes and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat.  Such substantive
changes shall be subject to approval by the Executive Council and, if required, by the
Conference.  The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties of any
changes in the operational manuals.
38. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to scientific and technological
exchange for peaceful purposes and technical cooperation shall be, inter alia, to:
(a) Facilitate implementation of measures to promote scientific and technological
exchanges in accordance with Article VII, section B;
(b) Facilitate implementation of measures to avoid hampering the economic and
technological development of States Parties in accordance with Article VII, section C;
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(c) Support the establishment and functioning of the institutional mechanisms for
international cooperation and Protocol implementation assistance in accordance with
Article VII, section D;
(d) Assist in the implementation follow-up of Article X of the Convention and
Article VII of the Protocol in accordance with Article VII, section E;
(e) Promote and facilitate cooperative relationships with other international
organizations and among States Parties in accordance with Article VII, section F;
(f) Promote the implementation of safeguards in accordance with Article VII,
section G;
(g) Receive, consider and process declarations in accordance with Article VII,
section H.
39. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with respect to administrative matters shall
include, inter alia:
(a) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and
budget of the Organization;
(b) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft report of the
Organization on the implementation of this Protocol and such other reports as the Conference
or the Executive Council may request;
(c) Providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, the
Executive Council and other subsidiary organs;
(d) Addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the Organization
relating to the implementation of this Protocol;
(e) Carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any agreements
between the Organization and other international organizations; and
(f) Ensuring that the confidentiality provisions of the Protocol as applied to the
Technical Secretariat are observed.
40. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the Executive Council of any
problems that have arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions that have come to its
notice in the performance of its activities and that it has been unable to resolve through
consultations with the State Party concerned.
41. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head
and chief administrative officer, and such scientific, technical, administrative and other
personnel as may be required.  The Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference
upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four years, renewable for
only one further term.
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42. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive
Council for the appointment of the staff and for the organization and functioning of the
Technical Secretariat.  Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director-General or as
members of the professional and clerical staff.  In the employment of the staff and in the
determination of the conditions of service, the paramount consideration121 shall be the
necessity of securing and maintaining122 the highest standards of professional expertise,
experience, efficiency, competence and integrity.  Due regard shall be paid to the
importance of selecting personnel on as wide an equitable geographic basis as possible.
Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to the minimum
necessary for the proper discharge of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.
43. The Director-General shall be responsible for the organization and functioning of the
Scientific Advisory Board, referred to in paragraph 22 (g), and shall, in consultation with
States Parties, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve in their
individual capacity.  The members of the Board shall be appointed on the basis of their123
expertise in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Protocol
paying due regard to the importance of selecting personnel on as wide an equitable
geographic basis as possible.  The Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation
with members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to
provide recommendations on specific issues.  In regard to the above, States Parties may, if
they deem it necessary, submit lists of experts to the Director-General.
44. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General and the other members of the
staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other source
external to the Organization.  They shall refrain from any action that might reflect adversely
on their positions as international officials124 responsible only to the Organization.
45. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the
responsibilities of the Director-General and the other members of the staff and shall not seek
to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.
46. All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Organization shall be
transmitted to the Director-General.  Requests and notifications shall be in one of the official
                                                
121Our analysis on pages 48 to 51 of Evaluation Paper No. 14, Article IX: The Organization, January 2000 has
drawn attention to the great importance of restoring to paragraph 42 the fundamental principle of staffing the
secretariats of international organizations which is expressed in Article 101.3 of the UN Charter and in the
WHO Constitution, the CWC and the CTBT.  That fundamental principle requires one set of criteria, namely
securing the highest standards of professional expertise, experience, efficiency, competence and integrity, to be
accorded priority, as the paramount consideration, while a secondary set of criteria receives due regard.
122Our analysis in paragraph 62 of Evaluation Paper No. 14, Article IX: The Organization, January 2000, which
has been amplified slightly in the version available on the website http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc, notes that
the WHO constitution emphasises the importance of ensuring that the efficiency and integrity of the secretariat
shall be maintained at the highest level thereby avoiding the problems being faced by the OPCW in maintaining
expertise and experience.   A recent article entitled "10 Suggestions to Strengthen UN" (Daily Yomiuri, Tokyo, 3
February 2000) by Yasushi Akashi, a former UN Undersecretary-General,  in point 5 emphasises the importance
of enhancing the efficacy of the Secretariat and of the necessity of ensuring "recruitment and retention of the
highest caliber individuals".
123To be consistent with paragraph 22 (g) of this Article.
124As noted in Evaluation Paper No. 14, Article IX: The Organization, January 2000, we recommend "officials"
as in the UN Charter, Article 100.1 rather than "officers".
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languages of this Protocol.  In response the Director-General shall use the language of the
transmitted request or notification.
(E) PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
47. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the
jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities
as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.
48. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives
of members elected to the Executive Council, together with their alternates and advisers, the
Director-General and the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities
as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the
Organization.
49. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this Article shall be
defined in an agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Organization to be
concluded between the Organization and the States Parties as well as in an agreement
between the Organization and the State in which the Organization is seated.  Such agreements
shall be considered and approved in accordance with paragraph 22 (i) and (j).
50. The Organization shall not be held liable for any breach of confidentiality committed
by members of the Technical Secretariat.125
51. The Director-General shall have the right to waive the immunity of any member of a
team conducting on-site activities or the other staff of the Technical Secretariat in any case
where, in his or her opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be
waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol.  Waiver of
immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held
to imply waiver of immunity in respect of the execution of the judgement, for which a
separate waiver shall be necessary.  Waiver shall always be express.
52. Notwithstanding paragraph 49, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the members
of a team conducting on-site activities shall be those set forth in this Article.
53. In deciding whether to waive immunity in cases of breach of confidentiality, the
Director-General or the Conference of the States Parties, as appropriate, shall request and
take into consideration the views of the Confidentiality Commission.
54. Following acceptance of the list of designated personnel as provided for in Annex D,
section I, each State Party shall issue, not later than 30 days after acknowledgement of receipt
of that list, or of changes thereto, in conformity with its national visa-related laws and
regulations and upon application by any person from the list of designated personnel,
multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas and other relevant documents to enable each member
of an investigation or visit team to enter, to remain on, or to transit its territory for the sole
                                                
125Elaboration of language relating to the waiver of the immunity of the Organization is imprudent as it instills
from the outset a sense of a lack of confidence in the Organization.  It is also unnecessary as it is always open to
the Conference of the States Parties to take such a decision should it judge that the particular circumstances at
some time in the future warrant such a step.  Likewise, specific language on the waiver of the immunity of the
Director-General is imprudent and unnecessary.
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purpose of carrying out on-site activities on the territory of the receiving State Party.  Such
documents issued by the receiving State Party shall be valid for at least two years after their
provision and shall be reissued, if needed. These documents shall enable the investigation and
visit personnel to remain on, or to transit its territory as long as is necessary for carrying out
the investigation or visit activities.
55. To exercise their functions effectively, members of the team conducting on-site
activities shall be accorded by the receiving State Party and the host State Party privileges
and immunities as set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (i).  Privileges and immunities shall be
granted to members of the team conducting on-site activities for the sake of this Protocol and
not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves.  Such privileges and immunities
shall be accorded to them for the entire period between arrival on and departure from the
territory of the receiving State Party and host State Party, and thereafter with respect to acts
previously performed in the exercise of their official functions in accordance with their
mandate.
(a) The members of the team conducting on-site activities shall be accorded the
same inviolability as is enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.
(b) The living quarters and office premises occupied by the team conducting on-
site activities carrying out investigation or visit activities pursuant to this Protocol shall be
accorded the same inviolability and protection as are accorded to the premises of diplomatic
agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.
(c) The papers and correspondence, including records, of the team conducting on-
site activities shall enjoy the same inviolability as is accorded to all papers and
correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2, of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.  The team conducting on-site activities shall have the
right to communicate with the Technical Secretariat, in accordance with the provisions of
Annex D, section I.
(d) Samples carried by members of the investigation team and approved
equipment carried by members of the team conducting on-site activities shall be inviolable
subject to provisions contained in this Protocol and exempt from all customs duties.
(e) The members of the team conducting on-site activities shall be accorded the
same immunities as are accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2
and 3, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
(f) The members of the team conducting on-site activities carrying out prescribed
activities pursuant to this Protocol shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes
accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.
(g) The members of the team conducting on-site activities shall be permitted to
bring into the territory of the receiving State Party or host State Party, without payment of
any customs duties or related charges, articles for personal use, with the exception of articles
the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.
113
(h) The members of the team conducting on-site activities shall be accorded the
same currency and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign
governments on temporary official missions.
(i) The members of the team conducting on-site activities shall not engage in any
professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the receiving State
Party or the host State.
56. When transiting the territory of States Parties other than the receiving State Party, the
members of the team conducting on-site activities shall be accorded the same privileges and
immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.  Papers and correspondence, including records
and samples and approved equipment, carried by the team conducting on-site activities, as
well as samples carried by the investigation team, shall be accorded the privileges and
immunities set forth in paragraph 55 (c) and (d).
57. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the members of the team
conducting on-site activities shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the
receiving State Party or host State and, to the extent that is consistent with the mandate for
on-site activities, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.  If the
receiving State Party or host State Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges
and immunities by the members of the team conducting on-site activities, consultations shall
be held between the State Party and the Director-General to determine whether such an abuse
has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such abuse.
58. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities accorded to members
of the team conducting on-site activities pursuant to this section, except for those accorded
pursuant to paragraph 55 (d).
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ARTICLE  X126
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
General undertakings
1. In addition to its obligations under the Convention, including Article IV, each State
Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional and legal processes, take any measures
required to implement its obligations under this Protocol.  In particular, it shall where
appropriate and necessary:
(a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other
place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity
prohibited to a State Party under the Convention  127, including enacting penal legislation
with respect to such a prohibition;
(b) Prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any activity prohibited to
a State Party under the Convention anywhere under its control; and
(c) Prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its
nationality from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under the Convention
anywhere.
2. Each State Party may, where requested, cooperate with other States Parties and afford
the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations
under paragraph 1.
3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this Protocol,
shall take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of people and to protect the environment,
and may cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this regard.
Relations between the State Party and the Organization
4. In order to fulfil its obligations under this Protocol, each State Party shall designate or
establish a National Authority and shall so notify the Organization upon entry into force of
this Protocol for it.  The National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for
effective liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.
5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and administrative
measures taken pursuant to this Article.
                                                
126The amendments made to this Article are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 2, Article X:
National Implementation Measures, July 1999  taking into account subsequent development of the text by the
Ad Hoc Group as well as of the previous Briefing Paper No 14, National Implementation Measures: An Update,
October 1998 and Briefing Paper No.4, National Implementation Measures, January 1998.
127The reference to Article I General Provisions of the Protocol is, in our view, inappropriate because the Ad
Hoc Group has a mandate to develop a Protocol to strengthen the Convention -- but does not have a mandate to
amend the Convention (see paragraph 8 of this Evaluation Paper).  Consequently, Article I General Provisions
of the Protocol should not extend the prohibitions of the Convention and does not in this proposed complete
text.
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6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of all
its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat in the
discharge of its functions in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.
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ARTICLE  XI128
RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE BTWC AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
1. This Protocol to the Convention shall not be interpreted as in any way modifying or
amending the Convention, or limiting or detracting from the rights and obligations assumed
by any State under the Convention.
2. This Protocol shall not be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the
rights and obligations assumed by any State under other international agreements, including
the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction.
                                                
128The amendments made to this Article are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 9, Article XI:
Relationship of the Protocol to the BTWC and Other International Agreements, November 1999.
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ARTICLE  XII129
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application, interpretation or implementation
of the Convention and this Protocol shall be settled in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the Convention and this Protocol and in conformity with the Charter of the
United Nations and other rules of international law.
2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more
States Parties and the Organization, relating to the application, interpretation or
implementation of this Protocol, the parties concerned shall engage in consultations without
delay with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other
mutually agreed peaceful means of the parties’ choice, including recourse to appropriate
organs of this Protocol or other organs established and entrusted by the Executive Council or
the Conference of States Parties with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in
conformity with Articles IV and IX, and referral to the International Court of Justice in
conformity with the Statute of the Court.  The parties to a dispute shall inform the Executive
Council of the commencement of consultations, and shall keep the Executive Council
informed of the actions being taken and their outcomes.  The Executive Council may
contribute to the settlement of a dispute by negotiation by whatever means it deems
appropriate, including offering its good offices and calling upon the States parties to a
dispute to seek a settlement by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties'
choice.  It may recommend a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. The Conference of States Parties shall consider questions related to disputes raised by
States Parties, the Organization or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.
4. The Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council are separately
empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to
request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question
arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization.  An agreement between the
Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with
Article IX.
5. This Article is without prejudice to Articles III and V of this Protocol.
6. Nothing in this Article shall affect the right of two or more States Parties to clarify
and resolve any dispute among themselves.
                                                
129The amendments made to this Article are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 10, Article XII:
Settlement of Disputes, November 1999.
118
ARTICLE  XIII130
REVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL
1. The First Conference of States Parties to review the operation of the Protocol
(hereinafter referred to as a “Review Conference”) shall be convened within 5 years after the
entry into force of the Protocol with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Protocol are
being realized.131
2. At intervals of 5 years thereafter, unless otherwise decided by a majority of States
Parties to the Protocol, further such Review Conferences of the Protocol shall be convened
with the same objective.
3. The Review Conferences shall take into account any new scientific and technological
developments relevant to the Protocol.
4. The schedules of the Review Conferences shall be so decided as to coincide with the
Review Conferences of the Convention.
                                                
130The amendments made to this Article are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 11, Article XIII:
Review of the Protocol, November 1999 taking into account subsequent development of the text by the Ad Hoc
Group.
131Although a footnote (AHG/51 (Part I), page 129, footnote 55) indicates that the question of the location of
the First Review Conference remains to be addressed after further consideration of the location of the Seat, we
do not consider it either necessary or desirable to include the location of the Review Conferences in the text of
the Protocol.
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ARTICLE  XIV132
AMENDMENTS
1. Any time after the entry into force of this Protocol any State Party may propose
amendments to this Protocol or its Annexes or Appendices.  Any State Party may also
propose changes, in accordance with paragraph 4, to specified parts of this Protocol or its
Annexes or to its Appendices.  Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures
in paragraphs 2 and 3.  Proposals for changes, as specified in paragraph 4, shall be subject to
the provisions set out in paragraph 5.
2. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General.  The
proposed amendment shall be considered only by an Amendment Conference.  The Director-
General shall circulate the proposal to all States Parties and seek their views on whether an
Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal.  If one-third or more
of the States Parties notify the Director-General, not later than 30 days after the circulation of
the proposal that they support the convening of an Amendment Conference, the Director-
General shall convene such a Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.  The
Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of the
Conference of States Parties unless all States Parties which support the convening of an
Amendment Conference request that it be held earlier.  In no case shall an Amendment
Conference be held sooner than 60 days after the circulation of the proposed amendment.
Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a
majority of all States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.
3. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after the deposit of
the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all of the States Parties casting a positive vote
at the Amendment Conference.
4. In order to assure the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol, provisions in the
Appendices, the Annexes other than Annex D and section I of Annex E, and those sections
of Article III, section D, which are so identified in that Article, shall be subject to changes in
accordance with paragraph 5, if the proposed changes are related only to matters of a
technical or administrative nature.  All changes to Section I Lists and Criteria (Agents and
Toxins) of Annex A shall be made in accordance with paragraph 5.  Annex D
Investigations and section I General Principles for the Handling of Confidential
Information of Annex E Confidentiality Provisions shall not be subject to changes in
accordance with paragraph 5.
5. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shall be made in accordance with the
following procedures:
(a) The text of the proposed changes, together with supporting documentation,
shall be transmitted to the Director-General.  The Director-General shall promptly
communicate any such proposal to all States Parties and the Executive Council.  Any State
                                                
132The amendments made to this Article are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 12, Article XIV:
Amendments, January 2000.
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Party and the Director-General may provide additional information to assist in the evaluation
of the proposal;
(b) Not later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall evaluate the
proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions and implementation of
this Protocol and for the provisions and implementation of the Convention and shall
communicate any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council;
(c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal, including whether the
proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 4, in light of all the information available to it,
and any specific guidelines or criteria for review specified in the article, annex or appendix to
which the change is proposed.  The Executive Council shall consider the proposal as a matter
of substance.  Not later than 90 days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its
recommendations, with appropriate explanations, to all States Parties for consideration.
States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 days;
(d) If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be
adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after
receipt of the recommendation.  If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be
rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within
90 days after the receipt of the recommendation;
(e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the
acceptance required under subparagraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether
the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 4, shall be taken as a matter of substance
by a Conference of States Parties at its next session;
(f) The Director-General shall notify all States Parties of any decision under this
paragraph;
(g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States
Parties 180 days after the date133 of notification by the Director-General of their approval
unless another time period is recommended by the Executive Council or134 decided by a
Conference of States Parties.
                                                
133"date" is used rather than "day" for consistency with Article XX paragraph 2 and with BTWC and CWC
usage.
134"or" is appropriate as it avoids a situation in which any other time period has to have been recommended by
the Executive Council.
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ARTICLE  XV135
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL
1. This Protocol shall remain in force so long as the Convention is in force.
2. Each State Party to this Protocol shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the
right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests.  It shall give notice of
such withdrawal to the Depositary, all other States Parties to the Protocol, the Executive
Council and the United Nations Security Council 3 months in advance.  Such notice shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme
interests.
3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Protocol shall not in any way affect its
rights and obligations under other international legal instruments to which it is a party.
4. Any State Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be deemed to have
withdrawn from this Protocol, irrespective of whether it has complied with the procedure set
forth in paragraph 2 of this Article.  The Protocol shall cease to be in force for such a State on
the same day as the Convention ceases to be in force for it.
                                                
135The amendments made to this Article are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 4, Article XV:
Duration and Withdrawal, September 1999.
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ARTICLE  XVI136
STATUS OF THE ANNEXES AND APPENDICES
The Annexes and Appendices to this Protocol form an integral part of the Protocol.
Any reference to this Protocol includes the Annexes and Appendices.
                                                
136This Article was analysed in Evaluation Paper No. 3, Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX and XXIII: Status of the
Annexes and Appendices, Signature, Ratification, Accession and Authentic Texts, September 1999.
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ARTICLE  XVII137
SIGNATURE
This Protocol shall be open for signature to all States Parties to the Convention,
before this Protocol enters into force.
                                                
137This Article was analysed in Evaluation Paper No. 3, Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX and XXIII: Status of the
Annexes and Appendices, Signature, Ratification, Accession and Authentic Texts, September 1999.
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ARTICLE  XVIII138
RATIFICATION
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to their
respective constitutional processes.
                                                
138This Article was analysed in Evaluation Paper No. 3, Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX and XXIII: Status of the
Annexes and Appendices, Signature, Ratification, Accession and Authentic Texts, September 1999.
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ARTICLE  XIX139
ACCESSION
Any State Party to the Convention which does not sign this Protocol before its entry
into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.
                                                
139This Article was analysed in Evaluation Paper No. 3, Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX and XXIII: Status of the
Annexes and Appendices, Signature, Ratification, Accession and Authentic Texts, September 1999.
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ARTICLE  XX140
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Protocol shall enter into force 180 days after the deposit of instruments of
ratification by 20 States141 but not earlier than two years after its opening for signature.
2. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to
the entry into force of this Protocol, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date
of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession.
                                                
140The amendments made to this Article are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 5, Article XX: Entry
into Force, September 1999.
141The paramount need is to achieve the earliest possible entry into force of the Protocol so that the
strengthening of the regime can begin to benefit from the operation of the Organization.  A requirement for a
large number of ratification instruments before entry into force would delay the strengthening of the regime.
With the Organization in existence, with full authority to implement and promote the Protocol, in accordance
with Article IX, the Protocol in our judgement will gather momentum and the number of States Parties will
increase significantly as confidence grows in the Organization and its operations.  We therefore favour a simple
numerical condition for entry into force, with no requirement for particular ratifications within this number,
which should be kept low, at 20.  A figure of 20 corresponds to a delay of entry into force of two years based on
the CWC ratification experience.
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ARTICLE  XXI142
RESERVATIONS
The Articles of and the Annexes and Appendices to143 this Protocol shall not be
subject to reservations.  In addition, no exceptions or conditions, however phrased or
named, including interpretative statements or declarations, which purport to exclude or
modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Articles and the Annexes and Appendices
to this Protocol in their application to any State, may be made by any State upon
signing, ratifying or acceding to this Protocol.144
                                                
142The amendments made to this Article are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 6, Article XXI:
Reservations, September 1999.
143"to" is preferred to "of" as this is then consistent with Article XVI which defines the status of the Annexes
and Appendices "to this Protocol" [Emphasis added].
144There is a need for this additional sentence in order to prevent, as comprehensively as possible, any attempt
to circumvent the ban on reservations by means of statements, declarations, exceptions or conditions which
similarly purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of any part of the Protocol in its application to any State.
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ARTICLE  XXII145
DEPOSITARY
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary
of this Protocol and shall, inter alia:
(a) Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each
signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of
the entry into force of this Protocol, and of the receipt of other notices;
(b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Protocol to the governments of all
signatory and acceding States; and
(c) Register this Protocol pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
                                                
145The amendments made to this Article are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 7, Article XXII:
Depositary/ies, September 1999.
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ARTICLE  XXIII146
AUTHENTIC TEXTS
1. This Protocol, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of
which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
2. IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have
signed this Protocol.
Done at ... on ... .
                                                
146This Article was analysed in Evaluation Paper No. 3, Articles XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX and XXIII: Status of the
Annexes and Appendices, Signature, Ratification, Accession and Authentic Texts, September 1999.
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ANNEXES147
                                                
147For clarity and to avoid confusion, the current Annex designations have been retained although Annexes B,
C, F and G have been deleted from this proposed complete text.  For example, this retention of the Annex
designation has obviated the need to modify all cross references to Annex D to read Annex B with the potential
for confusion amongst a readership that is accustomed to Annex D being the Annex on Investigations.
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A.  DECLARATIONS
I.  DEFINITIONS148
(A) DEFINITIONS FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE III
1.  The term “facility” means any room(s), laboratory(ies), buildings, or parts of
buildings, or other structures which can be or is used to conduct activity(ies) related to the
Convention.  Such a facility may be mobile or at a fixed location having an identifiable
boundary and/or a single operational control.
2. The term "the receiving or visited State Party and the host State Party" means the
State Party on whose territory or in any other place under whose jurisdiction or control an
investigation or a visit is proposed, taking place or has been completed.  In the specific case
where an investigation or a visit is proposed, taking place or has been completed on the
territory of a State Party/State, but in a place under the jurisdiction or control of another State
Party/State, the former State Party/State shall not be the “receiving or visited State Party”, but
shall be defined as the “host State Party/State of a visit or an investigation”.
3. The term "perimeter" means in the case of facility investigation, the boundary around
facility(ies), defined by either geographic coordinates or a description on a map.
4. The term "requested perimeter" means the perimeter requested by a requesting State
Party, in accordance with the provisions contained in Annex D, section III.
5. The term "alternative perimeter" means the perimeter as specified by the receiving
State Party alternatively to the requested perimeter, in accordance with the provisions
contained in Annex D, section III.
6. The term "final perimeter" means the perimeter that resulted from negotiations
between the investigation team and the receiving State Party, in accordance with the
provisions contained in Annex D, section III.
7. The term "point of entry/point of exit" means a location designated by the State Party
pursuant to this Protocol for the in-country arrival of investigation and visiting teams or for
their departure after completion of their mission.
(B) DEFINITIONS FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE III, SECTION D
DECLARATIONS
1. The term “site” means the location of one or more facilities within a geographically
and/or physically defined area which may have an identifiable boundary.
2. The term “biological defence programmes and/or activities” means a programme
and/or activities designed to detect and/or assess the impact of any use of microbial or other
biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict, and/or to prevent, reduce
and/or neutralize the impact of biological and toxin weapons on humans, animals or plants;
                                                
148 This is based on language transferred from Article II Definitions in AHG/51 (Part I).
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3. The term “biological defence facility” means a facility which works in a biological
defence programme and/or activities;
4. The term “vaccine” means preparations, including live-attenuated, killed or otherwise
modified microorganisms or components obtained from organisms, including inactivated
toxins and nucleic acids, which, when introduced by any routes into a human being or
animal, induces in it a specific immune response for prophylaxis or protection against
infectious disease(s) or intoxination;
5. The term “dose equivalent” means the amount of a single vaccine administration
regardless of whether multiple administrations are necessary to confer or preserve immunity
in the human or animal recipient.  When vaccines are in an intermediate or bulk state,
declaration of the number of doses should be based on the equivalent amount of finished
product needed for a single administration for paediatric or adult recipients, whichever is
greater, regardless of whether the vaccine is intended for paediatric or adult use.
6. The term "maximum biological containment" means any room or suite of rooms,
laboratory(ies) or other buildings or structures:
(a) Designed or used to handle and work with biological agents causing disease
and known or suspected to meet either:
(i) The classification criteria of Risk Group 4 human pathogens, as
determined by the States Parties and specified in the 1993 WHO
Laboratory Biosafety Manual; or
(ii) The classification criteria of Group 4 animal pathogens, as determined
by the States Parties and specified in the Amendment to the
International Animal Health Code adopted by the International
Committee of the OIE during its 66th General Session, 1998;
and/or having the following features
(b) Controlled access.  Entry and exit of personnel and supplies must be through
an airlock or pass-through system.  On entering, personnel should put on a complete change
of clothing; before leaving, they should shower before putting on their street clothing;
(c) Controlled air system.  Negative pressure must be maintained in the facility by
a mechanical, individual, inwardly directed, HEPA-filtered supply, and an exhaust air system
with HEPA filters in the exhaust and, where necessary, in the intake;
(d) Decontamination of effluents.  All fluid effluents from the facility, including
shower water, must be rendered safe before final discharge;
(e) Sterilization of waste and materials.  A double-door, pass-through autoclave
must be available;
(f) An efficient primary containment system must be in place.  For work with
human pathogens or zoonoses, primary containment must be provided by use of, one or more
of the following:
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(i) Class III biological safety cabinets, or
(ii) Positive-pressure ventilated suits.
In the latter case a special chemical decontamination shower must be provided for
personnel leaving the suit area.  For work with animal pathogens, primary containment must
be provided by use of Class I, II or III biological safety cabinets;
(g) Airlock entry ports for specimens and materials;
7. The term "plant pathogen containment" means any laboratory or other building or
structure specifically designed and used to handle and work with plant pathogens and pests
that are of economic importance to a specific area endangered thereby, and not yet present
there, or present but not widely distributed and which are also being controlled by official
regulatory measures.  Such a design includes access control through entry doors with
vestibule, hand washing facilities, the ability to apply negative pressure to the environment,
the exhaust air sterilized by HEPA filtration, incineration, or other physical or chemical
means and the ability to control the internal temperature.  Decontamination of all waste is
achieved by a suitable chemical or physical process before exhausting into a public or
communal system.
8. The term "production" means cultivation of replicative biological agents by any
means, or synthesis, or biosynthesis or extraction of non-replicative biological agents
including toxins.
9.  The term “genetic modification” means a process of arranging and manipulating
nucleic acids of an organism and/or microorganisms to produce novel molecules or to add to
them new characteristics or to modify the original characteristics.
10. The term “plant inoculant” means any formulation containing a pure or predetermined
mixture of microorganisms which enhance the growth capabilities, disease resistance or frost
resistance.  It may also cause disease in plants or otherwise adversely alter the properties of
plants or crops.
11. The term “biocontrol agent” means a living organism or biologically active substance
originated from such an organism used for the prevention, elimination or reduction of plant
diseases and pests or unwanted plants.
12. The term “primary production containment” means physical features in any system of
equipment for the production of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, that are
designed to prevent release which could compromise the health of workers or cause other
harm and to separate the production process from the environment.  Sample collection,
addition of material, transfers to another system, and final discharge of exhaust gases,
effluents and wastes, are performed so as to prevent such release.
13. The term “high biological containment” means any  room or suite of rooms,
laboratory(ies) or other buildings or structures with the following features:
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(a) Designed or used to handle and work with biological agents causing disease
and known or suspected to meet either:
(i) The classification criteria of Risk Group 3 human pathogens, as
determined by the States Parties and specified in the 1993 WHO
Laboratory Biosafety Manual; or
(ii) The classification criteria of Group 3 animal pathogens, as determined
by the States Parties and specified in the Amendment to the
International Animal Health Code adopted by the International
Committee of the OIE during its 66th General Session, 1998; or
(b) Having characteristics consistent with the guidelines specified in the 1993
WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual with respect to the maintenance of negative air pressure
to the environment, access control and the rendering safe of exhaust air and of contaminated
material and waste, including effluents by HEPA filtration, steam sterilization, incineration or
other physical or chemical means.
14. The term "diagnostic facility" means a facility which only tests samples for the
purpose of diagnosis of subclinical, clinical, or latent infection or intoxination in humans,
animals or plants; or for the purpose of analysis of microbial or toxin contamination in food,
water, soil and air by means of detection, isolation, and/or identification of microbial or other
biological agents or toxins and serology.
15. The term "aerobiology" means the study of or work with aerosols of materials
comprising biological agents and toxins or simulants in a facility or open air.
20. The term "simulants of biological agents and toxins" means substances of biological,
chemical or other origin which, due to their characteristics might be used or are used to carry
out study and research of the properties of biological agents or toxins.
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II.  LISTS AND CRITERIA (AGENTS AND TOXINS)
1. The list of agents and toxins following below is for use with Article III.
2. The following criteria were considered in developing the list of agents and toxins
and shall be considered, inter alia, in reviewing any proposed modifications to the list:
(a) The potential of individual agents and toxins for use as weapons,
(b) Scientific and technological developments that may affect the potential of
individual agents or toxins for use as weapons;
(c) Effects of potential inclusion or exclusion of an agent or toxin in the list on
scientific and technical research and development.
REVISION OF THE LIST
3.  Any State Party may propose modifications to the list.  The Executive Council shall
review such proposed modifications to the list of agents and toxins.  Any changes to the list
shall be made in accordance with Article XIV.
4. The list is not exhaustive, it does not exclude the relevance for the Protocol of
unlisted microbial or other biological agents or toxins.  149
5. In accordance with Article XI, this list shall not be interpreted as in any way
modifying or amending the Convention.
6. Pathogens causing zoonotic diseases appearing in one section of the list shall also
apply to the other sections.
A. HUMAN AND ZOONOTIC PATHOGENS
Viruses
1. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
2. Eastern equine encephalitis virus
3. Ebola virus
4. Sin Nombre virus
5. Junin virus
6. Lassa fever virus
7. Machupo virus
8. Marburg virus
9. Rift Valley fever virus
10. Tick-borne encephalitis virus
11. Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)
12. Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
                                                
149 The additional words "which potentially can be used as weapons" in AHG/51 in paragraph 3 are
unnecessary and are deleted
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13. Western equine encephalitis virus
14. Yellow fever virus
15. Monkeypox virus
Bacteria150
1. Bacillus anthracis
2. Brucella melitensis
3. Brucella suis
4. Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei
5. Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei
6. Francisella tularensis tularensis
7. Yersinia pestis
8. Coxiella burnetii
9. Rickettsia prowazekii
10. Rickettsia rickettsii
B. ANIMAL PATHOGENS151
1.  Foot and mouth disease virus
2. Vesicular stomatitis virus
3. Swine vesicular disease
3. Rinderpest virus
4. Peste des petits ruminants virus
5. Contagious bovine (pleuropneumonia)/Mycoplasma mycoides var.
mycoides152
6. Lumpy skin disease
7. Bluetongue virus
8. Sheep pox and goat pox
9. African horse sickness virus
10. African swine fever virus
11. Classic swine fever virus (Hog cholera virus)
12.  Avian influenza virus (Fowl plague virus)
                                                
150In accordance with standard international practice, the names of bacteria and rickettsiae are written in italic
script.
151The animal pathogens have been selected as those which appear on the OIE List A Diseases which are
defined as "transmissable diseases which have the potential for very serious and rapid spread, irrespective of
national borders, which are of major socio-economic or public health consequences and which are of major
importance in the international trade of animals and animal products."   Reports of disease outbreaks are
required to be submitted to OIE.  Consequently, selection of these diseases correspond to diseases for which
OIE member States already have infrastructure for disease surveillance and reporting.   The subdivision of
animal pathogens in AHG/51 (Part I) is not necessary and could be counter-productive particularly if the disease
were to appear in another species.  If it is retained then paragraph 6 above should be broadened by the deletion
of the words "causing zoonotic diseases".
152In accordance with standard international practice, the names of bacteria are written in italic script.
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13. Newcastle disease virus
C. PLANT PATHOGENS153 154
1. Dothistroma pini (Scirrhia pini)
2. Erwinia amylovora
3. Ralstonia solanacearum
4. Puccinia graminis 
5. Sugar cane Fiji disease virus
6. Tilletia indica
7. Xanthomonas albilineans
8. Xanthomonas campestris pv citri
9. Sclerotinia sclerotiorum
10. Peronospora hyoscyami de Bary f.sp. tabacina (Adam) skalicky
11. Claviceps purpurea
D. TOXINS
Bacteriotoxins
1. Botulinum toxins
2. Clostridium perfringens155 toxins
3. Staphylococcal enterotoxins
4. Shigatoxins
                                                
153The list of plant pathogens in AHG/51 (Part I), page 145, has been analysed with the aid of information from
the IPPO (International Plant Protection Organization) from the International Plant Protection Convention
Database concerning the geographic spread of these diseases.  This analysis shows that reports of the listed plant
diseases come from the following regions of the world:
C. PLANT PATHOGENS
1. Colletotrichum coffeanum var. virulans Africa
2. Dothistroma pini (Scirrhia pini) Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, South America, Oceania
3. Erwinia amylovora Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, South America, Oceania
4. Ralstonia solanacearum Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, Central America, Caribbean, 
South America, Oceania
5. Puccinia graminis Europe, Asia, , North America, South America, Oceania
6. Sugar cane Fiji disease virus Asia, Africa, Oceania
7. Tilletia indica Asia, South America
8. Xanthomonas albilineans Asia, Africa, South America, Oceania
9. Xanthomonas campestris pv citri Asia, Africa, South America, Oceania
10. Sclerotinia sclerotiorum Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, South America, Oceania
11. Peronospora hyoscyami de Bary f.sp. tabacina (Adam) skalicky Europe, Africa, North
America, South America, Oceania
12. Claviceps purpurea Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, South America
As Colletotrichum coffeanum var. virulans only occurs in a single region, this has been deleted.  Selection of the
other diseases correspond to diseases for which IPPC member States already have infrastructure for disease
surveillance and reporting. The subdivision of plant pathogens in AHG/51 (Part I) is not necessary and could be
counter-productive particularly if the disease were to appear in another species.  If it is retained then paragraph 6
above should be broadened by the deletion of the words "causing zoonotic diseases".
154In accordance with standard international practice, the names of bacteria and fungi are written in italic script.
155In accordance with standard international practice, the names of bacteria are written in italic script.
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Phycotoxins
1. Anatoxins
2. Ciguatoxins
3. Saxitoxins
Mycotoxins
1. Trichothecene toxins
Phytotoxins
1. Abrins
2. Ricins
Zootoxins
1. Bungarotoxins
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III.  LIST OF EQUIPMENT
The list of equipment following below is for use with Article III156 including inter alia its
use as a component of the reporting format157 for facilities declared pursuant to Article III,
section D.  
1. Aerosol chambers designed or used for the dissemination of aerosols of
microorganisms or toxins and simulants.
2.  Equipment designed or used to generate aerosols of microorganisms or toxins and
simulants.
3. Aerosol analytical equipment to determine the size of particles up to 20 micrometers
in diameter.
4. Fermenters/bioreactors for batch operation with a volume over 50 litres158.
5. Equipment for continuous or perfusion growth of microorganisms with a flow rate
capable of exceeding 2 litres an hour.159
6. Self-sterilizable centrifuges for continuous or semi-continuous operation with a
throughput capacity of over 100 litres per hour.
7. Cross-flow or tangential filtration equipment with a filter area of over 5 square
metres.
8. Freeze-drying equipment with a condenser capacity of over 5 kg of ice in 24 hours.
9. Cell disruption equipment capable of continuous operation without the release of
aerosols with a flow rate greater than 10 litres per hour.
10. Spray drying equipment.
11. Drum drying equipment.
12. Biological safety cabinets Class III or Class I with accessories for conversion to
Class III.
13. Flexible film isolators or other cabinets with air handling characteristics equivalent to
Class III and anaerobic boxes.
14. Biological safety cabinets Class II.
                                                
156The list of equipment has utility principally as a component of the reporting format for facilities declared
pursuant to Article III, section D and also for other purposes under Article III such as for declarations of
transfers and as an illustrative list in the context of a facility investigation.
157A version of this equipment list is included in this Evaluation Paper as an addendum to Appendix C
Facilities.
158Amended to be consistent with the capacity in Article III. D, section I.
159Amended to be consistent with the capacity in Article III. D, section I.
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15. Equipment for microencapsulation of microorganisms or toxins.
16. Automatic DNA sequencing equipment.
17. Automatic DNA synthesizer.
18. Automatic peptide sequencing equipment.
19. Automatic peptide synthesizer.
20. Milling equipment having a capacity of milling grain with mass median diameter less
than 10 micrometres.
21. Plant inoculation cabinets/chambers providing quarantine.
22. Cabinets/chambers designed or used for rearing insects.
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ANNEX  D.  INVESTIGATIONS160
I.  GENERAL PROVISIONS
(A) DESIGNATION OF INVESTIGATION PERSONNEL
1. The personnel of an investigation team shall consist of investigators and, as
necessary, investigation assistants.  The Director-General shall only designate properly
qualified investigation personnel from the appointed full time staff of the Technical
Secretariat or ad hoc experts, nominated by States Parties in accordance with paragraphs 10
to 15 of this section, to carry out field investigations.  In the employment of the staff and in
the determination of the conditions of service due regard shall be paid to the necessity of
securing the highest standards of efficiency, competency and integrity and the importance of
selecting personnel on as wide an equitable geographic basis as possible.  No national of the
requesting State Party or the receiving State Party shall be a member of an investigation
team.
Designation of full time investigation personnel
2. Candidates shall apply for appointment as investigation personnel to the full time staff
of the Technical Secretariat on the basis of their expertise and experience relevant to the
purpose of investigations of non-compliance concerns.
3. Not later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Protocol, the Technical
Secretariat shall communicate in writing to all States Parties an initial list of the names,
nationalities, dates and places of birth, gender, passport numbers and ranks of the persons
proposed for designation as investigation personnel by the Technical Secretariat, as well as a
description of their qualifications and professional experience.
4. Each State Party shall acknowledge receipt of this initial list of investigation
personnel proposed for designation, within 24 hours of receipt thereof.  Any investigator or
investigation assistant included in this list shall be regarded as accepted unless a State Party,
not later than 30 days after acknowledgment of receipt of the list, declares its non-acceptance
in writing.  The State Party may include the reason for the objection.  In the case of
non-acceptance, the proposed investigator or investigation assistant shall not participate in
investigation activities either (i) on the territory of a State Party that has declared its non-
acceptance, or (ii) in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party that has
declared its non-acceptance.  The Technical Secretariat shall immediately confirm receipt of
the notification of non-acceptance.  The Technical Secretariat shall, as necessary, submit
further proposals in addition to the initial list.
5. Additions or changes to the list of investigation personnel shall be effected according
to the procedures set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.
6. The Technical Secretariat shall keep the list of investigation personnel up to date and
notify all States Parties of any additions, deletions or changes to the list.
                                                
160The text in AHG/51 (Part II) has been used as the baseline for this Annex.
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7. A State Party that has been notified of an investigation shall not seek the removal
from the investigation team of any of the investigation personnel named in the investigation
mandate.  A State Party shall have the right at any other time, to object to any member of the
investigation personnel who has already been accepted.  It shall notify the Director-General
of its objection in writing and may include the reason for the objection.  The Director-
General shall within 12 hours of receipt of the objection, acknowledge receipt thereof.  Such
objection shall come into effect upon receipt by the State Party of the Director-General’s
acknowledgement.
8. The number of investigation personnel accepted by a State Party for designation shall
be sufficient to allow for availability of appropriate numbers of investigation personnel.
9. If, in the opinion of the Director-General, the non-acceptance by a State Party of
proposed investigation personnel impedes the designation of a sufficient number of
investigation personnel or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the tasks of the
Technical Secretariat for the purposes of  investigations, he/she shall take the matter up with
the State Party concerned. If the matter remains unresolved he/she shall then refer the issue to
the Executive Council.
Designation of ad hoc experts as investigation personnel
10.  Not later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Protocol, the Technical
Secretariat shall communicate the necessary qualifications, professional experience and an
indication of the minimum number of experts in each category to be included on the list of
investigation personnel for utilization on an ad hoc basis as investigators during field
investigations.
11. Ad hoc experts, meeting the requirements as communicated pursuant to paragraph 10,
shall be nominated by States Parties. Such nominations shall be submitted by States Parties to
the Director-General within 30 days after receipt of the communication and shall include the
names, nationalities, dates and places of birth, gender, passport numbers, qualifications and
professional experience of the ad hoc experts they nominate for designation as investigation
personnel.  The Director-General may seek further nominations, and additional nominations
may also be submitted by  States Parties, at any time. Such nominations shall be circulated to
States Parties in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3 to 9 above.
12. Not later than 120 days after the entry into force of this Protocol, the Director-General
shall communicate to each State Party the list of ad hoc personnel in accordance with the
provisions for the list of investigation personnel as set out in paragraphs 3 to 9 of this section.
13. In the event that necessary expertise is not available within the Technical Secretariat
and ad hoc experts are required for the conduct of a field investigation, such experts shall be
selected from the designated list of ad hoc personnel by the Director-General in accordance
with the provisions of  paragraph 42 of this section. A nominated ad hoc expert shall not be
appointed as an investigation team leader.
14. When assigned for a field investigation team the personnel on the list of ad hoc
personnel shall be considered members of the staff of the Technical Secretariat and as such
subject to all provisions, applicable to such personnel, contained in this Protocol.  A State
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Party that has been notified of an investigation shall not seek the removal from the
investigation team of any of the investigation personnel named in the investigation mandate.
15. Each State Party shall promptly notify the Technical Secretariat if an ad hoc expert
nominated by it can no longer fulfil the duties of investigation personnel.  Any ad hoc expert
appearing on the list of designated investigation personnel, may also withdraw from the list
by informing the Director-General in writing.
Training
16. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure that all members of the designated
investigation personnel are properly trained to conduct investigations.  The Technical
Secretariat shall conduct such training and it may coordinate, in agreement with States Parties
offering training, a schedule for such training.
(B) DESIGNATION AND CERTIFICATION OF LABORATORIES
17. The Director-General shall utilize only properly designated and certified laboratories
for off-site analyses of samples.
18. The criteria, including the proficiency standards, and procedures required for
designation and certification of laboratories shall be approved by the first Conference of
States Parties.
19. Not later than 30 days after the conclusion of the first Conference of States Parties, or
after the accession of a State Party to the Protocol, the Technical Secretariat shall
communicate to the States Parties the criteria, including the proficiency standards, and
procedures required for the designation and certification of laboratories as approved by the
first Conference of States Parties.
20. States Parties, wishing to do so, shall, within 60 days after receiving the
communication of the criteria, including the proficiency standards, and procedures required
for the designation and certification of laboratories, provide an initial list of laboratories
nominated for designation and certification.
21.  Nominated laboratories shall be designated and certified by the Director-General in
accordance with the provisions contained in paragraphs 18 to 20 above.  The Director-
General shall not later than 30 days after the completion of the designation and certification
process, communicate a list of all the designated and certified laboratories to all States
Parties.
22. The Director-General may terminate the designation and certification of a laboratory
on the request of the nominating State Party or if such a laboratory falls below the required
proficiency standards.
23. Further laboratories may, when necessary, be designated and certified in accordance
with the procedures referred to in paragraphs 18 to 20 above.  The designation and
certification of each laboratory shall be subject to renewal every three years.
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24. In the designation and certification of laboratories, the Director-General shall pay due
regard to the necessity of equitable geographic distribution of designated laboratories.  At the
request of a State Party, the Technical Secretariat shall assist in the upgrading of a
laboratory(ies) nominated for designation and certification.  The cost of upgrading the
nominated laboratories shall be borne by the State Party concerned, and/or by the Technical
Secretariat within available resources when possible.
25. In order to ensure the security and confidentiality of samples being analysed, the
Director-General shall enter into specific agreements with designated and certified
laboratories as soon as possible after the designation and certification of each laboratory.  A
designated and certified  laboratory shall not be used for the analysis of samples until such an
agreement has been concluded with the laboratory.
(C) STANDING ARRANGEMENTS
Point(s) of entry
26. Each State Party shall designate its point(s) of entry and shall supply the required
information to the Technical Secretariat not later than 30 days after this Protocol enters into
force for it.  These point(s) of entry shall be such that the investigation team can reach any
investigation area from at least one point of entry within 24 hours.  Locations of point(s) of
entry shall be provided to all States Parties by the Director-General.
27. Each State Party may change its point(s) of entry by giving notice of such change to
the Director-General.  Changes shall become effective 30 days after the Director-General
receives such notification, to allow appropriate notification to all States Parties.
28. If the Director-General considers that there are insufficient point(s) of entry for the
timely conduct of investigations or that changes to the point(s) of entry proposed by a State
Party would hamper such timely conduct of investigations, it shall enter into consultations
with the State Party concerned to resolve the problem.
Arrangements for use of non-scheduled aircraft
29. Where timely travel to the point of entry is not feasible using scheduled commercial
flights, an investigation team may utilize non-scheduled aircraft.  Not later than 30 days after
this Protocol enters into force for it, each State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat of
the diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft or appropriate procedures and
measures to facilitate the arrival and handling of non-scheduled aircraft transporting an
investigation team and equipment necessary for investigation.  Aircraft routings shall be
along established international airways that are agreed upon between the State Party and the
Director-General as the basis for such procedures.
30. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall provide the
receiving State Party with the proposed flight plan for the aircraft’s flight from the last
airfield prior to entering the airspace of the State in which the investigation site is located to
the point of entry, not less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that
airfield.  Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International
Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civilian aircraft.  The Technical Secretariat shall
include in the remarks section of each flight plan the diplomatic clearance number or details
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concerning the appropriate procedures and measures to facilitate the arrival of the non-
scheduled aircraft and the appropriate notation identifying the aircraft transporting the
investigation team and equipment necessary for the investigation.
31. Not less than three hours before the scheduled departure of the investigation team
from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the State in which the investigation is to
take place, the receiving State Party or host State Party/State shall ensure that the flight plan
filed in accordance with paragraph 30 is approved, so that the investigation team may arrive
at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.
32. The receiving State Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing and fuel
as required by the Technical Secretariat for the aircraft of the investigation team at the point
of entry when such aircraft is owned or chartered by the Technical Secretariat.  Such aircraft
shall not be liable for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges.  The Technical
Secretariat shall bear the cost of such fuel, parking, security protection and servicing.
Administrative arrangements
33. The receiving State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the
investigation team such as transport, communications means, interpretation, working space,
lodging, meals and emergency medical care.  In this regard, the receiving State Party shall be
reimbursed by the Organization for all such costs incurred by the investigation team within
30 days after receipt of a detailed notification claim for such costs from the receiving State
Party.
Approved investigation equipment
34. The approved investigation equipment for use during on-site investigations, which
shall be commercially available as well as the specifications for this equipment shall be
approved by the Conference of States Parties at its first session.  These specifications shall
take account of safety and confidentiality factors bearing in mind the type of location where
such equipment could be used.
35. The Technical Secretariat shall, as appropriate, update the list of equipment.   The
updated list shall be considered and approved by the Conference.
36. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure that all types of approved equipment are
available for on-site investigations when required. When required for an on-site investigation,
the Technical Secretariat shall duly certify that the equipment has been calibrated, maintained
and protected.  To facilitate the checking of the equipment at the point of entry by the
receiving State Party, the Technical Secretariat shall provide documentation and attach seals
to authenticate the certification.
37. Any permanently held equipment shall be in the custody of the Technical Secretariat.
The Technical Secretariat shall be responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such
equipment.
38. Subject to paragraph 39, there shall be no restriction by the receiving State Party on
the investigation team bringing into the investigation site such equipment on the list which
the Technical Secretariat has determined to be necessary to fulfil the investigation
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requirements.  The investigation team shall take into account local regulations having an
effect on the use of specific pieces of equipment when such equipment is being used during
an investigation.  The receiving State Party shall include the details of such regulations in the
pre-investigation briefing.
39. The receiving State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the prescribed time
frames, to inspect the equipment in the presence of investigation team members at the point
of entry, i.e. to check the identity of the equipment brought in or removed from the territory
of the receiving State Party or the host State. To facilitate such identification, the Technical
Secretariat shall attach documents and devices to authenticate its designation and approval of
the equipment.  The investigation of the equipment shall also ascertain to the satisfaction of
the receiving State Party that the equipment meets the description of the approved equipment
specified in the mandate for the particular type of investigation.  The receiving State Party
has the right to exclude equipment not meeting that description or equipment without the
above-mentioned authentication documents and devices.  The inspection of investigation
equipment shall not exceed four hours.
40. In cases where the receiving State Party agrees to provide, at the request of the
Technical Secretariat, investigation equipment, or the investigation team finds it necessary to
use equipment available on site not belonging to the Technical Secretariat and requests the
receiving State Party to enable the team to use such equipment, the receiving State Party shall
attempt to meet the request to the extent it can.  The investigation team shall have the right to
observe and confirm the calibration of such equipment.  The receiving State Party shall be
reimbursed for the cost of making the equipment available and for any calibration thereof
required by the investigation team.
41. In cases where the receiving State Party offers to provide equipment, available on site,
the investigation team may accept the offer.  The investigation team shall have the right to
observe and confirm the calibration of such equipment.  Any calibration required by the
investigation team and the use of the equipment shall be at the cost of the receiving State
Party.
(D) PRE-INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES
Assignment of investigation team
42. The Director-General shall determine the size of the investigation team and select the
proper qualified members to conduct the specific type of investigation requested in the
investigation request on as wide an equitable geographic basis as possible taking into account
the circumstances of the particular request. Members of the investigation team shall be
selected from the investigation personnel designated in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 15
above.  The size of the investigation team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the
proper fulfilment of the investigation mandate 161. The Director-General may at his/her
discretion alert potential members of the investigation team, as soon as possible after receipt
of the investigation request, of the possibility that they may be required for an investigation.
                                                
161It is unnecessary and would not be prudent to specify an upper limit for the size of the investigation team as
the necessary size will depend upon the particular circumstances of the investigation.
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43. The Director-General may extend the size of the investigation team and in agreement
with the receiving State Party.
Observer
44. The requesting State Party may, subject to the agreement of the receiving State Party,
send a representative who may be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third
State Party, to observe the conduct of an investigation.
45. The receiving State Party shall notify its acceptance or non-acceptance of the
proposed observer to the Director-General.
46. The receiving State Party shall as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the
receiving State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the final report.
47. The requesting State Party shall liaise with the Director-General to coordinate the
arrival of the observer at the same point of entry as the investigation team within a reasonable
period of the investigation team’s arrival.
48. The observer shall have the right throughout the period of investigation to be in
communication with the embassy or other official representation of the requesting State Party
located in the receiving State Party, or in the case of absence of an embassy or other official
representation, with the requesting State Party itself.  The receiving State Party shall, to the
extent possible, provide means of communication to the observer.
49. The observer shall have the right to arrive at the investigation area/alternative or final
perimeter, whichever occurs first, with the investigation team and to have access to and
within the investigation area/alternative or final perimeter, whichever occurs first, as granted
by the receiving State Party.
50. The observer shall have the right to make recommendations concerning the conduct
of the investigation.
51.  Throughout the investigation, the investigation team shall keep the observer informed
about the conduct of the investigation and the factual findings.
52. Throughout the investigation, the receiving State Party shall provide or arrange for the
amenities necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the investigation team as
described in paragraph 33.  All costs in connection with the stay of the observer on the
territory of the receiving State Party, shall be borne by the requesting State Party.
Dispatch/arrival of investigation team
53. The Director-General shall dispatch an investigation team as soon as possible after an
investigation request has been received and processed in accordance with the provisions of
Article III, section G.  The investigation team shall arrive at the point of entry specified in the
request in the minimum time possible in accordance with the provisions contained in
Article III, section G, and this Annex.
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54. In the case of field investigations, the Director-General may, in exceptional cases and
after prior consultation with the receiving State Party, dispatch an element, consisting of
ad hoc experts, of the investigation team assigned in accordance with paragraph 42 above,
later than the rest if the time period for the deployment of the full team cannot be achieved
simultaneously.
(E) CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION
Communications
55. The members of the investigation team shall have the right at all times during the
investigation to communicate with each other.  For this purpose they may use their own duly
approved and certified equipment with the consent of the receiving State Party and in full
compliance with the relevant regulations of the receiving State Party, if the receiving State
Party can not provide them with the necessary telecommunication equipment.  Members of
the investigation team shall have the right to communicate at all times with the Technical
Secretariat, using their own duly approved and certified equipment to the extent that the
receiving State Party can not provide them with the required telecommunication equipment
meeting the same specifications as for the similar approved and certified equipment. In doing
so, the members of the investigation team shall be under the obligation not to communicate
any information or data not related to the investigation mandate.
56. The members of the investigation team shall, unless authorized by the Director-
General, be prohibited at all times from communicating directly or indirectly on any matter
related to the investigation with any person or institution other than the members of the
investigation team or the Technical Secretariat.
Orientation overflight
57. Upon the request of the investigation team, the receiving State Party may provide an
overflight over the investigation area or the facility to be investigated during the investigation
for the purposes of providing the investigation team with a general orientation of the
investigation area or the facility to be investigated. 162
(F) POST-INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES
Preliminary findings
58. Upon completion of the investigation, the investigation team shall meet with the
receiving State Party to review the team’s preliminary findings and to clarify any remaining
ambiguities.  The team shall provide to the receiving State Party its preliminary findings in
written form having taken into account the provisions of Annex E, together with a list and
copies of written information and data gathered and other material intended to be taken off
site, and any samples proposed to be removed from the site. This document shall be signed
by the team leader.  In order to indicate that the receiving State Party has taken notice of the
contents of the initial findings, the representative of the receiving State Party shall
                                                
162The additional text excluding any mention or comment on the absence of an overflight is an unnecessary
impairment of the ability of the investigation team to provide an effective report.
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countersign the document.  This meeting and these procedures shall be completed not later
than 24 hours after completion of the on-site activities.
59. In accordance with the access provisions contained in Article III, section G,
subsection G, the receiving State Party may request that restrictions be placed on the removal
of specific samples, documents or other materials, if it deems this necessary to protect
commercial proprietary or national security information.
60. The receiving State Party may also draw to the attention of the investigation team any
information in the preliminary findings which, in its view, is unrelated to the investigation.
In such cases the receiving State Party shall have the right to request that such information is
deleted If the investigation team does not agree to the deletion of such information, it shall be
handled as confidential.
61. Further to the provisions of paragraph 59 above the investigation team shall, upon
request, supply copies of all information and data recorded during the investigation to the
receiving State Party.
Departure
62. Upon completion of the post-investigation activities, the investigation team and the
observer shall leave the territory of the receiving State Party as soon as possible. The
receiving State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the
safe conduct of the investigation team, equipment and baggage to the point of exit.  Unless
agreed otherwise by the receiving State Party and the investigation team, the point of exit
shall be the same as the point of entry used.
(G) MEASURES TO GUARD AGAINST ABUSE DURING AN INVESTIGATION
63. In carrying out the investigation in accordance with the investigation mandate, the
investigation team shall use only those methods provided for in this Protocol which are
necessary to provide sufficient relevant facts to clarify the concern about possible non-
compliance described in the investigation mandate and shall refrain from activities not
relevant thereto.
64.  It shall collect and document such facts as are related to the possible non-compliance
concern described in the investigation mandate but shall neither seek nor document
information which is clearly not related thereto, unless the receiving State Party expressly
requests it to do so.  Any material collected and subsequently found not to be relevant shall
not be retained.
65. Investigators shall, in accordance with the relevant rules laid down in international
law,  be liable to physical or juridical persons for any intentional or accidental damage
resulting from unlawful actions on their part, including the leaking of confidential
information that becomes known to them in the course of investigation work.
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II.  FIELD INVESTIGATIONS
(A)  INVESTIGATION REQUEST
Evidence, including information and analysis to be submitted with a request for an
investigation
1. A request for an investigation under paragraph 3 (a) of Article III, section G, for an
event(s) which has given rise to a concern about non-compliance shall include the following
information:
(a) Name of the State Party/State on whose territory or in any other place under
whose jurisdiction or control the alleged event(s) has taken place;
(b) A description of the alleged event(s), including all available information on:
(i) The use or release of microbial or other biological agent(s) or toxin(s)
for other than peaceful purposes; and/or
(ii) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery used in the alleged event(s);
(iii) The circumstances under which the alleged event(s) took place;
(iv) The suspected cause and/or perpetrator of the alleged event(s);
(c) To the extent possible, the date and time, when the alleged event(s) took place
and/or became apparent to the requesting State Party and, if possible, the duration of that
alleged event(s);
(d) The area requested to be investigated identified as precisely as possible by
providing the geographic coordinates, specified to the nearest second if possible, or other
alternative measures, as well as a map specifying the identified area and the geographic
characteristics of the area;
(e) Whether any victims are humans, animals or plants as well as an indication of
numbers affected and a description of the consequences of exposure, and if so:
(i) Symptoms and/or signs of the disease;
(ii) All available epidemiological data relevant to the disease outbreak;
(f) For requests involving outbreaks of disease, detailed evidence, and other
information, and analysis, including detailed information on events and/or activities which
substantiate its view that an outbreak of disease (a) is not naturally occurring, and (b) is
directly related to activities prohibited by the Convention;
(g) Information from and/or the outcome or results of any prior consultations/
clarifications relevant to the request.
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2. In addition to the information to be supplied with a request pursuant to paragraph 1,
other types of information may also be submitted as appropriate and to the extent possible
including, inter alia:
(a) Reports of any internal investigation including results of any laboratory
investigations;
(b) Information on the initial treatment and the preliminary results of the
treatment of the disease;
(c) A description of the measures taken to prevent the spread of the disease
outbreak and to eliminate the consequences of the alleged event(s), and their results in the
affected area, if available;
(d) Any request for specific assistance submitted separately in accordance with
the provisions contained in Article VI;
(e) Any other corroborative information, including affidavits of eye witness
accounts, photographs, samples or other physical evidence which in the course of internal
investigations have been recognized as being related to the alleged event(s).
Investigation area
3. The investigation area, requested in terms of paragraph 1 (d) above, shall:
(a) Be sufficient to fulfil the investigation mandate as perceived by the requesting
State Party;
(b) Be consistent with the non-compliance concern that was the cause for the
investigation request;
(c) Not cross any international borders.
4.   The Director-General shall designate the investigation area on a map by geographic
coordinates specified to the nearest second for inclusion in the investigation mandate.  The
designation shall be based on the investigation area identified by the requesting State Party in
the investigation request, and any guidelines received from the Executive Council.  The size
of the designated investigation area shall not exceed the size of the area requested by the
requesting State Party.
(B) PRE-INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES
Notification of investigation
5. The Director-General shall, not less than 12 hours prior to the arrival of the
investigation team at the point of entry, notify the receiving State Party of the impending
investigation.  The Director-General shall also notify other States Parties if access to their
territories might be required during the investigation.
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6. The notification made by the Director-General under the provisions of paragraph 5
shall include, inter alia:
(a) Name of the receiving State Party/State;
(b) Name of the requesting State(s) Party(ies) if not the same as the name of the
receiving State Party;
(c) The nature of the alleged event(s) to be investigated as determined from the
investigation request;
(d) The point of entry where the investigation team will arrive as well as the
means of arrival;
(e) The date and estimated time of arrival of the investigation team at the point of
entry;
(f) If using a non-scheduled aircraft, the standing diplomatic clearance number or
the appropriate information required by the receiving State Party to facilitate the arrival and
handling of the non-scheduled aircraft;
(g) Location and characteristics of the area where the incident(s) of non-
compliance is alleged to have taken place;
(h) A description of any effects on humans, animals or plants;
(i) A list of the approved equipment to be used during the investigation;
(j) A list of approved equipment which the Director-General requests the
receiving State Party’s consideration to be made available to the investigation team for use
during the investigation in accordance with section I, paragraph 41 of this Annex;
(k) A list of laboratory facilities and other support which the Director-General
requests, if  applicable, the receiving State Party to provide to the investigation team for use
during the investigation if available and possible;
(l) The investigation mandate;
(m) The names of the leader and the other members of the investigation team.
7. The receiving State Party shall acknowledge receipt of the notification of the
impending investigation not later than one hour after receipt of such a notification.
8. The receiving State Party shall indicate not later than six hours after receipt of the
notification, which of the requested equipment, laboratory facilities and other support will be
supplied.
Investigation mandate
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9. The investigation mandate, issued in accordance with Article III, section G shall
contain at least the following:
(a) The name of the receiving State(s) Party(ies);
(b) The nature of the alleged event(s) to be investigated as determined from the
investigation request, including any effects on humans, animals or plants;
(c) The investigation area designated in accordance with paragraph 4 of this
section;
(d) Specified investigation objectives to be accomplished;
(e) The planned types of activities, operational instructions and any other
identifiable tasks of the investigation team;
(f) Any transit or basing points to be used by the investigation team, as
appropriate;
(g) The names of the leader and of the other members of the investigation team;
(h) The list of approved equipment to be used during the investigation;
(i) The estimated time necessary to conduct the investigation.
Duration of an investigation
10. The investigation shall not exceed 30 days unless an extension is authorized by the
Executive Council163.  The estimated period of the investigation shall be indicated in the
investigation mandate and updated, within the time frame specified above, by the
investigation team in full consultation with the receiving State Party after the pre-
investigation briefing.  The investigation team shall make every effort to conduct the
investigation in the shortest time possible.  The period of investigation means the period from
the end of the point of entry procedures until the departure of the investigation team from the
point of exit.
(C) ACTIVITIES UPON ARRIVAL OF THE INVESTIGATION TEAM
Transportation from the point of entry
11. The receiving State Party shall transport the investigation team together with its
equipment to the location within the investigation area indicated by the investigation team as
the starting point of the investigation as soon as possible, but in any case shall ensure their
arrival at that location not later than 24 hours after the arrival of the investigation team at the
point of entry.
                                                
163An extension that is authorized by the Executive Council should not also require to be agreed to by the
receiving State Party.
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12. The host State Party/State shall as necessary assist in the transportation of the
investigation team and its equipment.
Pre-investigation briefing
13. The investigation team shall be briefed by representatives of the receiving State Party
with the aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate.  The briefing shall include,
inter alia, relevant natural terrain features, safety aspects, prevailing disease profiles in the
area to be investigated which the receiving State Party considers relevant to the briefing,
possible routes and means of transport to the area, logistical arrangements for the
investigation, details of equipment and/or laboratory facilities provided on request of the
Director-General and any other relevant information.
14. If the case so warrants, the receiving State Party shall have the right to inform the
investigation team during the pre-investigation briefing or at any time during the
investigation about the place or places which it considers sensitive or not related to the
Convention and therefore subject to the access provisions in Article III, section G,
subsection G.
15. The receiving State Party may provide additional information that became available
after the request was made or that does not appear on the investigation mandate.
16. The pre-investigation briefing shall not exceed three hours.
Investigation plan
17. After the pre-investigation briefing the investigation team shall prepare an initial
investigation plan to serve, inter alia, as a basis for logistic and safety arrangements.  This
plan shall at least contain the activities to be carried out by the team, logistic requirements of
the team and provisional timings of the activities and requirements.  The investigation team
shall, as appropriate, modify the investigation plan taking into account any comments by the
receiving State Party.  This plan shall be made available to the receiving State Party prior to
the commencement of the investigation.  The preparation of the investigation plan shall not
exceed two hours.
(D) CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION
Situation report
18. The investigation team shall, not later than 24 hours after its arrival on the territory of
the receiving State Party, in consultation with the receiving State Party send a situation report
to the Director-General.  It shall in consultation with the receiving State Party send further
investigation progress reports as necessary.
19. The situation report may indicate any urgent need related to the matter under
investigation for technical, medical, veterinary or agronomic assistance and any other
relevant information.  The progress reports may indicate any further need for assistance that
might be identified during the course of the investigation.
Implementation by the investigation team of specific on-site activities
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20. All on-site activities shall be conducted in accordance with the access provisions
contained in Article III, section G, subsection G.
Interviewing
Interviewing of eye witnesses
21. The investigation team may interview persons, with their explicit consent, who
witnessed or could provide information on a specific incident or series of incidents, that could
be relevant to the investigation.  The interview shall take place in the presence, and if
possible and appropriate with the assistance, of representatives of the receiving State
Party, unless the individual concerned indicates otherwise.
22. The investigation team may seek information relevant to the investigation which is
necessary to fulfil their investigation mandate.  If required, interpretation shall be provided by
the investigation team or, where requested, by the receiving State Party.
Interviewing of humans who may have been exposed to BTW or owners of
plants or animals which may have been exposed to BTW
23. The investigation team may interview humans, with their explicit consent, who may
have been exposed in order to establish how the exposure affected them.  In the case of
animals or plants which may have been exposed, the investigation team may interview the
persons responsible for the animals or plants, with their consent, in order to establish how the
exposure affected such animals or plants.  Interviews shall be conducted in the presence, and
if possible and appropriate with the assistance, of representatives of the receiving State
Party, unless the individual concerned indicates otherwise.
24. The investigation team shall seek only information which is relevant to the
investigation and necessary to fulfil their investigation mandate.  If required, interpretation
shall be provided by the investigation team or, where requested, by the receiving State Party.
Interviewing of other individuals
25. The investigation team may interview other individuals, such as national/local
government officials, personnel of any relevant medical, veterinary, pharmaceutical,
agricultural institutions or facilities, with their explicit consent, in the presence, and if
possible and appropriate with the assistance, of a representative of the receiving State Party,
unless the individual concerned indicates otherwise, in order to obtain information relevant to
the investigation.
26. The investigation team shall only seek information which is relevant to the
investigation and necessary to fulfil the investigation mandate.  If required, interpretation
shall be provided by the investigation team or, where requested, by the receiving State Party.
27. The receiving State Party, or the person being interviewed, shall have the right to
object to questions they deem not relevant to the investigation or impinge on sensitive
national security or commercial proprietary data.  If the investigation team leader nonetheless
continues to believe that these questions are relevant and should be answered, he/she may
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submit them in writing to the receiving State Party for reply, together with an explanation of
their relevance to the investigation.  The investigation team may note in its report any refusal
by the receiving State Party to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered and
any explanations provided by the receiving State Party in this regard.
28. Interviews shall be conducted in such a way as to avoid unduly hindering the work of
the personnel interviewed.  The investigation team shall, where relevant, give advance notice
of the proposed timings of any requested interviews with specific individuals.  The receiving
State Party may make proposals for the timings of such interviews.
Interviewing of individuals not available in the investigation area
29. If the investigation team, during the course of the investigation establishes that any
person(s) who meet the criteria for interviewing set out in paragraphs 21, 23 and 25 above,
but not present in the area of investigation during the investigation, the interviewing of whom
is required to fulfil its mandate, it may indicate such individuals164 to the receiving State
Party.  The investigation team shall provide the receiving State Party with the etiological
and/or epidemiological information indicating why such interviews are necessary to fulfil its
mandate.  The receiving State Party shall make every reasonable effort to enable the
investigation team to conduct such interview(s) as soon as possible.  Such interviews shall be
conducted in accordance with the provisions contained in paragraphs 21 to 28 above.
Visual observation
30. The investigation team may observe visually area identified in the investigation
mandate in order to obtain information relevant to the investigation.  All necessary
precautions shall be taken to ensure the health and safety of the investigation team.  The
investigation team shall be accompanied by representatives of the receiving State Party.
Video or photographic equipment shall be used in accordance with the access provisions
contained in Article III, section G, subsection G.
Disease/intoxination-related examination
31. Appropriately qualified medical members of the investigation team may conduct
medical examinations of persons affected or exposed, with their informed written consent or
with the informed written consent of their family or legal representatives.  The purpose of
such examinations shall be to enable the investigation team to make a diagnosis and/or
determine whether exposure has occurred.
32. Appropriately qualified members of the investigation team may conduct
disease/intoxination-related examinations of animals and/or plants affected or exposed, with
relevant explicit consent where possible and appropriate, of the legal owners of the animals
and/or plants.  The purpose of these examinations shall be to enable the investigation team to
make a diagnosis and/or determine whether exposure has occurred.
33. The investigation team may, where necessary and applicable, take body samples from
affected persons or animals as well as samples of affected or exposed plants in order to
                                                
164The normal place of residence of such individuals is immaterial.  They may, for example, be individuals who
were in the area of investigation during the event being investigated.
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diagnose, confirm a clinical diagnosis of the disease or determine whether exposure has
occurred.  In the case of persons affected this shall be with the informed written consent or
with the informed written consent of the family or legal representative of the person affected.
The receiving State Party shall receive duplicate samples for its own analysis.
34. The investigation team may observe, participate in or conduct post mortem
examinations where relevant, with the informed written consent by the family or the legal
representative of the deceased.
35. The investigation team may when necessary examine laboratory animals, existing
samples taken from laboratory animals or take samples from such animals with the consent of
the legal owners.
36. All medical information, including samples and other material taken from humans,
shall be accorded the most stringent protection measures by the investigation team and all
laboratories involved in the investigation.
37. If the investigation team, during the course of the investigation, establishes that any
affected or exposed persons or animals not present in the investigation area, the medical or
veterinary examination or taking of body samples is required for the fulfilment of its
mandate, it may indicate such persons or animals to the receiving State Party. The receiving
State Party shall enable the investigation team to conduct such medical or veterinary
examination and/or taking of body samples. Such activities shall be conducted in accordance
with the provisions contained in paragraphs 31 to 36 above.  The investigation team shall
provide the receiving State Party with the etiological and/or epidemiological information
which necessitates such activities.
Sampling and identification
38. The investigation team may, where appropriate and it considers necessary, take
environmental samples, samples of munitions and devices or remnants of munitions and
devices relevant to the investigation mandate.  Any such samples shall be analysed for the
presence of specific biological agents or toxins.
39. Samples shall be taken in the presence of a representative of the receiving State Party.
The investigation team may request the receiving State Party to assist in the collection of
samples under the supervision of members of the investigation team.  The investigation team
may also request the receiving State Party, where necessary and appropriate, to take relevant
control samples from areas immediately adjacent to the locations under investigation.  The
receiving State Party shall receive duplicate samples for its own analysis.
40.165 The Director-General shall have the primary responsibility for the security, integrity
and preservation of samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of samples transferred
for off-site analysis is protected.  The Director-General shall, in any case:
(a) Establish a stringent regime governing the collection, handling, storage,
transport and analysis of samples;
                                                
165Previously paragraph 44 on page 187 of AHG/51.  Reordered for greater clarity.
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(b) Select from among the designated and certified laboratories those which shall
perform analytical or other functions in relation to the investigation;
(c) Ensure that all samples shall be analysed in two designated and certified
laboratories, one of which may be within the receiving State Party;166
(d) Ensure that there are procedures for the safekeeping and maintaining of the
integrity of sealed duplicate samples for further clarification if necessary;
(e) Ensure the expeditious processing of the analysis of samples;
(f) Be accountable for the safety of all samples;
41.167 The investigation team may analyse samples using any methods specifically designed
or approved for use in such investigations, and available to the investigation team.  At the
request of the investigation team, the receiving State Party shall, to the extent possible,
provide assistance for the analysis of samples, using locally available resources.  If the
receiving State Party itself performs analyses, the investigation team or some member
especially assigned by the team leader shall be present throughout.168    All sampling shall
be conducted according to procedures and methods so as to ensure that the desired samples
taken are not contaminated and taken with due regard to health and safety considerations.
42.169 Analysis of one of the sealed duplicate samples referred to in paragraph 39 shall,
whenever possible, be carried out on the territory of the receiving State Party and in the
presence of representatives of the investigation team and the receiving State Party.
43.170 When it is not possible to carry out the analysis on the territory of the receiving State
Party, the investigation team may remove samples for analysis in designated and certified
laboratories.  Representatives of the receiving State Party shall have the right to accompany
all samples and observe any analysis and the subsequent destruction.  Any unused samples or
portions thereof, remaining after analysis has been completed, shall be returned to the
receiving State Party.
44. When off-site analysis is to be performed, the samples shall be analysed in different
designated and certified laboratories in separate States Parties.  The Director-General shall
ensure the expeditious processing of the analysis.
45. The receiving State Party shall receive duplicate samples for its own analysis.  The
receiving State Party and the investigation team shall also receive sealed duplicate samples
for safekeeping and use if necessary for further clarification.
46. If further clarification of analytical results becomes necessary, then the sealed
duplicate samples shall be used for this purpose.  The seals of these samples shall be broken
                                                
166Duplicate analysis of all samples in two designated and certified laboratories is essential.
167Previously paragraph 41 on page 186 of AHG/51.
168It is essential that the investigation team or a member of it shall be present throughout not just during all
analytical processes.
169Previously paragraph 42 on page 186 of AHG/51.
170Previously paragraph 43 on page 187 of AHG/51.
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in the presence of both the investigation team and representatives of the receiving State Party.
The analysis of these samples shall also take place in the presence of the investigation team
and representatives of the receiving State Party.
47.  Any unused samples or portions thereof, remaining after the investigation has been
completed and that have not been destroyed, shall be returned to the receiving State Party.
Collection and examination of background information and data
48. The investigation team may with the assistance of the receiving State Party:
(a) Obtain and examine epidemiological data which it deems relevant to the
investigation mandate.  Such data may include data on the prevalence of a disease, an
epidemic or other disease outbreaks, and any preliminary identification and diagnosis of the
event(s) that has given rise to the investigation as well as data on immunization programmes;
(b) Examine all medical, public and occupational health records and data which it
deems relevant to the investigation mandate.  Access to individual medical records shall be
by the informed written consent of the individual concerned, or the family or legal
representative where appropriate;
(c) Examine other documentation and records, such as those on veterinary or
agricultural matters, which it deems relevant to the investigation mandate.
49. The investigation team may request copies of any documentation or data relevant to
the investigation request for inclusion in the final report or to assist in its preparation.  The
reason for any objection given by the receiving State Party shall be put in writing for
inclusion in the investigation report.  Documentation and data requested by the investigation
team and identified as confidential by the receiving State Party shall be treated in accordance
with the confidentiality provisions of this Protocol.
50. Any documents or data collected and subsequently identified by the receiving State
Party not to be relevant to the investigation mandate, shall be returned to the receiving State
Party by the investigation team.  Any documentation or data identified by the receiving State
Party as in its view not being relevant to the investigation mandate shall be identified as such
in the final report.
Extension of investigation area
51. If during the course of the investigation the investigation team considers it necessary
to extend the area of investigation, it may request the receiving State Party for such
extension.  In its request, the investigation team shall indicate the requested extended area on
a map by geographic coordinates specified to the nearest second.  It shall also provide the
receiving State Party with the reasons for the request.  If agreement is not reached in 24
hours, the investigation team leader shall submit the issue to the Executive Council through
the Director-General.  The Director-General shall submit to the Executive Council a written
request to extend the investigation area which shall include the evidence, including
information and scientific and technical analysis providing a substantive basis for the request
as well as all the information in the original request submitted to the receiving State Party.
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The Director-General shall also transmit a copy of the request to the receiving and requesting
States Parties simultaneously with the submission of the request to the Executive Council.
52. If during an investigation the investigation team considers it necessary to extend the
investigation to a neighbouring State Party/State, the investigation team shall notify the
Director-General.  The Director-General shall inform the Executive Council. On the basis of
that information and/or any other information, any State Party may request in accordance
with Article III, section G that a separate investigation be conducted on the territory of a State
Party identified by the Director-General in the submission to the Executive Council. In the
case of a non-State Party, the Director-General shall immediately contact that non-State Party
in accordance with the procedure set out in Article III, section G.
Extension of investigation duration
53. If the investigation team, at any time during the investigation, finds that the estimated
time for the investigation is not adequate, the investigation team may apply to the Director-
General for an extension of the investigation duration.  The Director-General may extend the
duration of the investigation in accordance with paragraph 9 of this section.
Preliminary findings and departure
54. The post-investigation activities relating to preliminary findings and departure of the
investigation team shall be conducted in accordance with paragraphs 58 to 62 of section I of
this Annex.
(E) REPORTS
Interim investigation report
55. An interim investigation report shall be made available to the receiving State Party
not later than 30 days after completion of the investigation.
56. The interim investigation report shall summarize the factual findings of the
investigation.  In addition, the report shall include a description of the investigation process,
tracing its various stages, with special reference to:
(a) The activities conducted by the investigation team and its factual findings,
particularly with regard to the concern regarding possible non-compliance as expressed in
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b);
(b) The locations and times of any sampling and on-site analysis;
(c) Supporting evidence such as the records of interviews, the results of
disease/intoxination-related examinations and epidemiological and scientific analyses, and
the documents examined by the investigation team;
(d) Any information that the investigation team in the course of its investigation
collected, that might serve to help in the identification of the origin of any biological agent or
toxin found during the course of the investigation such as, inter alia, chemical composition
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and the presence of inert materials in the case of possible toxin weapons and serological or
molecular sequence evidence in the case of infectious agents;
(e) The report shall also present such environmental and historical information as
is available on the previous presence of the alleged agent in the region;
(f) An account of the assistance and its timeliness, provided by the host State
Party/State;
(g) The result of any completed laboratory investigations and sampling and
identification;
(h) A factual description by the investigation team of the degree and nature of
access and cooperation granted by the receiving State Party and the extent to which this
enabled the investigation team to fulfil its mandate.
57. The receiving State Party shall have the right to the following, which shall be
communicated to the investigation team within 10 days after receipt of the interim report
from the investigation team:
(a) Identify any information and data not related to the non-compliance
concern(s) contained in the investigation mandate which in its view, due to its confidential
nature, should not be contained in the final version of the report.  The investigation team shall
consider these observations and, as a rule, should remove that information and data as
requested;
(b) Comment on the contents of the interim investigation report.  The
investigation team shall refer to the comments of the receiving State Party in the final version
of the report and, wherever possible, incorporate them before submitting the final report to
the Director-General.
Laboratory reports
58. Laboratory analysis and identification of biological agents and/or toxins shall be
reported by the laboratory by means of the following types of reports:
(a) Initial laboratory report.  An initial laboratory report shall be made available to
the leader of the investigation team by the laboratory as soon as possible after receipt of the
sample(s) and shall indicate initial findings, contain a differential diagnosis, give an estimate
of the duration of further work as well as a plan for the conduct of further analysis and tests.
(b) Intermediate laboratory report.  The laboratory shall make an interim
laboratory report to the leader of the investigation team if it has not finalized its work after
30 days since the initial report.  It  shall contain details of progress of work and the final plan
for future work.
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(c) Final laboratory report.  The laboratory shall make a final report of its findings
to the leader of the investigation team as soon as it has finalized its work, which should not
be171 later than six months after receipt of the sample(s).  The final laboratory report shall
contain a description of the work done and a complete diagnosis or identification of an agent
or agents.  If it was not possible to make a positive diagnosis or identification, the report shall
state that fact and give an explanation as to why it was not possible to make a final diagnosis
or identification.
59. If there is any discrepancy in the laboratory reports, the investigation team shall
submit a duplicate sample to another designated and certified laboratory for analysis.
60. The laboratory reports shall be completed as soon as possible but should not be172
later than six months after the conclusion of the on-site investigation for inclusion in the draft
final report.
Final report
61. A draft final report which shall contain the interim investigation report, the comments
of the receiving State Party and the laboratory reports shall be made available to the receiving
State Party by the leader of the investigation team not later than 10 days after receipt of the
final laboratory report(s).  The receiving State Party may provide written comments on the
draft final report which shall be communicated to the investigation team leader within 7 days
after receipt of the draft final report.  Any written comments that the receiving State Party
may wish to make concerning the contents and findings of the draft final report, shall be
attached as an annex to the final version of the draft report.  The draft final report together
with its annexes shall become the final report.
62. The final report shall be transmitted to the Director-General not later than 14 days
after the completion of the investigation for further handling in accordance with Article III,
section G.
                                                
171It would be imprudent to include a deadline of six months within the Protocol as there can be no certainty
that the designated and certified laboratories will have the capacity available to carry out and complete the work
required by the Organization within six months.  The Protocol will come into disrepute if the quality of the
analytical results of samples from investigations is not of the highest international standard.
172Amended for consistency with paragraph 58 (c).
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III.  FACILITY INVESTIGATIONS
(A) INVESTIGATION REQUEST
Information to be submitted with a request for an investigation
1. Requests for facility investigations under Article III, section G, for an event(s) which
has given rise to a concern about non-compliance shall at least include the following
information:
(a) Name of the State Party on whose territory or in any other place under whose
jurisdiction or control the alleged non-compliant activity has taken place;
(b) A description of the specific event(s) or activity(ies) which gave rise to a non-
compliance concern, including specific information regarding the development, production,
stockpiling, acquisition or retention of:
(i) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(ii) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict;
(c) The name, if known, or other form of identification and location(s) of the
facility(ies) where the alleged non-compliant activity(ies) took place.  This shall include as
much detail as possible including a site diagram, indicating boundaries as well as the
requested perimeter, related to a reference point with geographic coordinates, specified to the
nearest second, if possible, or other alternative measures;
(d) The approximate period during which the non-compliant event(s) or
activity(ies) is alleged to have taken place;
(e) Information from and/or the outcome or results of  prior consultations/
clarifications or any other prior investigations relevant to the request.
2. In addition to the information to be supplied with a request pursuant to paragraph 1,
other relevant information should also be submitted as appropriate and to the extent possible
including, inter alia:
(a) Whether the facility(ies) concerned has been declared under the Protocol;  and
any information included in or absent from the declaration relevant to the allegations; if not,
any information to suggest that the facility(ies) concerned should have been declared under
the Protocol;
(b) Details of the ownership and/or operator of the facility(ies) concerned.
Requested perimeter
3. The requested perimeter identified in paragraph 1 (d) above, shall:
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(a) Where possible, run at least 10 metres outside any buildings or other
structures;
(b) Not cut through existing security enclosures; and
(c) Where possible, run at least 10 metres outside any existing security enclosures
that the requesting State Party wishes to include within the requested perimeter.
4. If the requested perimeter does not conform with the specifications of paragraph 3, it
shall be re-drawn by the investigation team in consultation with the receiving State Party to
ensure that it conforms with that provision.
(B) PRE-INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES
Notification of investigation
5. The Director-General shall, not less than 12 hours before the planned arrival of the
investigation team at the point of entry, notify the receiving State Party, of the impending
investigation.  This notification shall include, inter alia:
(a) Name of the receiving State Party;
(b) Name of the requesting State Party;
(c) The name, if known, and location of the facility(ies) to be investigated;
(d) The point of entry where the investigation team will arrive as well as the
means of arrival;
(e) The date and estimated time of arrival of the investigation team at the point of
entry;
(f) If using a non-scheduled aircraft, the standing diplomatic clearance number or
the appropriate information required by the receiving State Party to facilitate the arrival and
handling of the non-scheduled aircraft;
(g) The names of the leader and of the other members of the investigation team;
(h) The investigation mandate.
6. The receiving State Party shall acknowledge receipt of the notification of the
impending investigation not later than 3 hours after receipt of such a notification.
Investigation mandate
7. The investigation mandate, issued in accordance with Article III, section G, shall
contain at least the following:
(a) The name of the receiving State Party;
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(b) The non-compliance concern(s) that gave rise to the investigation request;
(c) The location and requested perimeter of the investigation site specified on a
map, taking into account all information on which the request was based;
(d) The names of the leader of and of the other members of the investigation
team;
(e) The list of approved equipment to be used during the investigation;
(f) Operational instructions and any other identifiable tasks;
(g) The planned types of activity of the investigation team;
(h) Objectives to be accomplished by the investigation team;
(i) Point of entry to be used by the investigation team;
(j) The estimated time necessary to conduct the investigation.
Duration of an investigation
8. The period of the investigation shall not exceed 84 consecutive hours, unless extended
by agreement with the receiving State Party.  The period of investigation shall be the period
from provision of access to the investigation team within the requested or if different final
perimeter, exclusive of time spent on presentation of the preliminary findings.
Monitoring of perimeter
9. Not later than 12 hours after receiving the notification in accordance with paragraph 5
of this section, the receiving State Party shall begin collecting factual information of all
vehicular exit activity from all exit points for all land, air and water vehicles of the perimeter
as determined in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of this section.  This obligation may be
met by collecting factual information in the form of traffic logs, photographs or video
recordings.
10. Upon the investigation team’s arrival at the alternative or final perimeter, whichever
arrives first, it shall have the right to begin implementing exit monitoring procedures in order
to secure the alternative or final perimeter, whichever arrives first. Such procedures shall
include the identification of vehicular exits and the making of traffic logs.
11. The investigation team may inspect, in accordance with the access provisions
contained in Article III, section G, subsection G, vehicular traffic exiting the perimeter. The
receiving State Party shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate to the investigation
team that any vehicle, subject to inspection, to which the investigation team is not granted
full access, is not being used for purposes related to the possible non-compliance concern(s)
as stated in the investigation mandate.  Personnel and vehicles entering and personnel and
personal vehicles exiting shall not be subject to inspection.
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12. The investigation team may, under the supervision of a representative(s) from the
receiving State Party and/or the facility, take photographs and make video recordings of exit
traffic which are deemed relevant to the investigation mandate by the investigation team.
The photographs and video recordings shall be safeguarded by the investigation team and the
receiving State Party, which at the end of the investigation shall take a joint decision about
their relevance to the investigation mandate.  All photographs and video recordings not
relevant to the investigation mandate shall remain with the receiving State Party.  Other
procedures for exit monitoring shall be agreed upon by the investigation team and the
receiving State Party.  The investigation team has the right to go, under escort, to any other
part of the perimeter to check that there is no other exit activity.
13. All activities for securing the perimeter and exit monitoring shall take place within a
band around the outside of the perimeter, not exceeding 45 metres in width, measured
outward.
14. The application of the above procedures may continue for the duration of the
investigation, but shall be conducted in such a manner as to ensure the least possible
hampering or delaying of the normal operation of the facility.
(C) ACTIVITIES UPON ARRIVAL OF INVESTIGATION TEAM
Alternative determination of final perimeter
15. At the point of entry, if the receiving State Party is unable to accept the requested
perimeter, it shall propose an alternative perimeter as soon as possible, but in any case not
later than two hours after the arrival of the investigation team at the point of entry.  In case of
differences of opinion, the receiving State Party and the investigation team shall engage in
negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on a final perimeter.
16. The alternative perimeter shall be designated as specifically as possible in accordance
with paragraph 3.  It shall include the whole of the requested perimeter and, as a rule, bear a
close relationship to the requested perimeter, taking into account natural terrain features and
man-made boundaries.  It shall normally run close to the surrounding security barrier if such
a barrier exists.  The receiving State Party shall seek to establish such a relationship between
the perimeters by a combination of at least two of the following means:
(a) An alternative perimeter that shall not extend to cover an area significantly
greater than that of the requested perimeter;
(b) An alternative perimeter that is where possible a short, uniform distance from
the requested perimeter;
(c) At least part of the requested perimeter is visible from the alternative
perimeter.
17. If the alternative perimeter is acceptable to the investigation team, it shall become the
final perimeter and the investigation team shall be transported from the point of entry to that
perimeter in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 20 of this section.
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18. If no agreement is reached within three hours after the arrival of the investigation
team at the point of entry, the alternative perimeter shall be designated the final perimeter and
the investigation team shall be transported from the point of entry to that perimeter in
accordance with paragraphs 19 and 20 of this section.
Transportation from the point of entry
19. The receiving State Party shall transport the investigation team together with its
equipment, to the requested or, if different, final perimeter as soon as possible, but in any
case shall ensure their arrival at that location not later than 12 hours after the arrival of the
investigation team at the point of entry.
20. The host State Party/State shall as necessary assist in the transportation of the
investigation team and its equipment.
Pre-investigation briefing
21. The receiving State Party shall provide a pre-investigation briefing to the
investigation team prior to granting it access.  The briefing shall include the scope and a
general description of the activities conducted at the facility to be investigated as well as
details of the physical layout and other relevant characteristics of the area within the
perimeter, including either a map or sketch, whichever is available, showing all structures
and significant geographic features.  The investigation team shall also be briefed on the
availability of personnel and records which may be relevant to the investigation mandate.
The briefing shall also include information concerning the safety or other relevant regulations
including, where applicable, rules of observation and quarantine, in force at the facility.  The
briefing may, at the discretion of the receiving State Party, include an orientation tour of the
area within the perimeter.  The investigation team shall provide information on the
vaccination status of the team members at the pre-investigation briefing.  The duration of the
briefing shall not exceed three hours unless agreed to by the investigation team and the
receiving State Party.
22. If the case so warrants, the receiving State Party shall have the right to inform the
investigation team during the pre-investigation briefing or at any time during the
investigation about the areas, facilities or buildings which it considers sensitive or not related
to the Convention and therefore subject to the access provisions in Article III, section G,
subsection G.
Initial investigation plan
23. After the pre-investigation briefing the investigation team shall prepare on the basis of
information available and appropriate to it an initial plan for the conduct of the investigation.
This plan shall outline the specific activities the investigation team plan to carry out and
specific areas within the perimeter, documentation and personnel to which access is desired.
Other information such as approximate timings and the sequence of activities may also be
included in the plan.
24. The investigation team shall take into account the areas, facilities, buildings or
documentation which the receiving State Party considers sensitive or not related to the
Convention, in accordance with paragraph 22 above, in the preparation of the investigation
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plan.  The investigation team shall also take into account any measures, in accordance with
the provisions contained in Article III, section G, subsection G, indicated by the receiving
State Party and may make proposals concerning the implementation of these measures.
25. The investigation team shall indicate in the initial plan the number of personnel
responsible for perimeter activities.  The investigation team shall also include in its initial
plan an indication whether it plans to divide into subgroups.  It shall not divide into more
than two subgroups unless otherwise agreed by the receiving State Party.
26. The initial plan shall be made available to the receiving State Party prior to the
commencement of the investigation.  The investigation team shall, as appropriate, modify the
plan and consider any comments by the receiving State Party.  During the investigation, the
investigation team may revise the initial plan as it deems necessary, taking into account any
comments by the receiving State Party and information required during the investigation.
Any revision of the initial investigation plan shall be made available to the receiving State
Party.
27. The preparation of the initial investigation plan, including the consideration of the
receiving State Party shall not exceed two hours.
(D) CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION
Implementation by the investigation team of specific on-site activities
28. All on-site activities shall be conducted in accordance with the access provisions
contained in Article III, section G, subsection G.
Interviewing
29. The investigation team may interview any relevant personnel of the facility with their
explicit consent in the presence of representatives, which may include a legal advisor and/or a
senior member of the facility staff, of the receiving State Party with the purpose of
establishing relevant facts.  They shall only request information and data which are necessary
for the fulfilment of the investigation mandate.
30. The receiving State Party shall have the right to object to questions posed to the
facility personnel if it deems that those questions are not relevant to the investigation or
impinge on sensitive national security or commercial proprietary data.  If the investigation
team leader nonetheless continues to believe that these questions are relevant and should be
answered, he/she may submit them in writing to the receiving State Party for reply, together
with an explanation of their relevance to the investigation.  The investigation team may note
in its report any refusal by the receiving State Party to permit interviews or to allow questions
to be answered and any explanations given.
31. Interviews shall be conducted in such a way as to avoid unduly hindering the work of
the facility.  The investigation team shall give advance notice of interview requests.
Visual observation
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32. The investigation team may visually observe the interior and exterior of those
buildings and structures which are relevant to the investigation mandate within the
investigated facility.
Identification and examination of equipment
33. The investigation team may identify and examine only equipment relevant to the
investigation mandate at the investigated facility. In the identification and examination of
equipment, the investigation team may make use of, but not be limited to, the list of
equipment contained in Annex B.
34. The investigation team may also note the size and quantity of equipment in the
facility, or the absence of any equipment, and compare this with information provided in
facility declarations where appropriate.
Examination of documentation and records
35. The investigation team may only when required to fulfil its mandate, examine
documentation and records available at the facility, relevant to the investigation mandate and
which may include but are not limited to the supply and consumption of media and the design
or operation of equipment as well as receipt and transfer of biological agents and toxins.  The
receiving State Party may assist the investigation team by providing the relevant
documentation and records to the investigation team to discharge its functions in accordance
with the investigation mandate.
36. The receiving State Party may, in accordance with Article III, section G, subsection
G, protect documentation and records.
37. The investigation team may request copies of documentation or print-outs of records.
The investigation team and the Technical Secretariat shall, if so required by the receiving
State Party, treat as confidential such documents and print-outs or records and any other
information obtained as a result of access to documentation and records, and shall handle
them accordingly.  Documents and print-outs may be removed from the facility only with the
permission of the receiving State Party.
38. The examination of documentation and records shall be conducted in such a way as to
minimize disruption to the normal work of the facility.
39. The investigation team may, with the consent of the receiving State Party, obtain
information on relevant health, safety or other regulatory procedures or financial regulations,
to serve as background information which may assist the investigation team to understand
documents and records examined.
40. If specific issues arise during the investigation, which in the opinion of the
investigation team could be resolved by the examination of specific documentation and
records not available at the investigated facility, the investigation team may request the
receiving State Party to provide access at the investigated facility, to these specific
documents and records for review at the investigated facility in accordance with the
provisions of Article III, section G, subsection G.
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Examination of medical records
41. The investigation team may, in discharging its mandate and with the consent of the
receiving State Party, obtain access to medical and occupational health records and data of
the facility or such regulations being applied at the facility.  Access to such data shall be at
the discretion of the receiving State Party.  The receiving State Party shall, however,
endeavour to provide the greatest degree of access possible to such data.  The receiving State
Party may maintain the anonymity of data.  Access which may require scrutiny of individual
medical records in which the identity of an individual may be revealed, shall be by the
informed written consent of the individual.  If a request for access to medical and
occupational health data is refused, the receiving State Party shall provide a written
explanation to the investigation team leader.
Examination of clinical and pathological samples
42. The investigation team may with the permission of the receiving State Party examine
analytical data related to clinical and pathological samples relevant to the investigation
mandate taken previously by the facility.
Sampling and identification
43. The investigation team may, with the permission of the receiving State Party, obtain
samples and test these for the presence of specific biological agents or toxins in order to
address a specific non-compliance concern contained in the investigation mandate.
44. Sampling shall only be used when the investigation team comes to a conclusion based
on information obtained from the briefing and/or the application of the other measures in this
section during the investigation which suggest that sampling might provide significant
information necessary for the fulfilment of the investigation mandate.  Where possible,
specific tests shall be used to identify specific agents, strains or genes.
45. The receiving State Party shall have the right to take measures, in accordance with the
access provisions contained in Article III, section G, subsection G, to protect national
security and confidential proprietary information such as requiring the use of specific tests or
on-site analysis or, if necessary, to refuse a sample.  In the latter case the receiving State
Party shall be under the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate that the
requested sample is unrelated to the non-compliance concern(s) contained in the investigation
mandate.
46. Representatives of the receiving State Party shall take samples at the request of the
investigation team and in their presence.  If so agreed, the investigation team may take
samples itself.
47173. The Director-General shall have the primary responsibility for the security, integrity
and preservation of samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of samples transferred
for off-site analysis is protected.  The Director-General shall, in any case:
                                                
173Previously paragraph 55 on page 203 of AHG/51.  Reordered for greater clarity.
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(a) Establish a stringent regime governing the collection, handling, storage,
transport and analysis of samples;
(b) Select from among the designated and certified laboratories those which shall
perform the analytical functions in relation to the investigation;
(c) Ensure that all samples shall be analysed in two designated and certified
laboratories, one of which may be within the receiving State Party;174
(d) Ensure that there are procedures for the safekeeping and maintaining of the
integrity of sealed duplicate samples for further clarification if necessary.
48. Where possible, samples shall be analysed on-site.  The investigation team may test
samples using any methods approved by the Technical Secretariat for use in such
investigations.  At the request of the investigation team, the receiving State Party shall to the
extent possible provide assistance for the analysis of samples on site, using locally available
resources.  In the event that it is agreed between the investigation team and the receiving
State Party, that the receiving State Party itself performs analyses, this shall be done in the
presence of members of the investigation team.
49. If on-site analysis is impossible, the investigation team may request the removal of
samples for analysis in laboratories selected in accordance with paragraph 47 (b) above.
Where possible a sample shall also be analysed in an accredited and certified laboratory on
the territory of the receiving State Party.  The receiving State Party shall have the right to
take measures necessary to ensure that commercial proprietary or national security
information would not be jeopardized by the off-site analysis of samples.  If the removal of
samples is agreed, the receiving State Party shall have the right to accompany the sample and
observe any analysis and its subsequent destruction.
50. When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples shall be analysed in at least two
designated and certified laboratories.  The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious
processing of the analysis.  The samples shall be accounted for by the Technical Secretariat.
51. The receiving State Party shall receive duplicate samples, for its own analysis.  The
receiving State Party and the investigation team shall also receive sealed duplicate samples
for safekeeping and use if necessary for further clarification.
52. If further clarification of analytical results becomes necessary then the sealed
duplicate samples shall be used for this purpose.  The seals of these samples shall be broken
in the presence of both the investigation team and representatives of the receiving State Party.
The analysis of these samples shall also take place in the presence of the investigation team
and representatives of the receiving State Party.
53.  Any unused samples or portions thereof, remaining after the investigation has been
completed and that have not been destroyed shall be returned to the receiving State Party.
                                                
174Duplicate analysis of all samples in two designated and certified laboratories is essential.
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54. The receiving State Party shall have the right to offer a sample for analysis in
accordance with the provisions in paragraphs 46 to 55 of this section at any time in order to
help resolve the non-compliance concern(s) contained in the investigation mandate.
55. Any on-site sampling and analysis shall be conducted in such a way as to avoid any
adverse impact on the normal work of the facility and any consequent loss of production.
(E) POST-INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES
Preliminary findings and departure
56. The post-investigation activities relating to preliminary findings and departure of the
investigation team shall be conducted in accordance with paragraphs 58 to 62 of section I of
this Annex.
(F) REPORTS
Interim investigation report
57. An interim investigation report shall be made available to the receiving State Party
not later than 14 days after completion of the on-site part of the investigation.  The interim
investigation report shall summarize the factual findings of the investigation.  In addition, the
report shall include a description of the investigation process, tracing its various stages, with
special reference to:
(a) The activities conducted by the investigation team and its factual findings,
particularly with regard to the concern regarding possible non-compliance as expressed in
subparagraph 1 (b);
(b) The positions and times of any sampling and on-site analysis;
(c) Supporting evidence such as records of perimeter monitoring activities, the
records of on-site activities conducted by the investigation team;
(d) Any information that the investigation team in the course of its investigation
collected, that might serve to help in the identification of any biological agent or toxin found
during the course of the investigation such as, inter alia, chemical composition and the
presence of inert materials in the case of possible toxin weapons and serological or molecular
sequence evidence in the case of infectious agents;
(e) The results of any completed laboratory investigations and sampling and
identification;
(f) A factual description by the investigation team of the degree and nature of
access and cooperation granted by the receiving State Party and the extent to which this
enabled the investigation team to fulfil its mandate;
(g) An account of the assistance and its timeliness, provided by the host State
Party/State, if applicable.
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58. The receiving State Party shall have the right to the following, which shall be
communicated to the investigation team within 10175 days after receipt of the interim  report
from the investigation team:
(a) Identify any information and data not related to the non-compliance
concern(s) contained in the investigation mandate which in its view, due to its confidential
nature, should not be contained in the final version of the report. The investigation team shall
consider these observations and, as a rule, should remove that information and data as
requested;
(b) Comment on the contents of the interim report.  The investigation team shall
refer to the comments of the receiving State Party in the final version of the report and,
wherever possible, incorporate them before submitting the final report to the Director-
General.
Laboratory reports
59. Laboratory analysis and identification of biological agents and/or toxins shall be
reported by the laboratory by means of the following types of reports:
(a) Initial laboratory report.  An initial laboratory report shall be made available to
the leader of the investigation team by the laboratory as soon as possible after receipt of the
sample(s) and shall indicate initial findings, give an estimate of the duration of further work
as well as a plan for the conduct of further analysis and tests.
(b) Intermediate laboratory report.  The laboratory shall make an interim
laboratory report to the leader of the investigation team if it has not finalized its work after
30 days since the initial report.  It  shall contain details of progress of work and the final plan
for future work.
(c) Final laboratory report.  The laboratory shall make a final report of its findings
to the leader of the investigation team as soon as it has finalized its work, but not later than
six months after receipt of the sample(s).  The final laboratory report shall contain a
description of the work done and an identification of an agent or agents.  If it was not
possible to make a positive identification, the report shall state that fact and give an
explanation as to why it was not possible to make a positive identification.
60. If there is any discrepancy in the laboratory reports, the investigation team shall
submit a duplicate sample to another designated and certified laboratory for analysis.
61. The laboratory reports shall be completed as soon as possible but should not be later
than six months176 after the conclusion of the on-site investigation for inclusion in the draft
final report.
Final report
                                                
175The short time is necessary in order not to delay the overall timescale for reporting.
176It would be imprudent to include a deadline of six months within the Protocol as there can be no certainty
that the designated and certified laboratories will have the capacity available to carry out and complete the work
required by the Organization within six months.  The Protocol will come into disrepute if the quality of the
analytical results of samples from investigations is not of the highest international standard.
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62. A draft final report which shall contain the interim investigation report, the comments
of the receiving State Party and the laboratory reports shall be made available to the receiving
State Party by the leader of the investigation team not later than 10 days after receipt of the
final laboratory report(s).  The receiving State Party may provide written comments on the
draft final report which shall be communicated to the investigation team leader within 10
days after receipt of the draft final report.  Any written comments that the receiving State
Party may wish to make concerning the contents and findings of the draft final report, shall
be attached as an annex to the final version of the draft report.  The draft final report together
with its annexes shall become the final report.
67. The final report shall be transmitted to the Director-General not later than 14 days
after receipt of written comments from the receiving State Party for further handling in
accordance with Article III, section G.
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E.  CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS177
I.  GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
(A) THE CONFIDENTIALITY REGIME
1. In order to establish and maintain the regime governing the handling of confidential
information pursuant to Article IV (hereinafter referred to as “the Confidentiality Regime”),
an appropriate unit of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as “the Confidentiality
Unit”) under the direct responsibility of the Director-General shall be charged with overall
supervision of the administration of confidentiality provisions.
2. The Confidentiality Regime shall be considered and approved by the Conference.
The Organization shall not distribute information or data supplied to it in confidence by
States Parties until the regime has been approved by the Conference at its first session.
3. The Executive Council shall establish a sub-committee in accordance with its rules of
procedure to monitor and make recommendations on the Confidentiality Regime being
applied by the Technical Secretariat.
4. Subsequently, the Director-General shall report annually to the Conference on the
implementation of the Confidentiality Regime by the Technical Secretariat.
(B) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
5. A classification system shall be introduced, which shall provide for clear criteria
ensuring the inclusion of information into appropriate categories of confidentiality and the
justified durability of the confidential nature of information.  While providing for the
necessary flexibility in its implementation, the classification system shall protect the right of
States Parties providing confidential information.  The classification system shall be
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article IX.
6. Each State Party from which information was received or to which information refers
shall have the right, in consultation with the Confidentiality Unit as the State Party may
consider appropriate, to classify such information in accordance with the classification
system.  Any such classification shall be binding for the Organization.
(C) CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION AS CONFIDENTIAL
7. The essential factors to be considered in determining the classification of an item of
information are as follows:
(a) The degree of potential damage which its disclosure could cause to a State Party, a
natural or legal person of a State Party, or to the Protocol or the Organization; and
                                                
177The amendments made to Annex E are based on the analysis in Evaluation Paper No. 16, Article IV:
Confidentiality Provisions, March 2000.
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(b) The degree of potential advantage its disclosure could offer to a State, or to a natural
or legal person.
(D) ACCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
8. Access to confidential information shall be regulated in accordance with its
classification and shall be on a need-to-know basis.
9. Not less than 30 days before an employee is given clearance for access to confidential
information that refers to activities on the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction
or control of a State Party, the State Party concerned shall be notified of the proposed
clearance.  The proposal shall be regarded as accepted unless the State Party declares within
30 days its non-acceptance in writing.  Individuals on the list of designated personnel as
provided for in Annex D, section I, paragraphs 1 to 16 after acceptance by States Parties,
shall be deemed to have fulfilled this requirement.
10. If necessary to fulfil its obligations under this Protocol, the Technical Secretariat may
grant access to information and data classified as confidential to authorised entities or
individuals outside the Technical Secretariat.  Such access shall be strictly limited to the
minimum necessary and shall be granted only on specific approval by the Director-
General as well as on the basis of a specific secrecy agreement and in conformity with the
procedures of the Confidentiality Regime.
11. Each access to confidential information at the Technical Secretariat shall be recorded
on file when accessing and exiting.  This record shall be retained for 10 years.
12. To the greatest extent consistent with the effective implementation of the provisions
under this Protocol, confidential information shall be handled and stored by the Technical
Secretariat in a form that precludes direct identification of the facility to which it pertains.
(E) OBLIGATIONS FOR INTENDED RELEASE OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
13.  No confidential information obtained by the Technical Secretariat in connection with
the implementation of this Protocol shall be published or otherwise released, except as
follows:
(a) Any information may be released with the express consent of the State Party from
which the information was received and the State Party to which the information refers;
(b) Information classified as confidential shall be released by the Organization only
through procedures which ensure that the release of information only occurs in strict
conformity with the needs of this Protocol.  Such procedures shall be considered and
approved by the Conference pursuant to Article IX.
II.  CONDITIONS OF STAFF EMPLOYMENT RELATING TO
THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
(A) GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
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1. Conditions of staff employment shall be such as to ensure that access to and handling
of confidential information shall be in conformity with the procedures established by the
Director-General in accordance with this Protocol and its Annexes.
2. Each position in the Technical Secretariat shall be governed by a formal position
description that specifies, inter alia, the scope of access to confidential information, if any,
needed in that position.
3. In the discharge of their functions, staff members of the Technical Secretariat shall
only request information and data which are necessary to carry out their duties and avoid to
the extent possible any access to information and data unrelated to the discharge of their
duties.  They shall not make any records of such information collected incidentally and not
related to the requirements of their duties.
(B) INDIVIDUAL SECRECY AGREEMENTS
4. The Director-General and the other members of the staff shall enter into individual
secrecy agreements with the Technical Secretariat in which each staff member shall agree not
to disclose during the period of employment and for an unlimited period after termination of
the staff member’s functions, to any unauthorized State, organization or person any
confidential information coming to the staff member’s knowledge in the performance of
official duties, unless the information has been declassified or officially released by the
Organization.
(C) CODE OF CONDUCT
5. 178 The Director-General may publicly release information that is not designated as
confidential and that falls into one of the following categories:
(a)  General information on the implementation of the Protocol which does not
contain information relating specifically to any State Party. This excludes specific
information about inspection activities being conducted in or planned for a State Party.
The types of information which may be released publicly under this provision shall be
set out in a list approved by the Conference;
(b) Factual organizational information about the Organization, except for
information that relates to the security of the Organization, or to personnel matters and
the privacy of the staff of the Secretariat; or
(c) Information referring to a State Party, which is unclassified and which that State
Party has specifically requested or consented to be publicly released.
                                                
178The Protocol language in Annex E of AHG/51 (Part I) is unduly and unnecessarily restrictive as it could well
result in the future BTWC Protocol Organization being perceived as a secretive organization and certainly one
whose benefits for global security and peace and international cooperation are little recognised.  Such a
perception will not be in the long term interests of the Protocol regime, of the future Organization or of its States
Parties.  We recommend that paragraph 5 be amended as shown to parallel the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality
guidelines on the public release of information and requiring the Director-General to prepare a Media and Public
Affairs Policy for approval by the Conference at its first session.
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All contact between the Technical Secretariat staff members and the media or any
individual who is not employed or contracted by the Organization nor authorised by a
State Party in relation to the implementation of the Protocol shall be subject to a Media
and Public Affairs Policy which the Director-General shall submit to the Conference for
approval at its first session.
6. In order to avoid unauthorized disclosures, staff members shall be appropriately
advised and reminded about confidentiality considerations and of the possible penalties that
they would incur in the event of improper disclosure.
7. In evaluating the performance of staff members of the Technical Secretariat, specific
attention shall be given to the employee’s record regarding protection of confidential
information.
(D) OBLIGATIONS OF OBSERVERS AND THE REQUESTING STATE PARTY
SENDING AN OBSERVER
8. The requesting State Party shall ensure that an observer sent in accordance with
Annex D, section I, subsection D, complies with and is individually bound by all relevant
provisions of this Protocol.  If any confidential information is disclosed to or acquired by the
observer, in addition to and without diminishing the observer’s own individual responsibility,
the requesting State Party shall also become responsible for the handling and protection of
that information in accordance with this Protocol.
III.  PROCEDURES IN CASE OF BREACHES OR ALLEGED BREACHES
OF CONFIDENTIALITY
(A) OBLIGATION FOR INQUIRY
1. The Director-General shall establish procedures to be followed in case of breaches or
alleged breaches of confidentiality, which shall be considered and approved by the
Conference pursuant to Article IX.  The Director-General shall also implement decisions of
the Conference of States Parties amending the procedures related to the issue of breaches or
alleged breaches of confidentiality.
2. The Director-General shall promptly initiate an inquiry when there is sufficient
indication that obligations concerning the protection of confidential information have been
violated.  The Director-General shall also promptly initiate an inquiry if an allegation
concerning a breach of confidentiality is made by a State Party.
3. In case of an allegation of a breach of confidentiality, States Parties and/or staff
members which are named in the allegation or which might be involved in the alleged breach
shall be informed of that allegation immediately. The Director-General shall hold
consultations with the concerned States Parties in the course of the inquiry.
4. States Parties shall, to the extent possible, cooperate with and support the Director-
General in conducting an inquiry of any breach or alleged breach of confidentiality and in
taking appropriate action in accordance with applicable laws and regulations in case a breach
has been established.
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5. An inquiry shall result in a written report, which shall remain confidential and be
subject to the application of the need-to-know principle.  The Director-General shall, upon
request, provide the report to the States Parties concerned.  The results of the inquiry shall be
reported to the Conference of the States Parties in a form from which specific confidential
material has been removed to ensure that confidential information connected with a breach is
not further disclosed beyond its authorized scope of access, and to respect those elements of
the privacy of the individual staff members not relevant to the case.
(B) INTERIM MEASURES
6. The Director-General may take interim measures any time after the commencement of
the inquiry in order to prevent further damage.  These measures may include withdrawal of
personnel concerned from specific functions, denial of access to certain information and, in
serious cases, temporary suspension, pending completion of procedures contained in this
section.
(C) MEASURES IN CASE OF BREACHES OR ALLEGED BREACHES
7. In case of a breach or an alleged breach of confidentiality by an agent or official of a
State Party or by a staff member of the Technical Secretariat, consultations shall be held
between the States Parties concerned or between the Organization and States Parties
concerned to address the case.  If such consultations are not concluded to the satisfaction of
the parties involved within 60 days, each State Party shall have the right to initiate the
proceedings of the Confidentiality Commission to consider the case.  The Commission shall
seek to settle the case through mediation, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful
means.  The Commission may request the Director-General to submit the result of the inquiry
carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 above.
8. When the inquiry pursuant to paragraph 2 establishes that there has been a breach of
confidentiality by a staff member of the Technical Secretariat, Article IV, paragraph 6, and
section E of Article IX may apply where appropriate.
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APPENDICES179
                                                
179For clarity and to avoid confusion, the current Appendix designations have been retained although
Appendices D and F have been deleted from this proposed complete text.  Appendix F has been deleted as this
is not intended to form part of the Protocol as it is a List of Approved Investigation/Visit Equipment to be
approved by the Conference of the States Parties.
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DECLARATION FORMATS
INITIAL DECLARATIONS
APPENDIX A
DECLARATIONS OF OFFENSIVE
AND/OR DEFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN PROGRAMMES
AND/OR ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO FORCE
OF THE PROTOCOL FOR EACH STATE PARTY
1. Name of State Party:
......................................................................................................................................
2. Date of entry into force of the Protocol for the State Party:
......................................................................................................................................
3. Date of initial declaration:
......................................................................................................................................
PART A
DECLARATION OF OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN
PROGRAMMES AND/OR ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED PRIOR TO ENTRY
INTO FORCE OF THE PROTOCOL FOR EACH STATE PARTY180
1. At any time since 1 January 1946181 have you conducted any activities as specified
in Article III, section D, subsection I, paragraph 6?
YES / NO
2. Indicate the years of operation of the programme(s) and/or activities during the
declarable period:
......................................................................................................................................
                                                
180This is a key initial declaration that will contribute immensely to increasing transparency and building
confidence between States Parties as it is uncertainty about past offensive programmes and/or activities and the
facilities which were engaged therein that is one of the greatest contributors to mistrust and lack of confidence
between States Parties.
181The operative date of 1 January 1946 is adopted because this is the agreed operative date for Confidence-
Building Measure F which continues to be politically binding on the States Parties to the Convention.   The
choice of a later date would contradict the aim and purpose of the Protocol to increase transparency and build
confidence between States Parties.
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3. Indicate whether any research and development activities or other work182 on
microbial or other biological agents or toxins were carried out for hostile purposes or
for use in armed conflict:
Research and development YES / NO
Studies on pathogenicity/virulence YES / NO
Studies on antibiotic resistance YES / NO
Environmental stability studies on microbes YES / NO
Studies on toxicity YES / NO
Studies in toxinology YES / NO
Aerobiology studies including open air release YES / NO
Vector transmission studies YES / NO
Genetic modification studies YES / NO
Testing and evaluation YES / NO
Production YES / NO
Stockpiling YES / NO
Other acquisition YES / NO
Weaponization YES / NO
4. Give a summary of each subject indicated as “YES” in paragraph 3 above:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
5. Indicate whether any research and development activities or other work was carried
out on equipment or means of delivery for microbial or other biological agents or
toxins for hostile purposes or for use in armed conflict:
Research and development YES / NO
Testing  and evaluation YES / NO
Production YES / NO
Stockpiling YES / NO
Other acquisition YES / NO
                                                
182As the purpose of the initial declaration is to increase transparency and build confidence between States
Parties it is essential that the declarations are comprehensive and separately include not only research and
development but also testing and evaluation as well as production.
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6. Give a summary of each subject indicated as “YES” in paragraph 5 above:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
7. Have any microbial or other biological agents or toxins ever been used for hostile
purposes or in armed conflict?
YES / NO
8. If “YES” in paragraph 7, give a summary of each case indicating the agent(s), date(s)
and place(s):
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
9. List all facilities, including their addresses, activities and purposes, that participated in
the programme(s) and/or activities and indicate which had been destroyed when and
how it was done.  Describe what was done with all the facilities that were not
destroyed:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
10. Was any maximum containment facility constructed for use in the biological
offensive programme(s) and/or activities?
YES / NO
If yes, indicate the floor area of each facility:
......................................................................................................................................
11. List all test ranges, including their addresses, activities and purposes, used in the
programme(s) and/or activities and give a description including dates of the
dismantling or conversion of each:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
12. Indicate what all the converted facilities and test ranges are presently being used for:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
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13. List all microbial or other biological agents and/or toxins worked with, developed,
produced, otherwise acquired, stockpiled or weaponized:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
14. If agents and/or toxins were produced, indicate the cumulative amount of each agent
and toxin produced since 1 January 1946:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
15. If agents and/or toxins were stockpiled, indicate the cumulative amount of each agent
and toxin stockpiled since 1 January 1946:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
16. Indicate which produced or otherwise acquired, stockpiled or weaponized agents
and/or toxins listed in paragraph 13 above were destroyed, how, where and when it
was done.  Give a summary of what was done with those not destroyed:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
17. Give a summary of the destruction or conversion of the equipment or means of
delivery described in paragraph 6 above:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
18. State the present status of the data, video recordings, etc. obtained when the
programme(s) and/or activities was in operation:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
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PART B183
DECLARATION OF DEFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN
PROGRAMMES AND/OR ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED PRIOR TO ENTRY
INTO FORCE OF THE PROTOCOL FOR EACH STATE PARTY184
1. At any time in the period since 1 January 1946185 but before the entry into force of
the Protocol for your State Party, have you conducted programmes and/or activities as
specified in Article III, section D, subsection I, paragraph 7?
YES / NO
If yes, complete the remainder of this format.
2. Indicate the period(s) of any such programmes and/or activities during the declaration
period:
......................................................................................................................................
3. Give a summary of the general objectives of any such programmes and/or activities:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
4. Indicate by ticking the appropriate box whether any work was carried out in the
following areas186:
                                                
183 The text in AHG/51 (Part II) has been used as the baseline for Appendix A Part B.
184 As for past offensive programmes, this is another key initial declaration that will contribute immensely to
increasing transparency and building confidence between States Parties as uncertainty about past defensive
programmes and/or activities and the facilities which were engaged therein that contributes to mistrust and lack
of confidence between States Parties.
185The operative date of 1 January 1946 is adopted because this is the agreed operative date for Confidence-
Building Measure F which continues to be politically binding on the States Parties to the Convention.   The
choice of a later date would contradict the aim and purpose of the Protocol to increase transparency and build
confidence between States Parties.
186As the purpose of the initial declaration is to increase transparency and build confidence between States
Parties it is essential that the declarations are comprehensive and separately include not only research and
development but also testing and evaluation as well as production.
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Work area Research and
development
Testing or
evaluation
Production
other than in
research,
development,
testing or
evaluation
Detection or diagnosis
Decontamination n.a.
Prophylaxis against disease
Physical protection n.a.
Treatment of disease
Pathogenicity or virulence n.a.
Genetic modification n.a.
Other characteristics of agents n.a.
Toxinology* n.a.
Toxicity other than relating to
toxins
n.a.
Aerobiology n.a.
Vector (e.g. insect) ecology n.a.
Fermentation
*  Toxinology is the study of toxins.
5. Summarize the principal objectives of and the work performed in the programmes
and/or activities indicated in question 4 above, including a description of any
significant changes in direction during the declaration period and the reasons for
them. (Examples of changes may be starting/terminating work in areas denoted in
question 4):
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
6. Indicate which of the types of work performed in the programmes and/or activities
indicated in question 4 above are carried on in programmes and/or activities
conducted since entry into force of the Protocol for your State Party, by means of an
asterisk against the appropriate entry in question 4.
7. For the programmes and/or activities indicated in question 4 above, indicate:
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(a) The types of pathogens and/or toxins worked on (tick any that apply):
Human or zoonotic pathogens:
. . .  Bacteria     . . .  Viruses     . . .  Fungi     . . .  Others
Animal pathogens:
. . .  Bacteria     . . .  Viruses     . . .  Fungi     . . .  Others
Plant pathogens:
. . .  Bacteria     . . .  Viruses    . . .  Fungi     . . .  Others
Toxins:  . . .
(b) All agents and/or toxins listed in Annex A that were worked on:
..........................................................................................................................
(c) Whether any such agents and/or toxins were worked on in any of the
following types of organization (tick any that apply):
Organizations in the declaring State Party:
. . .  Industry     . . .  Academia
. . .  Government ministry/department/agency other than defence or
military
Organizations in another State or State Party, working under contract or
through collaboration:
. . .  Industry     . . .  Academia
. . .  Government ministry/department/agency other than defence or
military
(d) The affiliation of sources of funding that applied at any time during the
declaration period (tick any that apply):
o Defence Ministry/Department/Agency o wholly o partially
o Other government ministry/department/
agency o wholly o partially
o Non-government o wholly o partially
o International organization o wholly o partially
8. Provide the names and postal addresses of all facilities which made substantial
contributions to the programmes and/or activities and indicate which, if any, are still
involved in a current programme:
Whether still active in the
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Name Postal address programmes and/or
activities (YES / NO)
9. Indicate whether the programmes and/or activities were supported by outdoor studies
of biological aerosols or their simulants:
YES / NO
10. Indicate whether vaccine or vaccine ingredients causing a specific and protective
immune response were produced for armed forces or public use or storage:
YES / NO
11. Briefly describe any significant changes during the declaration period, and the reasons
for them, in respect of the following:
(a) Sources of funding:
..........................................................................................................................
(b) Organizational structure:
..........................................................................................................................
(c) Number and types of personnel:
..........................................................................................................................
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ANNUAL DECLARATIONS
APPENDIX B187
DECLARATION OF DEFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN PROGRAMMES
AND/OR ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR
1. Name of State Party:
......................................................................................................................................
2. This declaration relates to the calendar year:
......................................................................................................................................
3. At any time in the declaration year, have you conducted any programmes and/or
activities as specified in Article III, section D, subsection I, paragraph 9?
YES / NO
If yes, complete the remainder of this format188.
4. Did any of the programmes and/or activities continue until the end of the declaration
year:
YES / NO]
5. Describe the general objectives of any such programmes and/or activities specified in
Article III, section D, subsection I, paragraph 9 (50 lines or less):
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
6. Indicate by ticking the appropriate box whether any work has been carried out in the
following areas189:
Work area Research and
development
Testing or
evaluation
Production
other than in
research,
                                                
187The text in AHG/51 (Part II) has been used as the baseline for Appendix B.
188A single format for the declaration of current biological defence programmes and/or activities will suffice.  It
is important to recognize that the number of States Parties which have declared biological defence programmes
and facilities under the Confidence-Building Measures, based on the 1997 declarations, is small.  In the 1997
declarations, some 43 facilities were declared as biodefence facilities: 32 were in Western countries (19 in the
USA), 1 in China, 1 in India, 9 in Russia.
189As the purpose of the declaration is to increase transparency and build confidence between States Parties it is
essential that the declarations are comprehensive and separately include not only research and development but
also testing and evaluation as well as production.
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development,
testing or
evaluation
Detection or diagnosis
Decontamination n.a.
Prophylaxis against disease
Physical protection n.a.
Treatment of disease
Pathogenicity or virulence n.a.
Genetic modification n.a.
Other characteristics of agents n.a.
Toxinology* n.a.
Toxicity other than relating to
toxins
n.a.
Aerobiology n.a.
Vector (e.g. insect) ecology n.a.
Fermentation
*  Toxinology is the study of toxins.
7. Summarize the principal objectives of and the work performed in the programmes
and/or activities in the areas indicated in question 6 above:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
As an aggregate for the programmes and/or activities in the areas indicated in question 6
above, state for the reporting period:
8. Funding
(a) The total funding:
..........................................................................................................................
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(b) Affiliation of sources of funding (tick all that apply):
o Defence Ministry/Department/Agency o wholly o partially
o Other government ministry/department/
agency o wholly o partially
o Non-government o wholly o partially
o International organization o wholly o partially
(c) Whether aspects of the work were conducted under contract with, or by, any
of the following types of organization (tick any that apply):
. . .  Industry     . . .  Academia
. . .  Government ministry/department/agency other than defence or military
If yes, indicate the percentage of the total funding that was expended in such
organizations for this purpose (Estimates of percentages shall be rounded up to
the nearest whole number):
. . .  Less than 5%   . . .  5-25%   . . .  26-50%   . . .  51-75%   . . .  76-100%
Summarize the objectives of any such work:
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
9. For the personnel employed, including those contracted for more than six months:
(a) Indicate the total number of personnel:
 ___  1-10   ___  11-25   ___  26-100   ___  101-500   ___  greater than 500
(b) Indicate the total person years of work (Where a fraction of a person year is
involved, this shall be rounded up to the nearest whole number):
 ___  1-10   ___  11-25   ___  26-100   ___  101-500   ___  greater than 500
(c) Give a detailed break-down of the following personnel categories taking part
in the activities and/or programmes:
Scientific personnel
including engineers
Technical assistance
personnel
Military personnel
Civilian personnel
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Contract personnel*
* Contract employees who have worked for more than six months in the reporting period.
10. Indicate:
(a) The types of pathogens and/or toxins worked on (tick any that apply):
Human or zoonotic pathogens:
. . .  Bacteria     . . .  Viruses     . . .  Fungi     . . .  Others
Animal pathogens excluding zoonotic pathogens:
. . .  Bacteria     . . .  Viruses     . . .  Fungi     . . .  Others
Plant pathogens:
. . .  Bacteria     . . .  Viruses    . . .  Fungi     . . .  Others
Toxins:  . . .
(b) All agents and/or toxins listed in Annex A which were worked on, and for
each indicate whether any genetic modification was performed:
Agent Genetic modification
performed (YES / NO)
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
In any such work, indicate any agents and/or toxins listed in Annex A which
were worked on in any of the following types of organization:
Organizations in the declaring State Party:
Industry: agent(s):  ..................................................................................
Academia: agent(s):  ..................................................................................
Government ministry/department/agency other than defence or military:
agent(s):  ..................................................................................
Organizations in another State or State Party, working under contract or
through collaboration:
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Industry: agent(s):  ..................................................................................
Academia: agent(s):  ..................................................................................
Government ministry/department/agency other than defence or military:
agent(s):  ..................................................................................
(c) Whether fermenters/bioreactors exceeding 25 litres in volume were used to
produce pathogens, toxins or simulants:
YES / NO
If yes, indicate the types of products made and the purpose:
Type of product Purpose
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Were any such fermenters/bioreactors located in any of the following types of
organization (tick any that apply):
Organizations in the declaring State Party:
. . .  Industry     . . .  Academia
. . .  Government ministry/department/agency other than defence or military
Organizations in another State or State Party, working under contract or
through collaboration:
. . .  Industry     . . .  Academia
. . .  Government ministry/department/agency other than defence or military
(d) Whether vaccine or vaccine ingredients causing a specific and protective
immune response were produced for the general public or for armed forces:
YES / NO
If yes, provide the names of the facilities involved:
..........................................................................................................................
(e) Whether the programmes and/or activities were supported by outdoor studies
of biological aerosols or their simulants:
YES / NO
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Were any such outdoor studies performed in any of the following types of
organization (tick any that apply):
Organizations in the declaring State Party:
. . .  Industry     . . .  Academia
. . .  Government ministry/department/agency other than defence or military
Organizations in another State or State Party, working under contract or
through collaboration:
. . .  Industry     . . .  Academia
. . .  Government ministry/department/agency other than defence or military
11. Provide a list of all biological defence facilities for which a declaration format
(Appendix C) or a listing format (Appendix D) has been provided (tick the
appropriate box):
Name of biological defence
facility
A declaration format has
been provided (Appendix C)
A listing format has been
provided (Appendix D)
. . .
. . .
12. Provide a diagram of the organizational structure of the declared programmes and/or
activities, describing the reporting relationships including all the facilities mentioned
in question 11 above:
......................................................................................................................................
13. Describe the national publication policy for the declared programmes and/or
activities:
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
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APPENDIX C190
FACILITIES191
Guidelines for completing the declaration format
1. The facility declaration format requires information on facilities meeting the criteria
set out in one or more of the declaration triggers of the Protocol.  Such facilities are referred
to throughout the format as the “declared facility”.  The format is to be utilized by declared
facilities to report activities captured by declaration triggers.
2. The design of the format takes account of the differing sizes, complexities and scope
of facilities satisfying the requirements of one or more of the Protocol declaration triggers.  It
is recognized that in some cases the room(s), laboratory(ies), buildings, or parts of buildings,
or other structures which can be or is used to conduct activity(ies) related to the Convention
that satisfy the requirements of the trigger - and that therefore are to be the declared facility -
may involve only part of a building.  Indeed, the facility declarable under the Protocol may
be at a location with a large number of other facilities engaging in activities that are not
declarable.
3. The facility declaration format is designed to cover this range of possibilities.  The
facility to be declared is the combination of room(s), laboratory(ies), buildings, or parts of
buildings, or other structures which can be or is used to conduct activity(ies) related to the
Convention which carried out activities during the reporting calendar year that satisfied the
requirements of a specific declaration trigger.  Where that exact same combination of rooms
etc. also satisfies a different trigger, such a combination shall be declared as the same facility
(i.e. as a single facility).  When the combination of room(s), laboratory(ies), buildings, or
parts of buildings, or other structures which can be or is used to conduct activity(ies) related
to the Convention that satisfies a different trigger is not identical, it shall be treated as a
separate declarable facility.
4. When scientific/technical activities which may require declaration under a particular
trigger are conducted in different parts of a location, for example in different buildings and/or
departments at a university campus or at a commercial installation operated by a single
company, and they share one or more room(s), laboratory(ies), buildings, or parts of
buildings, or other structures which can be or is used to conduct activity(ies) related to the
Convention they shall be considered as a single facility for the purpose of determining
whether a declaration should be made.  Scientific/technical activities at the same location that
meet the criteria of one or more declaration triggers but do not share one or more room(s),
laboratory(ies), buildings, or parts of buildings, or other structures which can be or is used to
conduct activity(ies) related to the Convention shall be considered as separate facilities for
the purpose of declaration.
                                                
190The text in AHG/51 (Part II) has been used as the baseline for Appendix C.
191It is useful to recall the information provided in the introductory section of this Evaluation Paper which
shows that, based on the 1997 CBM information, there were biological defence facilities in only 15 countries,
maximum containment facilities in a further 6 countries and vaccine production facilities in a further 15
countries resulting in a total of 36 countries. Given the Protocol objective of increasing transparency and
building confidence between States Parties, it is apparent that the triggers "Other Production Facilities" and
"Work with Listed Agents and Toxins" are necessary to increase the distribution and spread of relevant declared
facilities both within these countries and to additional countries.
196
5. Each declared facility shall answer the questions in sections A and B and, according
to the trigger(s)192 involved, the following questions in section C:
Trigger that applies Questions to be answered in section (C)
Biological defence facility 34
Vaccine production facility 35
Maximum biological containment (BL-4 )
facility 36
Work with listed agents and/or toxins 37
Other production facilities193 38
Other facilities194 39
FORMAT. DECLARATION OF FACILITIES
Reporting period
This declaration covers the calendar year:  .............................................................................
INTRODUCTION
(i) Declaration trigger(s) that apply to the facility
Submit a copy of the facility declaration format for each facility satisfying the requirements
of one or more of the declaration triggers identified below.  Indicate which of the declaration
triggers is applicable to this facility, by ticking the appropriate triggers below and indicating
the approximate percentage of the total work of the declared facility that relates to each
trigger:
Approximate percentage
(in person-years)
Biological defence facility ...
Vaccine production facility ...
Maximum biological containment (BL-4 - ...) facility ...
Work with listed agents and/or toxins ...
Other production facilities ...
Other facilities ...
                                                
192For consistency with Article III. D. I, the stand-alone trigger of high containment (BL-3) facilities has been
deleted throughout.
193Amended to be consistent with Article III. D. I.
194Amended to be consistent with Article III. D. I.
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SECTION (A)  GENERAL INFORMATION
Name and address
1. Name of the declared facility:
2. Address of the declared facility:
3. Postal address of the declared facility, if different:
4. Building details for the declared facility.
State, as appropriate, building name(s): ...................................
building number(s): ...................................
room number(s): ...................................
floor level(s): ....................................
Diagram/location195
5.  Fixed facilities.  Provide the following:
(a) An orientation map (with scale, and a key explaining any abbreviations and
symbols) of the location of the declared facility, including the following
elements:
(i) The principal natural and/or man-made topographical features
surrounding the declared facility, e.g., major highways or roads,
mountain(s), rivers (minimum size of area represented by the map
should be approximately 1 square kilometre);
(ii) Geographic coordinates of a designated reference point where the
declared facility is located, accurate to one second;
(iii) Direction of true north;
(iv) For current biological defence facilities only: In addition, provide the
general boundary of the site within which the declared biological
defence facility is located, including all major access routes.
(b) A facility diagram.  The purpose of the facility diagram is to graphically
indicate the location of the declared facility (e.g., the area(s) where declared
activities took place).  The facility diagram can be one or multiple diagrams
and should include the entire declared facility, with boundaries of the declared
facility building(s), room(s) or other structures, as appropriate, clearly marked.
                                                
195As there is no requirement to identify the specific purpose of the buildings within the declared facility, there
is no necessity to exclude the locations of animal holding areas from such maps (cf. Note 74 on page 256 of
AHG/51 (Part I).
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If the declared facility is defined as room(s), or floor(s) within buildings, the
diagram must include floor plan(s) with boundaries of the declared facility’s
spaces clearly marked.  The facility diagram shall include the following
elements:
(i) Clearly marked boundary of the declared facility (e.g., the area(s)
where declared activities took place, which could be building(s),
room(s) or other structures);
(ii) Geographic coordinates of a designated reference point within
100 metres of the declared facility, accurate to one second;
(iii) Direction of true north;
(iv) A key with an explanation of all abbreviations and symbols, and with
an indication of the scale of the diagram.
6. Mobile facilities.
(a) List the locations at which the declared facility is usually operated:
..........................................................................................................................
(b) Indicate where the declared facility was normally kept, if different from
above:
..........................................................................................................................
(c) List the locations at which the declared facility was operated:
..........................................................................................................................
Owner
7. Name:
......................................................................................................................................
8. Affiliation (tick all that apply):
o Ministry/Department/Agency of Defence o wholly o partially
o Other government ministry/department/
agency o wholly o partially
o Non-government o wholly o partially
Operator(s) (Only provide details if different from the owner)
9. Name(s):
......................................................................................................................................
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10. Affiliation(s) (tick all that apply):
o Ministry/Department/Agency of Defence o wholly o partially
o Other government ministry/department/
agency o wholly o partially
o Non-government o wholly o partially
Funding
11. Estimate the funding levels for the current biological defensive programme work at
the declared facility:
......................................................................................................................................
12. Affiliation of sources of funding (tick all that apply):
o Ministry/Department/Agency of Defence o wholly o partially
o Other government ministry/department/
agency o wholly o partially
o Non-government o wholly o partially
o International organization o wholly o partially
(a) Identify the primary sponsor of or source of funding for declared activities at
the declared facility (tick all that apply):
o Ministry/Department/Agency of Defence o wholly o partially
o Other government agency or department o wholly o partially
o International body (e.g. WHO, UN, etc.) o wholly o partially
o Other non-government o wholly o partially
(b) Identify the type of primary purchaser or recipient of the product or services of
declared activities at the declared facility (tick all that apply):
o Ministry/Department/Agency of Defence o wholly o partially
o Other government agency or department o wholly o partially
o International body (e.g. WHO, UN, etc.) o wholly o partially
o Other non-government o wholly o partially
Personnel
13. Estimate the person-years of technical and scientific staff directly involved in the
declared activities at the declared facility (include on-site contractors):
___   0 - 10          ___   11 - 25          ___   26 - 50          ___   greater than 50
(a) Estimate the percentage of these personnel who hold, as their highest
qualification, a diploma, bachelors degree or technical degree in the life
sciences, chemistry, engineering or physics:
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___  none ___  1 - 25 per cent ___  26 - 50 per cent
___  51 - 75 per cent ___  76 - 100 per cent
(b) Estimate the percentage of these personnel who received a higher or advanced
degree in the life sciences, chemistry, engineering or physics:
___  none ___  1 - 25 per cent ___  26 - 50 per cent
___  51 - 75 per cent ___  76 - 100 per cent
(c) Estimate the percentage of person-years that are full-time active duty military:
___  none ___  1 - 25 per cent ___  26 - 50 per cent
___  51 - 75 per cent ___  76 - 100 per cent
(d) Estimate the percentage of person-years that are full-time civilian ministry/
department/agency of defence employees (include on-site contractors):
___  none ___  1 - 25 per cent ___  26 - 50 per cent
___  51 - 75 per cent ___  76 - 100 per cent]
SECTION (B)  SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION
14. State the aims and objectives of the work at the declared facility (10 lines or less):
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
15. Describe the work at the declared facility in the reporting year (10 lines or less):
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
16. Fields of activity at the declared facility
Indicate by ticking the appropriate box whether any work was carried out in the following
areas196.   Work performed only in order to establish and carry out routine procedures or to
maintain safety at the declared facility shall not be reported.
                                                
196As the purpose of the declaration is to increase transparency and build confidence between States Parties it is
essential that the declarations are comprehensive and separately include not only research and development but
also testing and evaluation as well as production.
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Work area Research and
development
Testing and
evaluation
Production
other than for
research,
development,
testing or
evaluation
Detection, identification and diagnosis
Decontamination, disinfection and
pest control
Prophylaxis
Physical protection
Medical or veterinary treatment
Genetic modification
Insect/pest control for use in
agriculture/horticulture
Characteristics of biological agents or
toxins:
pathogenicity/virulence n.a. n.a.
toxinology* n.a. n.a.
environmental stability n.a. n.a.
antimicrobial resistance n.a. n.a.
Aerobiology n.a.
Vector (insect) ecology n.a.
Plant pathology n.a.
n.a. = not applicable
*  Toxinology is the study of toxins.
17. Indicate whether high biological containment (BL3), as defined by the Protocol, was
used for declared activities within the declared facility:
YES / NO
18. If yes, specify the floor area of the working areas by indicating which range applies:
up to 30 sq.m.       30 to 100 sq.m.       100 to 500 sq.m.       over 500 sq.m.
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19. Did declared activities at the declared facility utilize outlet air vents and/or exhaust
paths equipped with filters that removed or captured particles as small as
0.3 micrometres in diameter?
YES / NO
20. Was waste from declared activities at the declared facility, whether solid, air or liquid,
rendered safe by decontamination or sterilization prior to release or removal from the
facility?
YES / NO
21. If the declared facility included room(s) for holding and/or working with live animals
under maximum biological containment (BL-4) or high biological containment (BL3),
indicate which applies:
Maximum biological containment (BL-4 ) YES / NO
High biological containment (BL-3 ) YES / NO
22. Answer the questions about equipment at the declared facility, to be found in the
attached Addendum197.
23. Indicate whether tissue culture media was used:
YES / NO
If yes, indicate which range applies:
up to 1,000 litres          1,000-10,000 litres          over 10,000 litres
estimate the amount used, to an accuracy of +/- 20 per cent: . . . . .
24. Indicate whether other complex culture media was used:
YES / NO
If yes, indicate which range applies:
up to 1,000 litres          1,000-10,000 litres          over 10,000 litres
                                                
197The Addendum includes, in a simple tabular form, the information required on equipment previously
contained in Annex A II List of Equipment in AHG/51 (Part I).
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25. Indicate whether embryonated eggs were used to culture microorganisms:
YES / NO
If yes, indicate which range applies:
1 - 10,000 eggs      10,000 - 100,000 eggs      over 100,000 eggs
26. If the facility conducted work with agents and/or toxins listed in Annex A, whether or
not it satisfied the declaration trigger for work with listed agents and/or toxins,
provide the following information:
(a) List the agents worked with:
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
(b) Estimate the quantity of human, animal or plant pathogen agents produced, as
a single total for all agents, in ranges of litres of culture or of working
suspensions of agents:
up to x          x to y          above y
(c) Estimate the quantity of toxins produced, as a single total, in ranges of dry
weight or wet packed weight, in grams:
up to x          x to y          above y
27.  Indicate whether any agents and/or toxins listed in Annex A were transferred outside the
declared facility for any of the following purposes:
To perform further studies in research and
development, testing or evaluation? YES / NO
For larger scale production? YES / NO
For downstream processing? YES / NO
For animal studies? YES / NO
For aerobiology studies? YES / NO
28. Indicate other classes of microorganisms and/or toxins not included in the previous
question involved in declared activities at the declared facility (check all that apply):
Bacteria YES / NO
Viruses YES / NO
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Rickettsia YES / NO
Toxins YES / NO
Fungi YES / NO
29. Were there any areas which could be entered only by specifically vaccinated
personnel?
YES / NO
If yes, list the vaccines that applied:
......................................................................................................................................
30. Did any declared activities of the declared facility involve aerobiological work
(excluding nasal and oral inhalers intended for personal prophylactic use)?
YES / NO
31.  Was the declared facility supported at the same location or elsewhere by:
 A fixed outdoor site or fixed grid that is designed,
intended and used for outdoor studies of
biological aerosols? YES / NO
An experimental facility for animals, or an
animal holding facility? YES / NO
A waste decontamination facility? YES / NO
A facility for larger scale production, or for
downstream processing? YES / NO
32. Indicate the publication policy for work at the declared facility:
Publishing in the open literature and/or
 at open scientific/technical meetings YES / NO
Scientific/technical reports on limited distribution only YES / NO
No publications or reports YES / NO
33. Attach a list of the papers that were published in the open literature and/or at open
scientific/technical meetings by personnel involved in the declared activities, during
the reporting calendar year, in scientific/technical/medical/veterinary journals or
books, or in conference proceedings, or made available in an electronic format (state
authors, title and full reference):
......................................................................................................................................
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......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
SECTION (C)  ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
34. Biological defence
If the declared facility satisfied the requirements of the declaration trigger for biological
defence facilities, answer the following:
(a) Did declared activities at the declared facility include work on pathogenicity?
YES / NO
If yes, summarize the aims and objectives of biological defence work on
pathogenicity at the declared facility (10 lines or less):
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
(b) Did declared activities at the declared facility include work on virulence?
YES / NO
If yes, summarize the aims and objectives of biological defence work on
virulence at the declared facility (10 lines or less):
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
(c) Did declared activities at the declared facility include work on aerobiology?
YES / NO
If yes, summarize the aims and objectives of biological defence work on
aerobiology at the declared facility (10 lines or less):
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
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(d) Did declared activities at the declared facility include work on toxinology?
YES / NO
If yes, summarize the aims and objectives of biological defence work on
toxinology at the declared facility (10 lines or less):
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
35. Vaccine production
If the declared facility satisfied the requirements of the declaration trigger for vaccine
production, provide the following information for any vaccine ingredients and/or vaccines
produced:
(a) List the vaccine ingredients produced:
Ingredient Intended for
(tick which applies)
Disease against
which the vaccine
is directed
Production
objectives*
Human
vaccine
Animal
vaccine
* Production objectives: A - Public sale or use; B - Defence ministry/department/agency; C - Both
(b) Estimate the total quantity of vaccine ingredients produced (tick the
appropriate box):
Intended for Highest level of
containment used in
any production
Quantity of vaccine ingredients produced
(Litres of culture or of bulk working
suspension)
BL3 BL4 up to 1,000 1,000 to
10,000
above 10,000
Human
vaccine
Animal
vaccine
(c) List the vaccines produced:
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Vaccine Intended for use with
(tick which applies)
Disease against
which the vaccine
is directed
Production
objectives*
Humans Animals
* Production objectives: A - Public sale or use; B - Defence ministry/department/agency; C - Both
(d) Estimate the total quantity of vaccine produced (tick the appropriate box):
Vaccine Registration/
licence number
Number of doses* produced
up to 1,000,000 1,000,000 to
5,000,000
above
5,000,000
* State the number of doses produced in terms of the estimated dose for adults even if a vaccine is intended
for use with children or immature animals.
36. Maximum biological containment (BL-4)
If the declared facility satisfied the requirements of the declaration trigger for maximum
biological containment (BL-4), provide the following information:
(a) Estimate the total floor area of the BL4 containment area, by indicating which
range applies:
up to 40 sq.m.         41 to 100 sq.m.         100 to 500 sq.m.         over 500 sq.m.
(b) Indicate the number of units: . . .
(c) Indicate whether the contained area includes any unit(s) for the management
and/or treatment of patients:
YES / NO
(d) Indicate whether work in these laboratories was carried out on:
Human pathogens YES / NO
Zoonotic pathogens YES / NO
Other animal pathogens YES / NO
Toxins YES / NO
Plant pathogens YES / NO
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(e) Method/system of decontamination of the biocontainment area(s) (check all
that apply):
Formaldehyde/paraformaldehyde YES / NO
Ultraviolet light YES / NO
Steam YES / NO
Chlorine/perchlorate YES / NO
Hydrogen peroxide YES / NO
Washdown YES / NO
Other, specify:  ..............................................................................
(f) Indicate all biological agents on which genetic modification was conducted to
enhance pathogenicity, virulence, stability or resistance to antibiotics or
chemical or physical methods of disinfection, or which altered the host range,
the infection route or the ease of identification or diagnosis, within a high
biological containment facility (BL3):
37. Work with listed agents and/or toxins
Did the declared facility satisfy the requirements of the declaration trigger for work with
listed agents and or toxins?
YES / NO
If yes, indicate which activities198 it has conducted:
(a) Production of one or more agents and/or toxins listed in Annex A, using:
(i) Any fermenter(s)/bioreactor(s) with a total internal
volume of 50 litres or more YES / NO
(ii) Continuous or perfusion fermenters/bioreactors with
a flow rate capable of exceeding 2 litres an hour YES / NO
(iii) A chemical reaction vessel or equipment used for
recovery with a total internal volume of
50 litres or more YES / NO
(iv) More than 2,000 embryonated eggs
on an annual basis YES / NO
(v) More than 1,000 litres of tissue culture or other
medium on an annual basis YES / NO
(b) Intentional aerosolization of any agent and/or toxin listed in Annex A in:
(i) A static aerosol test chamber YES / NO
                                                
198Amended to be consistent with the capacity in Article III. D, section I.
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(ii) An explosive aerosol test chamber YES / NO
(iii) A dynamic aerosol test chamber that has a
total volume exceeding 5 m3 YES / NO
If yes, provide the following information:
Agent Estimated amount produced
(litres of culture or of working suspensions of agents)
 [a to b] [b to c]  [above c]
Toxin Estimated amount produced (dry or wet packed weight in grams)
 [a to b]  [b to c]  [above c]
(c) Did the facility conduct insertion of any nucleic acid sequence coding for any
pathogenicity/virulence factor or for any toxin or subunit of any toxin, into an
agent listed in Annex A?
YES / NO
If yes, name the agent(s) and the toxin(s) and give a short description of the
purpose:
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
(d) Did the facility conduct insertion of any nucleic acid sequence coding for any
pathogenicity/virulence factor from an agent or toxin listed in Annex A, or for
a subunit of such toxin into any microorganism, resulting in a genetically
modified organism with disease-causing or toxic properties?
YES / NO
If yes, name both organisms or toxins and give a short description of the
purpose:
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
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(e) Did the facility conduct intentional aerosolization of any agent and/or toxin
listed in Annex A or any work with aerosolized agents and/or toxins listed in
Annex A?
YES / NO
If yes, name the agent(s) or toxin(s) and give a short description of the
purpose:
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
(f) Did the facility conduct the administration of any agent and/or toxin listed in
Annex A to animals via the respiratory tract?
YES / NO
If yes, name the agent(s) or toxin(s) and give a short description of the
purpose:
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
..........................................................................................................................
38. Other production
Did the facility produce any products for distribution, sale, or public or general use,
either directly or after further processing, formulation or packaging?
YES / NO
If yes,
(a) Indicate the type(s) of product produced.  If more than one product applies,
indicate with an asterisk which type constituted the major activity in terms of
amount of product:
Medicine
Antimicrobial
Pesticides
Plant inoculants
Enzymes
Fine chemicals
Proteins other than enzymes
Peptides or amino acids
Nucleic acids or genetic elements
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Microorganisms for use in biotransformation processes
Other, specify:  ..............................................................................
(b) State if any of these products were produced in areas protected by high
biological containment:
YES / NO
(c) State the approximate aggregate total amount produced in ranges:
up to x kg dry weight          x to y kg dry weight          above y kg dry weight
(d) If the declared facility included room(s)/other enclosure(s) with quarantine for
plants or plant pathogens, specify the floor area of the working areas,
excluding shower areas, by indicating which range applies:
up to 30 sq.m.          30-100 sq.m.          over 100 sq.m.
(e) Did the facility produce plant inoculants and/or biological control agent(s)
inside a plant quarantine capability?
YES / NO
If yes,
(i) Indicate which was produced:
..............................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................
(ii) State the approximate aggregate total amount produced in ranges:
up to x kg dry weight          x to y kg dry weight          above y kg dry weight
39. Other facilities
(a) Possession of aerosol chambers.
Did the facility possess  aerosol chambers?
YES / NO
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(b) Possession of aerosol generation equipment.
Did the facility possess aerosol generation equipment?
YES / NO
(c) Conducting genetic modification.
Did the facility conduct genetic modification?
YES / NO
Agent or toxin
concerned
Indicate if under high
biological containment
(BL3 - ...) level
Indicate if under maximum
biological containment
(BL-4 - ...) level
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ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX C
EQUIPMENT INFORMATION
1.  The following table shall be completed by inserting a Ã in the appropriate boxes.
2.  When any one of the following five types of equipment, 1, 2, 4, 21 and 22 (shown by a *
in the "Present" box) is present, then additional information as detailed below the table shall
be provided.
Equipment Not
present
Present Utilized
Used in
high
containmen
t
Used in
maximum
containmen
t
1. Aerosol chambers designed
or used for the dissemination of
aerosols of microorganisms or
toxins and simulants.
*
2.  Equipment designed or
used to generate aerosols of
microorganisms or toxins and
simulants.
*
3. Aerosol analytical
equipment to determine the size of
particles up to 20 micrometers in
diameter.
4. Fermenters/bioreactors for
batch operation with a volume over
50 litres199.
*
5. Equipment for continuous
or perfusion growth of
microorganisms with a flow rate
capable of exceeding 2 litres an
hour.200
6. Self-sterilizable centrifuges
for continuous or semi-continuous
operation with a throughput
capacity of over 100 litres per hour.
7. Cross-flow or tangential
filtration equipment with a filter
area of over 5 square metres.
8. Freeze-drying equipment
with a condenser capacity of over 5
kg of ice in 24 hours.
                                                
199Amended to be consistent with the capacity in Article III. D, section I.
200Amended to be consistent with the capacity in Article III. D, section I.
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Equipment Not
present
Present Utilized
Used in
high
containmen
t
Used in
maximum
containmen
t
9. Cell disruption equipment
capable of continuous operation
without the release of aerosols with
a flow rate greater than 10 litres per
hour.
10. Spray drying equipment.
11. Drum drying equipment.
12. Biological safety cabinets
Class III or Class I with accessories
for conversion to Class III.
13. Flexible film isolators or
other cabinets with air handling
characteristics equivalent to Class
III and anaerobic boxes.
14. Biological safety cabinets
Class II.
15. Equipment for
microencapsulation of
microorganisms or toxins.
16. Automatic DNA
sequencing equipment.
17. Automatic DNA
synthesizer.
18. Automatic peptide
sequencing equipment.
19. Automatic peptide
synthesizer.
20. Milling equipment having a
capacity of milling grain with mass
median diameter less than 10
micrometres.
21. Plant inoculation
cabinets/chambers providing
quarantine.
*
22. Cabinets/chambers
designed or used for rearing
insects.
*
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
1. Dynamic, static and explosive aerosol chambers designed or used for the
dissemination of aerosols of microorganisms or toxins of particles mass median diameter not
exceeding 10 micrometres.
(a) Indicate the type(s) of activities conducted by or in these aerosol systems or
chambers.
___  Static tests  (Study of aerosol properties)
___  Dynamic tests  (Study using aerosol flows)
___  Explosive tests  (Explosive/shock wave dissemination of aerosols)
___  Other (specify)  ..............................................................................
(b) What is the volume of the largest chamber used?
Static
___  Equal to or less than 10 cubic metres
___  More than 10 cubic metres
___  Not applicable, no static chambers used
Explosive
___  Equal to or less than 10 cubic metres
___  More than 10 cubic metres
___  Not applicable, no explosive chambers used
Dynamic
___  Equal to or less than 10 cubic metres
___  More than 10 cubic metres
___  Not applicable, no dynamic chambers used
 2. Equipment designed or used to generate aerosols of microorganisms or toxins and
simulants.
(a) Form of source material used to generate aerosol(s) (check all that apply):
___ liquid
___ solid
___ not applicable
(b) Mass median diameter of aerosol particles generated (check all that apply):
___ less than 10 microns
___ 10 - 20 microns
___ over 20 microns
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(c) For which purpose was the equipment used:
Aerosol chambers Yes / No
Open-air release Yes / No
With experimental animals Yes / No
Not applicable
4. Aggregate fermenters/bioreactors capacity.
(a) Volume range.
Specify which range applies: 
up to 100 litres Yes / No
101-1,000 litres Yes / No
1,001-10,000 litres Yes / No
10,001-100,000 litres  Yes / No
over 100,000 litres Yes / No
(b) Specify the volume of the largest fermenter/bioreactor.
21. Plant inoculation cabinets/chambers providing quarantine.
Total cabinet/chamber working volume range
up to 1 m3 Yes / No
1-3 m3 Yes / No
over 3 m3 Yes / No
22. Cabinets/chambers designed or used for rearing insects.
(a) Total cabinet/chamber working volume range
up to 3 m3 Yes / No
over 3 m3 Yes / No
(b) Have any been operated at any time during the previous calendar year under
quarantine
Yes / No
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APPENDIX E
INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED IN THE DECLARATIONS
REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII
1. A general description of measures taken to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of the
bacteriological (biological) agents, toxins for peaceful purposes.
2. A general description of measures taken to further the development and application of
scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease or for
other peaceful purposes.
3. A general description of any other measure that the State Party has taken to
implement Article X of the Convention and Article VII of the Protocol.
4. A general description of the outcome of any review undertaken on the existing
national trade legislation or regulations, in accordance with section C, paragraph 7 (c) of
Article VII.
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APPENDIX G
STANDARDIZED FORMATS FOR REPORTING
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF EQUIPMENT
Each State Party shall use the following formats for the implementation of its obligations
under Article III, section F, paragraph 5.
(A) ANNUAL REPORTS ON IMPORTS
1. Name of the importing country:  ....................................................................................
2. National Authority:  .......................................................................................................
A B C D E F G
Type of
equipment
Final
exporter
State
Number of
items
State of
origin
(if not
exporter)
State of
trans-
shipment
(if any)
Type of the
facility for
intended use
Specificities
of the
equipment
and
proposed
application
(optional)
(B) ANNUAL REPORT ON EXPORTS
1. Name of the exporting country:  ....................................................................................
2. National Authority:  .......................................................................................................
A B C D E F G
Type of
equipment
Final
importer
State
Number of
items
State of
origin
(if not
exporter)
State of
trans-
shipment
(if any)
Type of the
facility for
intended use
Specificities
of the
equipment
and
proposed
application
(optional)
